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This study explores the potential of applying Canadian experiences of brownfield 
redevelopment to Chinese practices by investigating three cases: City of Kitchener, City 
of Hamilton and City of Dalian. Data collection methods in this research contain 
interviews, on-site observations and document collection and review. 
 
Both Kitchener and Hamilton have achieved considerable success in redeveloping 
brownfields largely due to government’s persistent commitment, various financial 
incentives through CIP, effective marketing efforts, and good public-private partnerships. 
These factors are regarded as successful municipal experiences based on the assumption 
that all municipal programs/approaches should be considered “successful” if the 
redevelopment occurs as opposed to the no-action alternative. 
 
Brownfields in Dalian are being formed, purchased and redeveloped in a different way 
from their Canadian counterparts. Dalian confronts different challenges such as high 
environmental risks and lacking detailed historic site information and community support. 
After comparing Canadian and Chinese practices, the study concludes that the successful 
municipal experiences of Kitchener and Hamilton are meaningful references to Dalian’s 
practice. Especially, public-private partnerships, marketing of brownfield programs and 
brownfield coordinators can help Dalian to create community support, improve the 
regulatory environment, and reshape the City’s public image. The SSRA approach used 
in Canada to develop appropriate clean-up criteria for a brownfield site may also be a 
useful technique for Dalian. Nevertheless, upper levels of Chinese government must take 
hard efforts in rule-making, regulating and planning in order to maintain economic 
growth while at the same time ensuring public safety/health in brownfield redevelopment. 
In addition, the researcher raises several constructive suggestions to China’s brownfield 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Rambling around major cities in Canada, have you ever noticed some desolated murky 
grey buildings, which stand out offensively from elegant neighbors? The buildings have 
once experienced the gorgeous past of the industrialization in Canada now are abandoned 
and idled. They are so-called brownfields, the eyesores of cities and in some of the worst 
cases are also considered as a “cancer” (Greenberg, et al, 1998). Brownfields are 
abandoned industrial and commercial properties, “the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse 
of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant” (US EPA, 2002). In the past, residents tended to 
keep away from brownfields, fearing of their spectre of potentially “cancer-causing 
toxins” or “heavy-metal time bombs” (Wright, 1997). Investors were reluctant to 
redevelop brownfields, because of the associated uncertainty and risks of environmental 
liability, up-front cleanup cost, dim market prospects, community opposition, etc. 
However, in recent years things have begun to change. Brownfield redevelopment is now 
hotter than ever, and one of the main reasons is that such redevelopments are considered 
to be able to clean up blight, increase the tax base, create new jobs, and help curbing 
sprawl (De Sousa, 2000; NRTEE, 2003). To certain extent, all three government levels in 
Canada have carried out some types of brownfield incentives/programs to encourage and 
facilitate the process.  
 
Unlike Canada, brownfield redevelopment in China is a relatively new issue. It was not 
until late 1980s and early 1990s, ten years after the Reform and Opening-Up policy was 
adopted that a number of brownfield sites began to emerge in Chinese cities (Zhou and 
Wang, 2004). To a large extent, brownfields resulted from the process of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization. The unprecedented economic growth and industrial 
restructuring have produced many brownfield sites in urban areas (Cao and Guan, 2007). 
Remnants of abandoned or closed factories, which were the casualties of urban 
restructuring, were eyesores and would usually be rapidly torn down, redeveloped and 
converted into other uses (Zhu, 2003; Wu, 1997). This type of redevelopment must likely 
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tend to encounter some problems and challenges, yet little discussion has been provided 
in academic literature. In October, 2003, the central government put forward the 
scientific concept of development as a national development principle in the Third 
Plenary Session of the 16th CPC National Congress. This concept of development 
focuses on human-oriented, overall, coordinated and sustainable development, not just 
economic development. Guided by this concept, the issue of how to maintain economic 
growth while at the same time ensuring public safety/health in brownfield redevelopment 
becomes significant in China. This is especially the case in the City of Dalian which aims 
to be designated as an eco-city and pursues sustainable development. In-depth 
investigation in terms of how brownfield sites are being redeveloped in current China and 
the identification of associated challenges become very necessary. The successful 
brownfield redevelopment experiences learned from developed countries will be very 
meaningful for China’s practice. 
 
1.2 Research Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of the proposed research is to explore the potential application of brownfield 
redevelopment in Dalian, China, based on municipal experiences in Ontario, Canada. 
More specifically, this thesis explores how brownfield redevelopment can be improved in 
the City of Dalian, China, with a particular focus on the application of the successful 
Canadian brownfield redevelopment experiences as learned from the case studies of 
Kitchener and Hamilton. The following research objectives have been established: 
 
 To develop a comprehensive understanding of brownfield redevelopment in 
Canada: challenges and corresponding government policies; 
 
 To develop a comprehensive understanding of brownfield redevelopment in 
selected municipalities in Ontario --Hamilton and Kitchener, with respect to 
formation, current situation, challenges, municipal policies and results; in order to 
summarize “successful” municipal experiences; 
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 To develop a comprehensive understanding of brownfield redevelopment in 
Dalian, China: formation, current situation, challenges and corresponding policies; 
 
 To analyze the potential of applying Canadian brownfield redevelopment 
experiences to the City of Dalian, China. 
 
Underlying the purpose and research objectives of this research, the following research 
questions will be investigated: 
 
1. What is the current status of brownfield redevelopment in Canada? To what 
extent are brownfields being redeveloped in Canada? What have been the major 
barriers to brownfield redevelopment in Canada? What measures have Canadian 
governments carried out to overcome the barriers in recent years? 
 
2. What is the current status of brownfield redevelopment in the selected 
municipalities? What are the challenges of brownfield redevelopment in two cities? 
What approaches have the municipalities adopted to promote brownfield 
redevelopment? Are these approaches effective? What are the successful 
experiences in those municipalities that may be used to assist brownfield 
redevelopment in Dalian? 
 
3. What is the current status of brownfield redevelopment in Dalian? How are 
brownfields being purchased, sold and redeveloped? What are the problems and 
challenges of brownfield redevelopment? How has Dalian municipality responded 
to the challenges? 
 
4. What are the similarities and differences in brownfield redevelopment between 
two Canadian cities and Dalian? What are the factors leading to those differences? 
 
5. Is it possible to apply the “successful” brownfield redevelopment approaches in 
Canada to the municipality of Dalian? Do they make sense according to 
government officials, planners and other stakeholders in Dalian? What are the 
practical applications of Canadian experiences to Dalian’s practice? 
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By addressing these research questions, this research is intended to introduce successful 
Canadian experiences to improve the brownfield redevelopment in Dalian, China. The 
research is also intended, by extension, to fill a gap in the academic literature on the topic 
of brownfields in developing countries, especially in a socialist country like China. 
 
1.3 Research Site Introduction: the City of Dalian, China 
The City of Dalian is located on the east coast of Eurasia and the southern tip of Liaoning 
Province in northeast China, with the Yellow Sea on the east, Bohai Sea on the west, 
facing the Shandong peninsular across the sea on the south and backed up by the vast 
Northeast Plain on the north (See Figure 1.1). Dalian covers an area of 12574 square 
kilometers, consisting of 6 districts (Zhongshan, Xigang, Shahekou, Ganjingzi, Jinzhou 
and Lüshunkou), three surrounding smaller municipalities (Wa Fangdian City, Pu 
Landian City and Zhuanghe City) and one county (Changhai County) (See Figure 1.2). 
The central city of Dalian is made up of 4 districts, namely Zhongshan, Xigang, 
Shahekou and Ganjingzi (See Figure 1.3). The City of Dalian has a distinctive topology, 
with its important harbour on Yellow Sea and the Qianshan Mountain range of Chang 
Baishan Mountain system passing through the whole city from north to south. Dalian, as 
one of heavy industry cities, is port, trade and tourism base in China. It is one of the most 
open to outside world, the most vigor and the most developed city in northern part of 
China (Yu Di, 2003). 
 
According to the Dalian Statistics Yearbook 2006, the City of Dalian has a population of 
5.721 million. The GDP of 2006 was 256.97 billion Yuan, 16.5% higher than that of 
previous year (Dalian Statistics Bureau, 2006). Industry (both manufacturing and service 
sectors) is a major part of Dalian’s economy. In 2006, the secondary industry (including 
mining, manufacturing and construction) accounted for 47.8% of Dalian’s economy, 
while the tertiary industry (including transport, high-tech industry, insurance & banking, 
wholesales & retails, real estates and other service sectors) contributed 44.1% of Dalian’s 
economy (Dalian Statistical Bureau, 2006). The total amount of investment in relate to 
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environment protection is 0.52 billion Yuan, accounting for 3% of the government’s total 
investment in 2006 (Dalian Statistical Bureau, 2006).  
 
Figure 1.1: Location of the City of Dalian, China 
 
 Source: http://www.mapquest.com/, 2006 
 
Figure 1.2: Administrative Division of Dalian 
 
Source: http://www.dl.gov.cn/gov/dlgk/dlgk_xzqh.vm, the official website of the City of 
Dalian, 2006 
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Figure 1.3: The Central City of Dalian 
 
Source: http://www.io.dalian.gov.cn/intro/7674_10508.htm, Information Office of City of 
Dalian 
 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a literature review on 
brownfield redevelopment in both Canada and China, and emphasizes the gap of 
brownfield experiences in developing countries in current academic literature. Chapter 3 
describes the research methodology used to accomplish the research purpose and 
objectives. Chapter 4 reports the research findings in the case studies of Kitchener and 
Hamilton and summarizes the successful experiences learned from them. Chapter 5 
reports findings from the fieldwork conducted in the City of Dalian, China. Finally, 
Chapter 6 provides a comparative analysis of the case study both in Canada and China; 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Brownfields are real properties, “the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be 
complicated by the presence or potential presence of hazardous substances, or 
contaminants” (US EPA, 2002). Brownfields are typically located in urban areas many of 
which have easy access to transportation facilities and are fully serviced with municipal 
utilities. It has been widely accepted that brownfield redevelopment helps build 
sustainable communities by providing a wide range of environmental, social and 
economic benefits, including cleaning up blight, enhancing environmental quality (land, 
air, water), curbing sprawl, renewing urban core, and increasing economically viable 
business opportunities etc (NRTEE, 2003; Abdel-Aziz et al, 2004; Boles, 2003; De Sousa, 
2000). However, a large number of brownfields still exist and remain underused without 
any strong possibility of being redeveloped. Most urban areas face a combination of 
difficulties in redeveloping brownfields. Investors prefer to develop a greenfield site 
rather than a brownfield site because of the cost and risk involved. As a result, many 
municipalities in Canada have enacted some form of brownfield redevelopment 
approaches, usually an incentive program that encourages the cleanup and 
redevelopments.  
 
This chapter reviews the literature related to brownfields and their redevelopment, from 
the definition, the causes and extent of the problems, to the challenges of the 
redevelopment process, to the government actions underway and the recent academic 
progress within the past five years. Although brownfield redevelopment is quite a new 
issue in China and little research has been done on Chinese brownfield sites, this chapter 
will also review Chinese literature in order to establish a solid theoretical foundation for 
this thesis research on brownfields in the City of Dalian, China. 
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2.2 Definition and Formation of Brownfields 
2.2.1 Definition of Brownfields 
The term “brownfields” was first used in 1992 when a congressional field hearing was 
hosted by the Northeast Midwest Congressional Coalition in the U.S (Wikipedia, 2006). 
The recognition of brownfields is relatively new, and experts still can not agree on what a 
brownfield site is. There are many definitions, while the most widely quoted one is 
coined by the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) in 1997 as “abandoned, 
idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or 
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination” (De 
Sousa, 2003; Alker et al，2000；Boles, 2003). However, US EPA has revised this 
definition into “…real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be 
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant” in the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act in 
2002 (US EPA, 2002), because EPA considers that a brownfield should comprise all "real 
property", including residential property, as well as commercial and industrial properties. 
 
In Canada, the definition adopted by the National Round Table on the Environment and 
the Economy (NRTEE) is described as “an abandoned, vacant, derelict or underutilized 
commercial or industrial property where past actions have resulted in actual or perceived 
contamination and where there is an active potential for redevelopment” (NRTEE, 2003, 
p A-3). It should be noted that the term of “brownfields” is usually used in Canada and 
the United States, while other terms such as derelict land (used in the United Kingdom) 
and former industrial sites (used in many parts of Europe) have also been used 
alternatively to define abandoned or underused former industrial sites suspected of being 
contaminated (Alker et al，2000). 
 
In China, the term of “brownfields” is neither usually used in the Chinese academic 
literature nor in government documentation. Although there is a term called Deserted 
Land according to the Classification of Urban Land Use and Standards of Land Use 
Planning and Construction Land (Ministry of Construction P.R. China, 1991), it is not 
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defined as derelict former industrial or commercial land but “the land which is 
undeveloped and can not be developed because of various reasons, including bare rocks, 
gravel land, steep slope land, subsided land, Salinas, sandy land, wetland etc.” As a 
matter of fact, alternative terms like old industrial sites and contaminated land are widely 
used to define former industrial, commercial or residential land, which is considered or 
suspected contaminated by its past use (Wu, 1997; Zhang et al, 2003; Zhu, 2003; Fu and 
Jiang, 2005; Zhao and Yang, 2006). However, the usage of these terms is seldom linked 
to the characteristics of “vacant” or “derelict”. Former old industrial sites usually would 
be rapidly torn down, redeveloped and converted into other uses once they were vacant 
(Zhu, 2003; Wu, 1997). 
 
Because our research is based on both Canadian and Chinese experiences, a broader 
concept of “brownfields” is needed to cover the context in which it is used in both 
countries, regardless of the physical and site condition differences. “A conceptual 
definition of brownfileds must remain true to the key concerns of the environmental and 
economic development that gave rise to the term” (Yount, 2003, p32). It may be any 
property with actual or perceived contamination, no matter whether it is previous 
industrial, commercial or residential land. It may also be vacant, derelict, or contaminated. 
Therefore, the definition of “brownfields” coined by the US EPA in 2002 is adopted in 
this thesis to extend the lens of the research.  
 
Brownfield redevelopment can be better understood if compared with other related terms 
such as greenfield and contaminated sites. 
 
Brownfield and Greenfield 
“Greenfield” is “a vacant property with no actual or perceived contamination, usually 
located outside urban centres and without municipal services” (NRTEE, 2003, p A-3). It 
is used to describe the clean and undeveloped land often on the urban periphery, 
including agricultural fields, woodlands, metropolitan parks, greenways, ecological 
corridors, etc (Great Lakes Commission, 2008; De Sousa, 2002; Alker et al，2000). 
“Brownfield”, which is a semantic counterpart to “greenfield”, has usually been adopted 
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to describe lands on which industrial or commercial activities took place in the past. 
According to MMAH (2000a, p2), a brownfield site 
 may include buildings or may be vacant; 
 may be underused or abandoned; 
 are often located in prime locations where infrastructure, services and facilities 
already exist. 
 
Brownfields and Contaminated Sites 
The Canadian federal government defines a contaminated site as “one at which 
substances occur at concentrations (1) above background (normally occurring) levels and 
pose or are likely to pose an immediate or long term hazard to human health or the 
environment, or (2) exceeding levels specified in policies and regulations” (Government 
of Canada, 2000). A brownfield site includes not only real contaminated sites but also 
those perceived of being contaminated due to previous land-use activities such as waste 
disposal, manufacturing and petroleum-based activities (De Sousa, 2002). In other words, 
not all brownfields are actually contaminated. Moreover, another important difference 
between brownfields and contaminated sites is that the former holds excellent potential 
for being remediated and reused (NRTEE, 2003). 
 
2.2.2 Where Brownfields are Found 
Brownfields are found in former industrial, commercial and residential lots that contain 
functionally obsolete, underused, or abandoned buildings, either in urban areas or in rural 
communities (Simons, 1998; Greenberg et al, 2001). Usually, a brownfield site is found 
in established urban areas, which are already serviced with water, sewers, and roads. 
They are close to transportation facilities and urban amenities (Boles, 2003). They 
include decommissioned refineries, railway yards, old industrial waterfronts and 
riverbanks, crumbling warehouses, former retail gas stations, etc (NRTEE, 1998; MMAH, 
2000a; Boles, 2003). In small and rural communities, brownfields are also common 
which arise from chemical uses in agricultural activities and landfills (Boles, 2003). A 
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recent survey in the Ontario Rural Brownfield Project1 found that 68% of respondents in 
rural and small urban municipalities in Ontario indicated that there were brownfield sites 
in their community, many of which were abandoned gasoline stations, landfill sites and 
former industrial sites (i.e. foundry, paper mill) (MMAH, 2006 Summer). 
 
2.2.3 Historical Formation of Brownfields 
Brownfields, as a legacy of industrialization in Canada, by and large can be traced 
through the lens of economic history and the evolution of industrial locations. 
 
(1) At the Early Age of Industrialization: Industrial Concentration 
After the first steam engine whistled in the mid-nineteenth century, rapid industrialization 
occurred in Canada. At that time industrial establishments were most often located within 
the core areas of cities, along a major railroads or waterways (Filion and Mock, 1991). 
There are two main factors attributing to this pattern of location: transportation cost and 
agglomeration economy (Crafts & Mulatu, 2005). 
 
Transportation cost, including the cost of transporting raw and auxiliary materials as well 
as finished-products, was a prime force in the industrial location along transportation 
facilities. It by and large resulted from the characteristics of manufacturing in that era. On 
the one hand, the manufacturing process was largely dependent on the long distance 
transportation of heavy weight materials. Factories were powered by the consumption of 
fuel materials, such as coal and wood, because electricity had not been introduced at that 
time. Raw and auxiliary materials used by industry were either “localized materials” or 
“weight-losing materials” (Weber, 1971). On the other hand, the long hauls of coal or 
other bulk materials and commodities relied on waterwheels and steel rails, since the 
internal-combustion engine had not come into use and steam engines still dominated the 
transportation (Borchert, 1967). As a result, factories were located either close to urban 
markets or to centrally placed shipping nodes such as ports and railway depots, in order 
to minimize the transportation cost which took up a large proportion of total costs. 
                                                 
1 The project was conducted by the Ontario Centre for Environmental Technology Advancement (OCETA) and 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH) in 2006. 
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Agglomeration economy was another great concern accounting for urban industrial 
locations. In urban areas, factories enjoyed a wide range of external scale economies, 
such as the accessibility to a large labour pool, the economies of specialist suppliers, the 
development of technological knowledge spillover, as well as the sharing of public 
facilities and services (Bater and Walker, 1977). 
 
As industrial firms centered on urban areas, commercial and residential activities boomed. 
Millions of people, driven by the entrepreneur values, moved into cities from countryside. 
Consequently, cities experienced unprecedented expansion and growth. Cities during that 
period “might be best described as ‘cluttered’: smoky industrial districts, unpaved roads, 
mean and crowded working-class housing, half-finished suburbs” (Hodge, 2003, p 43). 
 
(2) After World War II, especially in the mid- to late- 1950s: Industrial 
Decentralization 
Industry tended to maintain its urban location until the mid- to late-1950s. After that, 
industrial firms became attracted to suburban areas or moved to other countries (Filion 
and Mock, 1991). Two aspects mainly contributed to the change: the impact of 
automobile and the steady decline of the industrial sector. 
 
Firstly, with the emergence of automobiles, the society had been changed into an auto-
dependent society (Boles, 2003; Hodge, 2003). Cars and trucks sharply reduced the 
transportation costs over rail and water, and lessened the dependence of urban 
manufacturers on ready access to central rail and harbour facilities (Gorman, 2003). 
Goods transportation was no longer dependent on waterways and railroads, but highways 
and expressways (Borchert, 1967). The infrastructures necessary to support automobiles 
had been established in a large scale since World War II. Downtown corporate interests 
and power brokers like Robert Moses, lobbied heavily for the governmental programme 
to bring highways into the heart of cities. New expressways radiating in all direction from 
central core were expected to bring workers, shoppers, middle-class to downtowns, to 
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reduce traffic congestion on city streets and to improve speed and accessibility. However, 
the downtown expressways ironically turned out to be two-way streets. They allowed 
businesses and residents to leave the city as well. Factory employees were able to drive to 
work, making it possible to live in the suburbs and to realize the American/Canadian 
dream of “single house + car”, while keeping a distance from crowded and polluted urban 
cores. As a result, the advantages of locating in urban areas tended to decline. Industrial 
firms began to settle in suburban sites close to major highways and expressways, and 
kept away from residential areas (Filion and Mock, 1991). 
 
Secondly, the steady decline of the industrial sector starting in the mid-twentieth century 
drove industrial firms to seek overseas markets, leaving a number of idle factories and 
manufacturing centers (Brachman, 2004). With the impact of rising labour costs and the 
shrinking domestic demand for durable consumer-goods, the national economy was 
increasingly driven by the service industry rather than traditional manufacturing (Filion 
and Mock, 1991). At that time, the labour costs in Canada became much higher than in 
developing countries because workers’ average annual earnings had been greatly 
increased. For example, the production workers’ average annual earnings grew from just 
$375 in 1905 to $2,953 only 50 years later (Meltz, 1983). More and more Canadians 
could afford cars, housing and clothing, etc, as the annual income was increased. People 
began to spend a growing proportion of dispensable income on education, tourism and 
health care. Thus, domestic demand for durable consumer-goods shrank.   
 
As industries gradually and steadily migrated from urban centres to the suburbs or 
overseas, cities were left with vast areas of under-utilized or vacant industrial sites 
(Gertler, 1995). Meanwhile, many commercial businesses in center cities also suffered. 
Shopping malls opened in the suburbs, and households moved there to follow jobs. 
Consequently, a large number of commercial establishments became functionally 
obsolete properties and were forced to close. Houses were also abandoned by owners. 
Those abandoned houses were usually demolished by the fiscally stressed cities, with the 
debris bulldozed into the basements and filled with one or two feet of dirt. This kind of 
irresponsible treatment brought forth residential brownfields (Simon, 1998, p30). 
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2.3 Why Bother to Redevelop Brownfields? 
2.3.1 Risks Associated with Contaminated Brownfields 
Once upon a time, brownfield sites were not a particular concern for either the public or 
the government. They were just derelict or shuttered old industrial sites, the eyesores of 
cities, waiting for new owners. It was not until 1970s when the environmental disasters 
such as Love Canal, Times Beach and Seveso broke out that governments finally began 
to be concerned about the remediation and redevelopment of contaminated brownfield 
sites (De Sousa, 2004; Gorman, 2003; Wright, 1997). Take the Love Canal incident for 
example. The Love Canal was once a canal that connected to the Niagara River five miles 
upstream of Niagara Falls. It had been used as a municipal and chemical dump site from 
1920 until 1953. In the spring of 1978, residents discovered that the dump site containing 
20,000 tons of chemical wastes was leaking into their neighbourhood. What’s worse, 
according to a health study conducted by scientists and community members (Gibbs, 
1998), 56 percent of children born between 1974 and 1978 suffered birth defects because 
of the hazardous-waste dump site nearby. The miscarriage rate increased 300 percent 
among women who had moved to Love Canal. Urinary-tract disease had also increased 
300 percent, with a great number of children being affected. As a reaction to the disaster 
over the Love Canal in New York, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund, was 
enacted in the United States in 1980, which authorized US EPA to investigate all the 
potentially contaminated sites, allocate responsibility for cleanup of soil, surface and 
groundwater, and force the PRPs (Potential Responsible Parties) to pay for the 
remediation (US EPA, 2006). 
 
The contaminated soil and groundwater in a brownfield can pose a wide variety of risks 
to the environment as well as the human being, depending on their contaminants, 
pathways and receptors (De Sousa, 2004). There are a number of pathways in which 
people, plants, wildlife and the natural environment can be exposed to a contaminant 
(MOE, 2007). Figure 2.1 illustrates some of the potential pathways a receptor may be 
exposed. Rao Kolluru identified the major types of health, environmental and public 
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welfare risks related to contaminated brownfields, which were categorized in Table 2.1. 
In 2006, Ellerbusch extended the scope of the overall brownfield-related risk, which was 
comprised of not only environmental/health aspects but economic, social, and political 
aspects (Ellerbusch, 2006). He examined the brownfield-related risks from many 
viewpoints: “that of property owner (loss of value); that of the purchaser (undiscovered 
contamination, liability for cleanup, latent health impacts); that of the lender (undisclosed 
liability for cleanup); that of the community (property decay, diminution of value, and 
redevelopment inconsistent with community wishes); that of local government officials 
(loss of tax revenue, potential for cleanup liability, and taxpayer reaction); and that of 
federal and state government officials (equity for citizens, fair assessment of liability)” 
(Ellerbusch, 2006, p570). 
 
Figure 2.1: Potential Exposure Pathways 
 








Table 2.1: Major Types of Health, Environmental and Public Welfare Risks Associated 
with Contaminated Brownfields 
Health Risks: high probability, low consequence, ongoing, chronic effects and 
consequences leading to 
•  incremental cancer rates (all types of cancer) 
•  non-carcinogenic hazards such as respiratory, neurological and reproductive      
maladies 
Ecological/Environmental Risks: subtle changes, complex interactions, long latency 
periods, and macro-impacts, effects and consequences on 
•  species abundance and diversity 
•  habitat and ecosystem quality 
•  natural resource integrity 
Public Welfare/Goodwill Risks: perceptions, property-value concerns and aesthetic 
effects leading to 
•  resource use restrictions (e.g., groundwater) 
• nuisance odors and visual degradation   
• decreased property values 
 
Source: Rao Kolluru, 1995. 
 
2.3.2 Sustainable Development Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment 
(1) Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development is broadly defined in Our Common Future (also known as The 
Brundtland Report) as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987). This concept became 
known world-wide in 1992 when the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) yielded one important document, Agenda 21. This document 
advocated that nations take specific actions to achieve a core goal of simultaneous 
consideration of social, economic, and environmental factors in decision-making (Eisen, 
1999). Since then, policy makers and planners in North America and Europe have been 
paying significantly more attention to measures designed to foster sustainable 
development and improve quality of life in urban areas. 
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(2) Smart Growth – Rethinking Planning and Development Strategies 
Guided by the concept of sustainability, communities are beginning to rethink the 
common planning method for accommodating growth, which is dominated by what some 
call “sprawl”. Sprawl is “a low density, single use, strip and leapfrog development” by 
consuming greenfields (Dieleman and Wegener, 2004, p316). Specifically, it is 
characterized by four dimensions: “a population that is widely dispersed in low density 
development; rigidly separated homes, shops, and workplaces; a network of roads 
marked by huge blocks and poor access; and a lack of well-defined, thriving activity 
centers, such as downtowns and town centers” (Ewing et al, 2002, p3). Such a resource-
consuming growth pattern imposes communities great economic, social and 
environmental impacts, which include city centre decline, increased reliance on the use of 
the private car, loss of open space, continuing damage to the natural environment, etc 
(Dieleman and Wegener, 2004; Ewing et al, 2002). Spurred by such a growing concern, 
smart growth becomes a critical strategy related to future development in urban planning. 
 
In contrast to sprawled development, “smart growth invests time, attention, and resources 
in restoring community and vitality to center cities and older suburbs” (Smart Growth 
Online, 2006). More specifically, the widely accepted smart growth principles are those 
promulgated by the smart growth network: 
• create a range of housing opportunities and choices; 
• create walkable neighborhoods; 
• encourage community and stakeholder collaboration; 
• foster distinctive, attractive places with a strong sense of place; 
• make development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-effective; 
• mix land uses; 
• preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas; 
• provide a variety of transportation choices; 
• strengthen and direct development towards existing communities; and 
• take advantage of compact building design. 
(Knaap & Talen, 2005, p108)  
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There are many development alternatives for smart growth, including brownfield 
redevelopment, restrictive growth policies, changing transportation patterns, promoting 
compact development designs on the metropolitan fringe, and so forth. However, 
brownfield redevelopment appears to be the smartest smart growth policy, when 
compared with other alternative smart growth policies in the U.S. (Greenberg et al, 2001). 
Brownfields and infill development are central to smart growth because “smart growth 
efforts in conjunction with brownfiled redevelopment help form sustainable 
communities” (Dorsey, 2003, p74). 
 
(3) Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment: Helping Build Sustainable Communities 
The benefits of brownfield redevelopment have been documented in many reports 
generated by a number of jurisdictions in Canada and abroad, such as the 1996 Report of 
the Greater Toronto Area Task Force (known as the Golden Report) and the 1998 
NRTEE Report, State of the Debate: Greening Canada’s Brownfield Sites. In the 
academic literature, significant benefits of brownfield redevelopment are consistently 
identified under the “sustainable development and smart growth theoretical rubrics” 
shown by Table 2.2 (De Sousa, 2004; Hara, 2004; Boles, 2003; Dorsey, 2003).  
 
Table 2.2: Sustainable Development Benefits from Brownfield Redevelopment 
Environmental 
Benefits 
 Reduction of development pressure on Greenfield sites2 
 Protection of public health and safety 
 Protection of groundwater resources 
 Protection and recycling of soil resources 
 Improved air quality 
 Restoration of former landscapes and creation of new ecological 
spaces 
Social Benefits  Renewal of urban cores and the quality of life in them 
 Elimination of negative social stigmas associated with affected 
communities 
                                                 
2 “Every hectare developed in a brownfield project can save an estimated minimum of 4.5 hectares of Greenfield land 
from being developed in an outlying area” (NRTEE, 2003, p3) 
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 Reduction of the fear of ill health, environmental deterioration 
and shrinking property values 
 Provision of public housing, parks and other public spaces 
Economic 
Benefits 
 Attraction of domestic and foreign investment 
 Restoration of the tax base, especially at the local level 
 Increased utilization of and reinvestment in existing municipal 
services 
 Development of remediation/decontamination technology 
 Creation of new jobs or retention of existing employment rates 
 Increased competitiveness for cities 
Source: De Sousa, 2004, pp 2-11 
 
2.4 Why Most Brownfields are still Brownfields? 
2.4.1 Status Quo of Brownfield Redevelopment in Canada 
Compared with the abundant scale of brownfield information currently available in the 
US and Europe, data on Canadian communities is very limited (De Sousa, 2003; Boles, 
2003). Although the federal government has introduced the Federal Contaminated Sites 
and Solid Waste Landfills Inventory Policy in 2000 which requires custodian 
departments and agencies to establish and maintain a database of contaminated sites for 
which they are responsible, there still does not exist a formal inventory of all brownfields 
in Canada because they include not only contaminated sites but also those suspected of 
being contaminated. Those listed on the government inventory are only federally owned 
contaminated sites, while many private owned brownfields have not been formally 
recognized. Therefore it is very difficult to look at the big picture and come up with the 
precise number, their total acreage and the percent of urban area in brownfields.  
 
According to a recent environmental labour market research conducted by Environmental 
Careers Organization (ECO) Canada, 64,046 properties were identified as potentially 
contaminated sites across the provinces and territories, of which nearly 40% were found 
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in Ontario (ECO Canada, 2007). The sources of potentially contaminated sites data come 
from gasoline stations, manufacturing industries, recycling industries, abandoned mines, 
and operating mines and quarries (ECO Canada, 2007). Generally speaking, it is usually 
estimated that the total number of brownfields across Canada ranges from 30,000 to 
100,000 (MMAH, 2007a; NRTEE, 2003). Several thousand brownfields have already 
been remediated and redeveloped, while many still remain undeveloped under 
conventional market forces. In order to better understand the status quo of brownfield 
redevelopment and its challenges, the author made the following table adapted from 








Table 2.3: Brownfield Tiers and Corresponding Redevelopment Prospects3
 Percentage 
in total sites Redevelopment Prospects Location Current Status 
Top 
Tier4
15 to 20 percent Very profitable, since the market 
values greatly exceed the costs 
of remediation 





60 to 70 percent High clean-up cost but potential 
for redevelopment, since the 
market value of the land itself, 
once cleaned up, may be slightly 
above or slightly below the 
combined cost of land and 
cleanup 
Established urban areas and 
along transportation 
corridors, where municipal 
services are readily available
Remain in limbo, with 
little prospect of 
remediation or reuse 
without strategic 




15 to 20 percent No market interest, since the 
cost of cleanup far exceeds the 
value of the land after 
remediation 
Rural or remote areas or in 
smaller urban areas 
Remained abandoned or 
idle without any realistic 
prospects for 
redevelopment in the 
foreseeable future 
Source: NRTEE, 2003, p5-6 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the tiers represent a conceptual approach for addressing the different needs of various types of brownfields, and are not 
strictly separated categories with defining criteria. 
4 The three general tiers are grouped by their prospects for redevelopment. 
2.4.2 Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment 
As Table 2.3 shows, 60 to 70 percent of brownfield in Canada remains in limbo while 15 
to 20 percent remains abandoned without prospective future. It reveals that brownfield 
redevelopment in Canada still has a long way to go. Brownfield redevelopment 
encountered a variety of legal, financial and community challenges, many of which are 
interrelated. Although each brownfield site comes up with its own specific set of 
challenges, the following seven barriers were commonly identified both in the academic 
literature as well as governmental documentation. 
 
1. Liability of Contamination 
The discovery of contamination on a brownfiled was once called as “the kiss of death” 
for a land acquisition or development project (McGregor, 2003). Concern about legal 
liability for contamination is considered perhaps the greatest impediment and the source 
of all the roadblocks to redevelopment (Abdel-Aziz et al, 2004; Burnham-Howard, 2004; 
Brachman, 2004; NRTEE, 2003; McGregor, 2003; McCarthy, 2002). Because 
brownfields are more or less related to environmental contamination, no matter whether it 
has been discovered or just being suspected, redeveloping brownfields is inevitably 
exposed to the liability of contamination, leading to a series of questions: “Who is liable 
for the clean-up of a site? How should liability be imposed/assigned? Should there be 
protection against liability after a site has been remediated to the standards of the day (i.e. 
future clause/prospective liability)?” (De Sousa, 2001, p139). Those questions affect all 
of the interest groups, including owners of brownfields, developers, lenders, 
municipalities and end-users. 
 
Abdel-Aziz and Chalifour (2004) find that four features of the liability regime in Canada 
have made participants engaging in brownfield redevelopment draw back. First, it is “no 
fault”. Liability may go beyond polluters. Any party involved in the redevelopment may 
be exposed to the liability in spite of fault, no matter whether it is a new owner or 
developer, Second, it is “joint and several”, which means that any party can be 
responsible for the entire site clean up, regardless of its contribution to the site’s pollution. 
Third, it is perpetual. “There is no effective time limit on liability for damages caused by, 
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or for regulatory obligations associated with, contamination” (Abdel-Aziz et al, 2004, p3-
4). Thus a former brownfield owner may still be exposed to liability once again in the 
future after the property was sold. Fourth, it is not quantifiable, because there does not 
exist a certain and potentially variable standard for assessing the liability. Without a 
credible assessment on the site, the potential liability of contamination is uncertain and 
unpredictable from a business perspective. On account of these features, developers may 




The marketability of a brownfield project has always been a great concern for developers 
and investors. There is usually a market aversion to brownfields (Pryce, 2003). On the 
one hand, the remediation and redevelopment of brownfields can be very expensive 
when compared with greenfields (Simons, 1998; De Sousa, 2001). Developers will need 
to spend considerable time and money to assess the site and determine exactly what 
contaminants, if any, it may contain, and then clean it up. All of this has to happen before 
development begins. Sometimes, the cost of cleaning, demolishing and preparing a 
brownfield property for redevelopment may be higher than the value of the land itself, 
and the subsequent costs of converting the existing buildings to modern needs may be 
more than new construction. Such upfront expenses make brownfields less attractive than 
greenfields (NRTEE, 2003). In Brantford, for instance, a fully serviced industrial site in 
the City’s new industrial parks sells for $55,000 to $60,000 an acre, while a typical 
brownfield site will cost from $150,000 to $300,000 per acre to remediate (Brantford 
Brownfields Committtee, 2002). On the other hand, the market return in the foreseeable 
future is uncertain, due to the lengthy predevelopment due diligence period and demand-
side factors (Brachman, 2004). Consumers’ preferences to brownfield redevelopment are 
subject to change, yet “developers simply follow consumers’ preferences” (Pryce, 2003, 
p566). Taking the two aspects into consideration, developers may tend to prefer a 
greenfield project to a brownfield project, and they may only be willing to redevelop 
those sites that have the greatest prospects for profitability (what is called Top Tier in 
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Table 2.3), while avoiding those less feasible ones (Middle Tier sites) and those seriously 
contaminated ones (Bottom Tier sites) (Mak, 2000). 
 
3. Lack of Financing 
From the lenders’ perspective, they are unwilling to finance brownfield redevelopment. 
Lenders are worried about the lack of liquidity when holding a brownfield as security, 
and fear the impaired collateral value of the site if it is found to be contaminated (NRTEE, 
2003; McCarthy, 2002). Some lenders may also be afraid of being potentially exposed to 
the liability of contamination when they are vested with a brownfield property through 
loan default (NRTEE, 2003). In combination with joint and several liability, a lender may 
potentially become liable for the whole cost of a claim. Property development 
information asymmetries on the capital market may have also inhibited lenders. In terms 
of asymmetric information (i.e. more information available to one party than another), 
lenders/investors are usually less well informed than developers about the investment 
risks, while more risky developers tend to conceal adverse information about a potential 
development project (Pryce, 2003).As a result, it is found that “brownfield redevelopment 
is increasingly driven by the availability of development grants and subsidies” (Adams et 
al, 2000, p135). 
 
4. Uncertain Clean-up Criteria 
Brownfield redevelopment usually begins with an environmental assessment to identify 
contaminants, followed by remediation to meet the requirements of federal and provincial 
environment laws and regulations. Generic criteria and site-specific risk assessment 
(SSRA) criteria are the two types of criteria currently being used internationally for 
evaluating the hazards posed by contaminants and formulating clean-up goals that protect 
public health and safety (De Sousa, 2001). Generic criteria are namely standardized 
cleanup criteria developed by governments for soil and groundwater contaminants. They 
can be arranged into broad categories based on land-use, soil texture, depth of 
contaminant and groundwater use. Worst-case scenarios for each category are used in 
order to be protective of all receptors, making the generic criteria to be the most stringent 
criteria in use (Phimister, 2004). Unlike generic criteria, SSRA criteria are developed 
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based on the actual conditions at a site (such as the physical characteristics and the 
anticipated use of the land) instead of a “worst case” set of assumptions, as is the case 
with generic criteria. 
 
In Canada, most provincial and municipal approval processes require brownfields to be 
remediated to meet a generic set of criteria (Phimister, 2004; NRTEE, 2003). However, 
this set of generic criteria may be too costly to be met or does not fit into the specific 
conditions of the site. Furthermore, each provincial government takes charge of 
developing their own generic criteria and SSRA approaches (De Sousa, 2001). Therefore, 
various levels of government in Canada may require different clean-up criteria. Some 
municipalities may even set up additional requirements for environmental approvals in 
case of their potential exposure to the legal liability (NRTEE, 2003). For instance, clean-
up criteria beyond the provincial standards may be required as the condition for 
redevelopment grant from municipalities. Thus, potential developers may face inflexible 
and inconsistent requirements for assessing risks on brownfields. 
 
5. Administrative Burden and Complexity 
In Canada, participants in brownfield redevelopment encounter various regulatory 
requirements and legislated processes established by federal, provincial and municipal 
governments (NRTEE, 2003). Stakeholders may need to spend substantial time and 
money in complying with these regulatory requirements for rezoning, administrative 
reviews, approvals and entitlements of the project. Some of the regulations may still be 
overlapping or inconsistent to each other, although efforts have been taken out to 
harmonize the requirements of different levels of governments in some areas (such as 
environmental assessment) (NRTEE, 2003; De Sousa, 2001).  
 
Besides, brownfield projects may be slowed down because of multiple departments and 
organizational layers of responsibilities and disciplines within governments (Abdel-Aziz 
et al, 2004; NRTEE, 2003). For instance, a brownfield project may need review and 
approval from five or six departments. Some of the responsibilities across departments 
may be overlapped. If developers go through them one by one, the development might be 
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prolonged and developers may even miss their best business chance at times. With the 
red tape and bureaucracy in the regulatory systems, brownfield redevelopment becomes 
complicated, uncertain and variable. 
 
6. Lack of Information 
“The lack of a systematic, nation-wide approach to collecting, storing and disseminating 
brownfield information in Canada” is also considered to be an obstacle (De Sousa, 2001; 
Mak, 2000). Information (such as the quantity, distribution, coverage of urban land, the 
extent/nature of contamination and other related intelligence) is of great value to both the 
private and public sector. For developers, sufficient brownfield information will reduce 
the uncertainty in the redevelopment, leading to better investment decision-making, while 
for governments, it helps establishing better redevelopment policies and strategies (Mak, 
2000). However, existing information on brownfields in Canada is scarce. There is no 
national database keeping tack of all the brownfields in Canada. The only nation-wide 
database covers federal-owned contaminated sites, excluding those privately owned. 
 
7. Market Conditions 
According to a USCM (US Conference of Mayors) survey in 2003, market conditions—
including site location, site size and configuration, building characteristics, construction 
cost, and access to a skilled labor force—are discovered to be an important impediment 
(Wernstedt et al, 2004). Take brownfields located in central city for example. Although 
they enjoy the proximity to business downtown and to a high concentration of activity, 
the lack of highway or road access has made their location less attractive and ideal, 
because a vast majority of highways are in the suburbs (Simons, 1998). In Brantford, 
brownfields are less competitive than greenfields in attracting new investments. They are 
usually located in the old urban areas and close to or within residential neighourhoods 
which lack access to the highway. This kind of location places brownfields at a 
disadvantage, since those new industrial parks in greenfields are very close to the 
Highway 403 (Branford Brownfield Committee, 2002). 
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2.5 Removing Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment 
2.5.1 Public Sector Action Underway 
In recent year, real progress has been made in Canada through wide-ranging efforts in 
overcoming the aforementioned barriers. 
 
1. Legislative Amendments Regarding Liability of Contamination 
Canadian governments (from provincial to federal level) have been very active in 
amending legislation to overcome some of the impediments related to the legal liability. 
In Quebec, legislation amendment to the Environmental Quality Act and other legislative 
provisions was passed in June 2002. These changes clarify the roles and responsibilities 
of different participants in brownfield projects and provide some protection from 
regulatory liability5. 
 
In Ontario, Brownfields Statute Law Amendment Act 2001 (“Brownfields Act”) which 
was jointly developed by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and the Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH) received Royal Assent in November 2001. 
Brownfields Act includes important legislative amendments in terms of Ontario’s key 
environmental statutes, the Environmental Protection Act (the "EPA"), the Ontario Water 
Resources Act (the "OWRA"), and the Pesticide Act (PA) (Van Rensburg, 2001). “It 
clarifies the broad reach of the order provisions6 in the three Acts, setting out a number of 
actions municipalities and secured lenders may take in relation to property and providing 
that just by virtue of taking such action, such persons or their representatives will not be 
considered an occupant or in charge, management or control of property under the order 
provisions in the three Acts” (Flagal, 2004, p12-2). Besides, Brownfields Act attempts to 
resolve the perpetual environmental liability problem by establishing a statutory process 
to address and resolve historical site contamination issues (Flagal, 2004).  
 
                                                 
5 “Regulatory liability is a legal obligation laid out by a statute that creates a regulatory offence. Regulatory offences 
are usually considered more minor than criminal offences, since they are only intended to secure the effective 
regulation of conduct in the interest of the community” (NRTEE, 2003, pA-3) 
6 Under the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.E.19, any person had ever owned, occupied or had charge, 
management or control of contaminated land, they potentially could be named in an order by the Director the authority. 
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New protection from environmental liability in the new Part XV.1 of the EPA7 and new 
cleanup standards established in the Records of Site Condition Regulation 8  
(O.Reg.153/04) were brought into force in Ontario as of October 1, 2004. Owners, 
occupants and others involved in a property (“charge, management or control”) receive 
limited protection from environmental orders that would require further cleanup of 
historic contaminants remaining on the site, after a record of site condition (RSC) is filed 
in the Brownfield Environmental Site Registry9 in accordance with section 168.4 in Part 
XV.1 of the EPA and with other things in the certified statements of the “Qualified 
Person” and the “Owner”. In order to receive a filed RSC, a brownfield property must 
have been properly assessed and shown to meet the appropriate soil, groundwater and 
sediment standards for the anticipated use set in the Records of Site Condition Regulation 
(O.Reg.153/04).  
 
On May 17, 2007, significant brownfield legislative reforms introduced as part of the 
2007 Budget Bill were passed by the Ontario legislature. The new legislation not only 
protects non-polluting parties from provincial cleanup orders in cases where 
contamination from a property has moved off-site below relevant standards after the 
certification date of RSC, but also protects municipalities in Ontario from civil lawsuits 
arising from inaccuracies in filed cleanup documentation (MMAH, 2007a). Voluntary 
companies interested in helping the province remediate abandoned mining sites are also 
protected from provincial cleanup orders provided that they are not the cause of 
contamination according to the new legislation.  
 
As to the federal government, the Treasury Board issued the Contaminated Sites 
Management Policy and the Policy accounting for Costs and Liabilities Related to 
Contaminated Sites in 2002, both of which requires all federal departments and agencies 
(with a few exceptions) to account for and report as liabilities of federally owned 
contaminated sites (Abdel-Aziz et al, 2004). 
                                                 
7  http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90e19_e.htm#BK202
8 http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/regs/english/2004/elaws_src_regs_r04153_e.htm#BK24
9 The primary purpose of the registry is: (1) to allow persons to file RSCs; (2) to facilitate public access to information 
contained in RSCs. Please refer to http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/environet/BESR/index.htm for details. 
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2. Financial Incentives 
In the past, the federal and provincial governments in Canada seldom established funding 
inventive program for brownfield redevelopment. Quebec was the only province that had 
a funding incentive program, i.e. the Revi-Sols10  program which provided grants for 
communities to cover the study costs leading to rehabilitation, as well as the actual costs 
of remediation (NRTEE, 2003). 
 
In recent years, especially since the national brownfield redevelopment strategy was 
developed by NRTEE in 2003, the federal government has begun to take multiple 
financial tools into consideration so as to promote brownfield redevelopment, including 
implementing tax system changes, removing liens&tax arrears, and providing mortgage 
guarantees, loans and grants. For instance, the Government of Canada endowed the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) with $125-million to establish and manage 
the Green Municipal Fund 11  (GMF) in 2000. The 2005 federal budget added $300 
million to GMF, half of which was dedicated to brownfield redevelopment. In March 
2005, the NRTEE prepared a proposal, Greening Canada’s Brownfields: A National 
Framework for Encouraging Redevelopment of Qualifying Brownfield through Removal 
of Crown Liens and Tax Arrears, to assist the Government of Canada and the 
provincial/municipal governments interested in redeveloping brownfields. 
                                                
  
In addition to the federal government, provincial governments in Canada have also 
introduced some financial tools and legislation to provide financial support in brownfield 
redevelopment. In Newfoundland and Labrador 12 , the 2006 provincial budget has 
committed $1 million for the continued cleanup of selected contaminated sites. In Ontario, 
there is a commonly known “prohibition against bonusing rule” which prohibits 
 
10 According to the Union of Municipalities of Quebec, the Quebec government has invested $75 million into the 
program Revi-Sols between 1998 and 2006. In 2007, the Revi-Sols program was replaced by “ClimatSol”, a new 
governmental program to foster and subsidize rehabilitation of contaminated land in Quebec. ClimatSol has a budget of 
$50 million over 3 years with a maximum contribution of $1 million per project. From http://www.radio-
canada.ca/nouvelles/Politique/2007/05/10/010-ClimatSol.shtml
11 The GMF operates at arms-length from the federal government, and supports municipal governments, and their 
partners, to improve the quality of air, water and soil, and reduce greenhouse gas emission. Further information 
regarding to GMF can be found at http://www.sustainablecommunities.fcm.ca/GMF/
12 Newfoundland & Labrador, 2006. Budget Highlights, The Right Choices: Momentum for Growth and Prosperity, 
from http://www.budget.gov.nl.ca/budget2006/highlights.htm (November 24, 2007) 
 29
municipalities from directly or indirectly assisting any manufacturing business or other 
industrial or commercial enterprise through the granting of bonuses under Section 106(1) 
and (2) of the Municipal Act (Piccioni, 2005). The Brownfields Act in 2001 amended the 
Municipal Act and allowed municipalities to offer property owners municipal tax relief 
where they were attempting to revitalize brownfield areas (Abdel-Aziz et al, 2004). The 
Ministry of Finance established the Brownfield Financial Tax Incentive Program 13  
(BFTIP) which allowed Ontario municipalities to provide landowners property tax 
assistance as an incentive for environmental rehabilitation. Also, the Brownfields Act 
amended the Planning Act to allow municipalities more flexibility to offer grants or loans 
for brownfield redevelopment through community improvement plan14 (CIP). According 
to Section 28 of Planning Act, the CIP is designated for a community improvement 
project area15 and must be approved by MMAH (Piccioni, 2005). The recent Municipal 
Statute Law Amendment Act 2006 (Bill 130) allows municipalities in Ontario to assume 
ownership of a property that has failed a tax sale free of provincial Crown liens16. 
 
Intergovernmental initiatives conducted by both the federal and provincial governments 
are also being established in recent years. In October 2006, the government of Canada 
and the government of Ontario announced the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing 
Program which involved a commitment of $301 million each from the federal and 
provincial governments to build affordable housing for 20,000 households in Ontario 
especially on cleaned up brownfield sites so as to address the lack of affordable housing 
in older urban areas in Ontario17. In 2007 almost 400 units under the Canada-Ontario 
Affordable Housing Program were allocated on former brownfield sites (MMAH, 2007b). 
 
3. Updating Environmental Standards 
                                                 
13 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing started to administer the Brownfield Financial Tax Incentive Program in 
July 2007 instead of Ministry of Finance. 
14 Section 28(1) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.13, defines community improvement plan as plan for the 
community improvement of a community improvement project area. 
15 Section 28(1) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.13, defines community improvement project area as “a 
municipality or an area within a municipality, the community improvement of which in the opinion of the council is 
desirable because of age, dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement, unsuitability of buildings or for any other 
environmental, social or community economic development reason”. 
16 From http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page184.aspx (December. 10, 2007) 
17 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH) 2006. Affordable Housing Targeted to Brownfield. From 
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page569.aspx (December 10, 2007) 
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The Site Condition Standards (Soil, Groundwater) currently being used at brownfields in 
Ontario is the “Soil and Ground Water and Sediment Standards for Use Under Part XV.1 
of the Environmental Protection Act18” published by MOE on March 9, 2004. Most of 
these generic standards can be dated back to between 1985 and 1996, and they have not 
been updated ever since 1996. In consideration of advances in knowledge (including 
improvements in procedures for developing criteria) and feedback from external 
stakeholders and internal MOE staff over the past decade, MOE regarded it necessary to 
review and update the Site Condition Standards with current science (MOE, 2007). In 
addition, other issues related to current generic criteria are expected to be addressed by 
virtue of the update, such as inequitable background standards for some land uses, the use 
of outdated toxicity data and the lack of transparency, etc.  
 
A proposed change to brownfield soil and groundwater standards was released in spring 
2006, after concerted effort made by MOE staff and stakeholders. On March 23, 2007, 
MOE initiated a 60-day public consultation for public review and comments on the 
proposal 19 . An external expert peer review of the methodology used to create the 
proposed standards was also carried out by MOE. Currently MOE continues to meet with 
stakeholders and technical experts to discuss individual issues regarding the 
modifications of the proposal (Leus, 2007). 
 
4. Reforming Planning Approval Process 
The government of Ontario has a strong commitment in reforming Ontario’s land-use 
planning system to make it more accountable, effective and transparent. As part of the 
OMB/Planning reform initiative, a new land use planning tool Development Permit 
System (DPS) became available to all municipalities in Ontario through the establishment 
of Ontario Regulation 608/06 Development Permits 20  under the Planning Act as of 
January 2007. The DPS was aimed to “help municipalities promote development, 
enhance environmental protection and facilitate key priorities of Ontarians such as 
community building, brownfield redevelopment, greenspace preservation and 
                                                 
18 http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page1513.aspx  
19 http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2007/TableofStandards.pdf  
20 http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_060608_e.htm#BK1  
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environmental protection” (MMAH, 2007d). The DPS combines three planning approval 
processes (the zoning, site plan and minor variance) into one application/approval process. 
Review timelines for the consideration of applications for development permits are 
shortened into 45 days. In addition, the DPS enables municipalities to incorporate more 
flexibility in the planning approval process by enabling municipalities to specify 
minimum and maximum development standards, to identify permitted and discretionary 
uses, and by allowing them to impose a range of conditions of planning approvals. 
Therefore, brownfield developers’ money and time are saved by the DPS which provides 
more certainty and flexibility in the planning process. 
 
2.5.2 Academic Literature Progress 
Up to date, much of the scholarly research on ways to stimulate redevelopment activities 
has concentrated on community participation, market-based incentives, legislation on 
environmental contamination, and transportation planning. 
 
1. Community Participation 
Community participation, which is also called Public Involvement (Greenberg & Lewis, 
2000), was once viewed as an impediment that added time and effort to brownfield reuse 
in the past (Chess & Purcell, 1999). Community groups have different priorities from 
local officials, and it is difficult to reach an accommodation (Greenberg & Lewis, 2000). 
Besides, it may take a great effort to channel neighbour’s energy into supporting 
brownfield redevelopment projects, owing to inefficient communication (Kaminstein, 
1996) and the public’s restricted knowledge towards brownfields (Zarcadoolas, 2001). 
However, according to McCarthy (2002, p294), “early involvement of the community 
can help foster understanding and consensus, and prevent protests and litigation.” For 
example, residents can provide ideas about the future use of brownfields that meet the 
needs of the community, and help developers and local governments to prevent the 
democratic process from ignoring, quieting, or suppressing dissent. Moreover, Ellerbusch 
et al have also identified community involvement as an important factor in successful 
redevelopment of contaminated land, and they found that “technical support could serve 
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as a useful framework for developing trustful and long-term relationships with 
communities” (Ellerbusch et al, 2006, p515-516). 
 
2. Market-based Incentives 
In Canada and the US, it is usually considered that government intervention and financial 
support is a “must” in urban renewal. However, De Sousa (2002, p307) discovered that 
“allowing market forces to dictate the course and outcome of brownfield redevelopment 
seems to be a more productive way”. His discovery was based on the success of 
brownfield redevelopment since mid-1990s in Toronto, where there was no senior 
government support and brownfield redevelopment was mainly dependent on the 
invisible hands of pure market forces.  
 
Similar findings occurred in Alberini et al’s survey of real estate developers. They 
explored that “subsidies may be a relatively inefficient way of soliciting cleanup and 
redevelopment at locales where virtually all prospective developers have not engaged in 
brownfield projects before” (Alberini et al, 2005, p349). Also, Howland (2003, p367) 
found that public subsidy was needed only “when a project called for a transfer from 
contaminated industrial to residential use, faced weak market demand for the final project, 
and contended with a complicated cleanup”.  
 
3. Legislation on Environmental Contamination 
Environmental contamination has always been a great concern in brownfield 
redevelopment, and governments have taken out various efforts to pass brownfield 
legislation to limit the liability of innocent property redevelopers. However, recent works 
has identified that there is not a systematical relationship between pollution and the 
vacancy and underuse of browfields, suggesting that environmental contamination may 
not be as significant a constraint to brownfield redevelopment as the prevailing sentiment 
assumed before (Schoenbaum, 2002; Wernstedt et al, 2004). Environmental remediation 
should not be the focus of brownfield redevelopment, and “the successful redevelopment 




4. Transportation Planning 
It was not until recently that people began to realize the importance of integrating 
brownfield redevelopment with transportation planning, because people tended to neglect 
market conditions as an important impediment to redevelopment. However, Johnson et al 
(2002) discovered that successful redevelopment of brownfields partly depended upon 
the successful integration of land use and transportation planning, based on a case study 
in the Philadelphia region. Furthermore, Amekudzi et al (2004) has also explored that the 
transportation infrastructure situation on a brownfiled site could either block or spur the 
redevelopment. Their research suggested that governments could proactively use 
transportation to encourage the redevelopment of brownfields “by locating regional or 
corridor scale improvements and renewing obsolete transportation infrastructure to 
improve the accessibility of brownfield corridors to major centers of economic 
activity…” (Amekudzi et al, 2004, p211). 
 
2.6 Brownfield Redevelopment in China 
2.6.1 Formation of Chinese Brownfields 
The question of how the brownfields emerged in China can also be similarly considered 
through the evolution of industrial location. 
 
(1) From 1950s to 1980s: Industrial Concentration 
Like the early age of industrialization in most developed countries, industry in China also 
most often concentrated on urban cores, close to major transportation facilities, since 
1949 when the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C) was proclaimed. Aside from the two 
factors listed in Section 2.2.3 – transportation cost and agglomeration economy, two 
additional factors have accelerated the process of industrial concentration in urban areas: 
the misconception in urban planning about building the “new socialist city” (Wu, 1997), 
and the free land use system (Zhou and Wang, 2004). 
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At the early days of P.R. C’s establishment, people held a very simple idea about building 
the “new socialist city” in pursuit of socialism. The new socialist cities should be cities of 
production, rather than the “capitalist” cities in other industrializing countries – that is, 
“cities geared to consumption” (Friedmann, 2005, p15). The tall factory-built metal 
chimneys towering over the city and the sirens from the factories sounding to wake the 
workers to come to work were the ideal picture of the “new socialist city” in the minds of 
many people who had just won the liberation and freedom (Yao and Shuai, 1995). This 
kind of simple idea had dominated planning in most cities, and was strengthened during 
the Big Leap Forward Campaign in 1950’s and the ten-year Cultural Revolution. When 
the municipality drafted the five-year plan, a high priority was put in the industrial 
development (Wu, 1997). Plans were designed to facilitate “socialist development and 
industrialization” (Friedmann, 2005). Consequently, a large number of factories were 
constructed within the urban area, and cities were transformed into engines of production.  
 
The free land use system during 1954 and 1988 was another important factor accounting 
for the industrial concentration in urban areas (Zhou and Wang, 2004). According to the 
Constitution at that time, all the land in China was declared to be the property of the State, 
and the land use right of any given parcel was transferred by the local government 
through administrative approvals. Once the land had been transferred legally, individual 
entity was not required to pay the rent (Cong, 2001). In other words, all the land in China 
was free to use unless it had not been approved by the government. According to Yu 
(1990), the free land use system was an “imbalanced mechanism of interests”, and it 
resulted in a trend of micro-entities (such as persons or enterprises) migrating to the 
urban areas consistently because the migration cost was far less than the benefit they 
obtained from the new location. In fact, many industrial firms had chosen to locate in the 
central city during the period since they not only enjoyed the benefits from transportation 
cost and agglomeration economy, but also the free urban land use. 
 
Due to the four factors (transportation cost, agglomeration economy, the misconception 
in planning about building the “new socialist city” and the free land use system), a lot of 
industrial firms were located in urban areas, along rivers and trails. For instance, in the 
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Yangtze Delta, in some cases, people might find “Layer Cake” cities with “chemical 
industries surrounding the urban edge, electroplating factories everywhere, printing and 
dyeing firms blossoming in the urban cores” (Yao and Shuai, 1995, p147).  
 
(2) From 1990s onward, especially in the mid-1990s: Industrial Relocation and 
Decentralization 
Since 1990s, ten years after the Reform and Opening-Up policy was adopted in China, 
many industrial firms originally located in urban cores are being relocated to the new 
industrial parks in the suburb or being compelled to shut down because of their failure to 
meet national environmental standards. There are two main aspects contributing to the 
large scale of industrial relocation across China: economic and environmental concerns.  
 
Firstly, industries can improve their economic performance through the relocation (Wu, 
1997). They can enlarge their production scale by building a larger factory in the suburb. 
Additionally, industries can take advantage of the proceeds they obtain from the transfer 
of land use right to bring in innovative technology and equipments, which is quite an 
advisable choice for many state-owned enterprises with poor economic performance. It 
should be noted that the National People’s Congress has amended the constitutional 
provision with respect to urban land use in April, 1988. This provision has reformed the 
free land use right system into the system of compensated use of land, and allows the 
transaction of land use right in the market, while the state ownership of all the land in 
China remains unchanged (Wang, 2005). Thereafter, industries can get a certain amount 
of money when they sell the land use right of a given parcel where the factories are 
formerly located. Sometimes the proceeds not only cover the relocation cost in the suburb 
but allow for further expansion and renovation (Shin, 2004). 
 
Secondly, industries’ migration to the new industrial parks outside the urban center helps 
control the environmental pollution and improves the quality of life within the urban 
areas (Zhou and Wang, 2004; Wu, 1997). As mentioned earlier, many industrial 
enterprises were established very early in the 1950’s, and most of them were industries 
consuming a large amount of energy and resources, such as textile mills, chemical plants, 
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machinery factories, and printing & dyeing firms. They generated a lot of pollution in 
cities, including wastewater, exhaust air and noise. Little attention was paid to the 
pollution control during the period of planned-economy (Zhou and Wang, 2004; Wu, 
1997; Edmonds, 1998). Since 1990s when the “socialist market economy” was already 
mature, the objectives of urban planning broke significantly with the earlier rhetoric of 
facilitating industrialization ex parte (Friedmann, 2005). The planning goals of cities 
have been converted into providing “adequate public facilities, improving the living 
environment, and promoting a sustainable development” (Friedmann, 2005, p113). 
Chinese governments are paying more and more attention to environmental pollution and 
fostering sustainable cities. The industrial relocation has thus been carried out extensively 
to control the pollution in cities.  
 
As the old industrial enterprises gradually moved out of the urban cores or shut down 
because of failure to meet national environmental standards or failure in the market 
competition, those former industrial sites began to emerge as “brownfields” in China. 
 
2.6.2 Current Situation of Brownfield Redevelopment in China 
Brownfields, called “old industrial sites” or “contaminated land” in Chinese 
documentation and academic literature, is relatively a new concept. In fact, there is no up 
to date research recording the exact number of brownfields in China and where they are 
located, by virtue of the lack of recognition of the term. Literature focusing on the old 
industrial sites or contaminated land also fails to provide credible estimates of the number 
and their distribution. Therefore it is impossible here to sort out the big picture of 
brownfields in China. A recent preliminary survey21 of contaminated rural land in China 
by the State Environmental Protection Administration of China (SEPAC) revealed that 
one tenth of the arable land in China had been contaminated, of which two million mu22 
were landfills. However, this information is incomplete, as the survey only focused on 
contaminated land in rural and agricultural sites while overlooking contaminated 
                                                 
21 The result of this preliminary survey was revealed by Mr. Zhou Shengxian, the director of the State Environmental 
Protection Administration of China, in a national video conference about the current condition of contaminated land in 
China on July 18th, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/environment/2006-07/18/content_4849642.htm
22 Mu, a Chinese unit of area, one mu equals to one fifteenth of a hectare. 
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brownfields in the urban area. A more formal and comprehensive survey on all the land 
(both rural and urban) with respect to its current condition of contamination was carried 
out from July, 2006 to December, 2007, which was a part of the one billion-Yuan three-
year (2005-2008) national project, The Survey on the Current Condition of National Land 
and the Protection & Remediation of Its Contamination, conducted by SEPAC and the 
Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C.. Results from this survey are still under 
investigation by the SEPAC in 2008.  
 
According to Wu (1997), the redevelopment of old industrial sites in Chinese cities 
presented three main features. First, the old industrial sites were usually redeveloped into 
the land uses for the service industry, including commercial/residential use, as well as 
green space and infrastructure. This type of transformation was designated to improve the 
urban environment and enhance the quality of life. Second, the redevelopment modes 
usually adopted ways of demolishing the old industrial buildings and starting over with 
new high-rises, while preserving the old property and converting it into other uses in situ 
was not commonly adopted. Although the former development mode provided a 
relatively higher floor area ratio and allowed more covered areas to meet the soaring 
demand for urban space, it might ignore the intangible value in the historic qualities of 
the old industrial buildings which could not be easily replicated with a new construction, 
such as “unique dimension and features, evidence of work and a sense of industrial 
history” (Wu, 1997, p53). As to the third feature, Wu (1997) indicated that the transfer 
of land use right in the old industrial sites appeared some sort of disorder and blindness, 
owing to the immature land market. According to the new land use policy amended in 
1988, any entity which wanted to sell the land use right on a particular parcel of land 
should acquire the approval from the local municipality. Without approval, the land use 
right was not allowed to be transacted in the market. However, there were always some 
companies selling the land use right illegally without the approval from the local 
government. As well, the lack of an adequate monitoring system of the land market partly 
results in the disorder and blindness. It is a pity that Wu (1997) has not intensively 
discussed the challenges in the redevelopment of old industrial sites in his article. In-
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depth details about how the Chinese brownfields are being redeveloped and how the 
contamination is being remediated at present still require further research.  
 
2.7 Deficiency of Current Study in Brownfield Redevelopment 
By and large, the literature examining the redevelopment of brownfields can be grouped 
into two categories:  
 
1. General overview of brownfield redevelopment, including discussion of definition, 
formation, benefits, barriers and future trends (Simons, 1998; Eisen, 1999; McCarthy, 
2002; De Sousa, 2001; Greenberg et al, 2001; NRTEE 2003; Dorsey, 2003; Gorman, 
2003; Yount, 2003; Wernstedt et al, 2004; De Sousa, 2004);  
2. Discussion on a specific aspect of brownfield redevelopment, including 
environmental assessment (Harrison and Davies, 2002; Nijkamp et al, 2002; Tam & 
Byer, 2004; Lesage et al, 2007; Maurice et al, 2007), risk management (Tedd et al, 
2001), community and public involvement (Kaminstein, 1996; Greenberg & Lewis, 
2000; Zarcadoolas, 2001; Ellerbusch et al, 2006), financial and insurance aspects 
(Adams et al, 2000; Singer, 2002; Pryce, 2003; Howland, 2003), regulatory incentives 
(Swickard, 2008), governmental policies (Schoenbaum, 2002; Boles, 2003; 
Amekudzi et al, 2004; De Sousa, 2006), lessons from the field (Meyer and Lyons, 
2000; Wernstedt et al, 2003; Alberini et al, 2005; Levi and Kocher, 2006), etc. 
 
Within the literature, articles examining the redevelopment of contaminated lands in 
Canada are extremely limited. Much of the most recent literature is focused on 
experiences in USA or UK (Gute and Taylor, 2006; Levi and Kocher, 2006; Howland, 
2007; Maurice et al, 2007; Watson, 2007; Dixon, 2008). In addition, the academic 
literature related to Canadian brownfields in recent years concentrates on governmental 
policies, while literature on private sectors’ experiences is rather scant. Scholarly 
research discussing and comparing redevelopment experiences at the municipal level is 
limited while much has been focused on policy and planning implications in the federal 
or provincial scope (De Sousa, 2006). Sufficient studies have not been undertaken to 
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demonstrate how to integrate market forces and municipal policies and provide 
successful incentives for the private sector to participate in the redevelopment. Such a 
research field is important to Canada where there is an increasing need for urban spaces 
to accommodate growth within the urban boundaries. 
 
Almost all the literature on brownfield redevelopment is based on a case study approach, 
while those cases are usually from North America or Europe. Cases from developing 
countries are still remaining blank. For example, China is in a rapid industrialization 
process accompanied by a massive emergence of brownfields. Research in China will 
possibly provide precious lessons and experiences on brownfield redevelopment in 
developing countries. 
 
Study is needed in Chinese academic literature with respect to Chinese brownfields. Up 
to date, most of the Chinese academic literature on brownfields has been concentrated on 
the introduction of brownfield experiences in developed countries (Fu and Jiang, 2005; 
Wang et al, 2006; Zhang, 2004; Luo, 2002; Jiang, 2005; Zhao and Yang, 2006) and 
discussed on converting the old industrial buildings into other uses without demolishing 
them from an urban landscape’s perspective (Zhang et al, 2003; Wang and Ren, 2003; 
Wang, 2004; Chen and Bao, 2003). However, in-depth research is required to develop the 
recognition of brownfields in Chinese literature, to explore how the current brownfields 
in China are being redeveloped, and to discover the challenges and problems 
accompanying the redevelopment process.  
 
In summary, it is the above deficiency in current literature in both Canada and China that 
has intrigued the researcher to conduct this cross-nation research, with a particular focus 




Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to explore the potential application of brownfield 
redevelopment in Dalian, China, based on municipal experiences in Ontario, Canada. In 
order to realize the purpose, a suitable methodology is required and sheds light on 
brownfield redevelopment in the City of Dalian. A case study research strategy was 
adopted to develop an in-depth understanding of successful Ontario brownfield 
experiences from two selected municipalities: Kitchener and Hamilton. Currently there is 
no systematic indicator framework that is known to exist or be in use for measuring the 
success of brownfield redevelopment in a standardized way (Wedding and Crawford-
Brown, 2007). Therefore, a common-sense assumption of measuring whether the 
municipal experiences are successful in this research is that: all municipal 
programs/approaches are considered “successful” if the redevelopment occurs as opposed 
to the corresponding option of not being redeveloped at all.  
 
Also, a case study was conducted in the City of Dalian in order to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of brownfield redevelopment: formation, current situation, 
challenges and corresponding policies. Face-to-face interviews were carried out to 
understand the associated stakeholders’ perception/concerns on brownfield 
redevelopment both in two selected Ontario cities and Dalian. These stakeholders 
included planners, government officials, consultants, developers, as well as experts in the 
field of environmental management. Direct personal observation was chosen to collect 
additional information in terms of brownfields’ current situation, how they were being 
redeveloped and their appearance when the project was completed. Documents collected 
from government, private sector, public libraries and research institutes were reviewed as 
supplementary sources of data in order to triangulate information from interviews and 
personal observation and increase the reliability and validity of the case study. 
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3.2 Case Study Approach 
3.2.1 Why Case Study Approach? 
A case study was chosen as the principal research strategy for three primary reasons: the 
nature of the research topic, research purpose, and the constraints of funding and time. 
Brownfield redevelopment is a complicated economic, social and environmental 
phenomenon which requires a close and in-depth study. Research on brownfields is not a 
simple topic which can be examined by cause and effect similar to the natural science 
framework. According to Verschuren (2003) and Ragin (1989), a case study is especially 
suitable for studying phenomena that are highly complex and/or embedded in their 
cultural context. A case study permits a comprehensive understanding of a complex 
instance, through “extensive description and analysis of that instance taken as a whole” 
and “in natural settings studied at close hand” (U.S. GAO 1990, p79; Orum et al, 1991, 
p6).   
 
Secondly, a case study fits well with the research purpose of exploring the potential 
application of brownfield redevelopment in Dalian, China, based on municipal 
experiences in Ontario, Canada. On the one hand, the foundation of this research is the 
municipal experiences of brownfield redevelopment in Ontario, Canada. What are the 
municipal experiences that might be of help to the City of Dalian? Only through case 
studies of selected Ontario cities can such a question be answered. According to Feagin et 
al (1991), the detailed data offered by a case study allows the researcher to develop a 
solid empirical understanding for a specific concept and generalizations. By means of the 
information gathered from solid research methods – interviews, on-site observation, 
collection and review of the related documents, the researcher could closely study the 
examples of Ontario municipalities and come up with reasonable summaries of 
successful municipal experiences in Ontario, Canada. With these experiences, the 
researcher was able to further analyze the potential of applying Canadian experiences to 
the City of Dalian. On the other hand, the prerequisite of the research purpose is a 
comprehensive understanding of brownfield redevelopment in Dalian, including the 
formation, current situation, challenges and corresponding municipal policies. Without a 
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comprehensive understanding of the situation in Dalian, it is impossible to explore the 
potential of applying Canadian experiences to Dalian and analyze how they can help to 
improve Dalian’s brownfield practice. A case study approach seems to be appropriate 
here, as it provides a rational framework to define how the case of Dalian can be studied.  
 
Thirdly, a case study is a pragmatic choice for the researcher, given the short research 
time of this project (only three months) and the limited research funding required to cover 
the expenses both for the field trips in Canada and in China. It was the limited scale and 
manageability of the case study that had further led the researcher to choose it as a 
research strategy. “A case study can be carried out on a small-scale, albeit detailed, basis” 
(Payne, 2004, p32). By focusing on a few cases, it is possible for the researcher to 
complete the research work more quickly, and in a much greater depth and detail, than if 
the researcher were to examine many cases.  
 
It should be noted that the old debate of a case study over reliability and validity has been 
recognized in this research. For one thing, people might challenge the reliability of 
research findings discovered from a case study because of the small-scale cases and the 
dependence on empirical data. It is sometimes said that a case study can be best 
descriptive and can not generate general principles. However, it is not reasonable that 
ideas derived from a case study are less scientific although dealing with only a limited 
number of cases and are descriptive (Payne, 2004; Feagin et al, 1991; Verschuren, 2003). 
“No one has accused great scientists like Charles Darwin of being less than scientific 
because of their naturalistic descriptive data” (Orum et al, 1991, p20). Payne (2004, p32) 
considered that the test of a good case study was dependent on “how well its data sustain 
its theoretical statements”. In addition, on the matter of the validity of a case study, 
people might consider that a case study is vulnerable to the idiosyncratic biases of the 
investigator. However, this notion has ignored the fact that a case study does permit the 
investigator to assemble complementary and overlapping measures (Feagin et al, 1991). 
According to Stake (2005), the triangulation of sources can help ensure the validity of a 
case study analysis. That is, the researcher can take advantage of multiple data sources, 
such as newspaper reports and personal interviews, in order to cross-check and thereby to 
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validate the case study (Yin, 2003). Such a strategy was adopted in this research for the 
case study of Kitchener, Hamilton and Dalian. 
 
3.2.2 Case Selection in Canada 
Two municipalities are chosen in Canada: Hamilton and Kitchener. There are four main 
reasons for this case selection. Firstly, Hamilton and Kitchener are among the very few 
municipalities that have relevant experience with their brownfield community 
improvement plans, considering that brownfeild redevelopment is a relatively new area of 
municipal interest in Canadian municipalities (Piccioni, 2005). In fact, the city of 
Hamilton is the only municipality in Ontario that has actually fully implemented a 
dedicated comprehensive brownfield incentive program, while the city of Kitchener has 
also offered several downtown revitalization programs that can be applied to brownfields. 
 
Secondly, both cities have been identified by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing as having leading edge incentive programs in brownfield redevelopment 
(MMAH, 2000b). These incentive and public investment strategies have proved to be 
successful in encouraging and facilitating the private sector to remediate and redevelop 
brownfields that have been left underused and abandoned for many years (MMAH, 
2007b). 
 
Thirdly, both Hamilton and Kitchener are old industrial cities with many brownfield sites 
to be redeveloped, similar to the city of Dalian, China. The City of Hamilton, as an 
important harbour on Lake of Ontario, can provide valuable experiences in redeveloping 
browfields in port land areas. These experiences are applicable to the City of Dalian, an 
important harbour in North China. As of early 2006, the Dalian High-tech Industrial Zone 
began to conduct the Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment program to redevelop the 
contaminated sites in the bay area, and tried to learn from the experiences in Hamilton.  
 
Fourthly, due to the limited research funding and time, only two municipalities were 
chosen in Canada. This number was selected because it permited the researcher to 
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complete the research work in much greater depth and detail within the time and funding 
constraints. Also, considering Kitchener and Hamilton are within the driving distance of 
the researcher, investigation in the two cities was feasible. 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
3.3.1 Interviews 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted in order to understand the current situation and 
barriers/challenges to brownfield redevelopment in three cities, by obtaining associated 
stakeholders’ perception/concerns towards brownfield redevelopment in the city, 
identifying their brownfield experiences and understanding their comments/expectations 
towards the municipality. Stakeholders’ perceptions on applying Canadian municipal 
experiences to the City of Dalian were particularly addressed in the interviews 
undertaken in Dalian.  
 
In face-to-face interviews, “the interviewer is in a good position to be able to judge the 
quality of the response of the subjects, to notice if the question has not been properly 
understood”, and thereby to carry out appropriate methods to encourage the interviewees’ 
full participation in the interview (Walliman, 2005, p284). In other words, face-to-face 
interviews can allow the researcher “control” over the line of questioning, and get in-
depth understanding and insight about interviewees’ opinions and feelings, as well as 
organizational and personal goals (Creswell, 2003). Therefore, in order to further 
understand the stakeholders’ perceptions/concerns on brownfield, face-to-face interviews 
are suitable for the research.  
 
In terms of the interview structure, all the face-to-face interviews in this research were 
unstructured, open-ended. According to Walliman (2005), a very open and unstructured 
form of interview is appropriate when the researcher needs to explore a situation and 
wishes to get information which the researcher cannot predict. In this research, the 
researcher needs to discover the current situation of brownfield redevelopment in selected 
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Canadian cities and the City of Dalian, and to understand the stakeholders’ perceptions 
on brownfield redevelopment and the subjective “logic” by which the stakeholders come 
to make their choices. This kind of information relates to beliefs, value and subjective 
rationality. Open-ended interviews permit the penetration into the interviewees’ cognitive 
world. What’s more, open-ended interviews allow interviewees to compose their answers 
in their own words and diverge from the subject, possibly offering additional facts that 
may be important for the study in the future (Palys, 1997). Considering the different 
economic and socio-cultural contexts in two countries – Canada and China, open-ended 
interviews allowed more spontaneity and flexibility than structured interviews and 
thereby enriched the research findings. In fact, the researcher found that much interesting 
and useful information came from the open-ended interviews. Some of the early 
interviews in the City of Dalian provided very important information which helped to 
indicate the next step of research direction and the priority issues of brownfield 
redevelopment in Dalian. Before each interview, a set of different interview questions 
was designed according to different interviewees’ profession and experiences on 
brownfields, but interviewees with the same profession were asked primarily the same set 
of questions. Appendix I to VII provide a list of questions in different interviews. 
 
In total, twenty-four face-to-face interviews were conducted with the stakeholders 
involved in brownfield redevelopment, among which seven interviews were conducted in 
Kitchener and Hamilton while seventeen interviews were in the City of Dalian, China. 
These stakeholders participating in the interviews included planners, government officials, 
consultants, developers and experts in the field of brownfield redevelopment and 
environmental management. Participation of all these face-to-face interviews was 
voluntary. Interviewees were informed at the very beginning of the interview that they 
could refuse to answer any questions, and stop at any point during the interview. Besides, 
the researcher called the interviewees in advance to reconfirm their willingness of 
participation before the appointed date of interview. Table 3.1 and table 3.2 are lists of 




Table 3.1: List of Interviewees in Face-to-face interviews in Canada, 2006 
Places Department Position Number of Interviewees 
City of Kitchener Senior Planner 1 
Consulting Firms Planning Consultant; Engineering Consultant 2 Kitchener 
Real Estate Company President 1 
City of Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator; Planner 2 Hamilton 
Canada Centre for Inland 
Waters RAP Coordinator 1 
Total Number of Interviewees 7 
 
Table 3.2: List of Interviewees in Face-to-face Interviews in City of Dalian, China, 2006 
Department/Position Number of Interviewees 
Dalian University of Technology 4 
Dalian High-Tech Industrial Zone Construction Bureau 2 
Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment Office 2 
Dalian Environmental Protection Bureau 2 
Dalian Economic Committee 3 
Dalian Urban Planning & Design Institute23  3 
Dalian Land Reserve and Transaction Center 1 
Total Number of Interviewees 17 
 
All in all, the face-to-face interviews in Kitchener, Hamilton and Dalian went well, yet 
some difficulties were met in the process. The language barrier was the first major 
challenge to holding interviews in Canada, since English was not the researcher’s first-
language. In order to accurately grasp all the information provided by the interviewees 
while at the same time presenting the interview smoothly, the researcher had tape-
recorded every interview conducted in Canada with the interviewees’ permission; 
meanwhile, additional notes were taken by the researcher during the interview. It was 
                                                 
23 Dalian Urban Planning & Design Institute is a subordinate body of Dalian Urban Planning Bureau. 
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fortunate for the researcher to meet those nice and kind interviewees in Kitchener and 
Hamilton who had been considerate of this linguistic difficulty and expressed their 
opinions slowly, clearly and tenderly.  
 
Government officials’ reluctance to provide comprehensive data related to environmental 
contamination and remediation on former industrial sites posed a challenge to the 
interviews held in Dalian, China. The officials tended to consider that this type of 
information was sensitive data which might result in negative impact on the issue of 
environmental pollution among the population if released to the public.  Even though 
findings of this thesis research would only be kept in the library’s database in another 
country and the public could not easily have access to them, government officials in 
Dalian still tended to treat the researcher with reservations when it came to the issue of 
contamination and remediation. In consideration of the research ethics, the researcher 
respected their response in the interview. 
 
The third challenge encountered in the interviews was the difficulty to increase the 
number of individuals to interview. The researcher was only acquainted with one or two 
interviewees in each city at the early stage of the research. This limited number of 
interviewees would inevitably make the research prone to bias. In order to avoid such 
bias and ensure the reliability of the research, a “snow-ball” technique was adopted to 
increase the number of individuals to interview. The researcher asked the early 
interviewees whether there was anyone else they were acquainted with and involved in 
the brownfield project or in the city that might be of help for the research. With the 
interviewees’ recommendation, the number of interviewees gradually increased to 
twenty-four.  
 
Finally, how to encourage the interviewees’ full participation in the interview also 
emerged as a challenge in face-to-face interviews. In order to promote interviewees’ 
complete responses, the researcher took advantage of the valuable tools learned from 
Morton-Williams (1993): good appearance and visual signs to show the researcher’s 
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confidence and friendliness, such as nods, smiles etc. Frankly speaking, these tools had 
turned out to be quite successful and most of the interviews went on very well. 
 
3.3.2 On-site Observation 
On-site observation was chosen as a complementary data resource to record additional 
information on brownfields which had been mentioned by the interviewees during the 
interview. These brownfield sites being observed include those that have not been 
redeveloped, those being redeveloped, as well as those that have been redeveloped 
successfully (See Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). According to Walliman (2005), 
observations can be adopted for “recording the nature or conditions of objects”, and “the 
observations of objects can be a quick and efficient method of gaining preliminary 
knowledge or making a preliminary assessment of its state or condition” (Walliman, 2005, 
p288). On-site observations of brownfields in Kitchener, Hamilton and Dalian allowed 
the researcher to further understand some of the brownfield sites’ current status, how they 
were being redeveloped and their appearance when the redevelopment was completed. 
All the on-site observations were recorded with the use of a digital camera that was 
capable of photography and video. A number of pictures were taken to record the on-site 
observations, and they were stored electronically and categorized by subject, events and 
context. 
 
Figure 3.1: Observations of Kaufmann Lofts in the City of Kitchener, Canada 
           
                    The Facade                                         Loft that has not been redeveloped 
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              Loft being furnished                               Loft Model that has been redeveloped 
 
Figure 3.2: Observations of Bayfront Park, West Harbour, Hamilton, Canada 
          
  People jogging on the waterfont trail                 People canoeing in the Bayfront Park 
 
3.3.3 Documents Collection and Review 
Documents from government departments, commercial/professional bodies, public 
libraries, collections and the internet were collected and reviewed as an additional data 
source, which helped to ensure the reliability and validity of the research. As 
aforementioned, one of the disadvantages of case study is the potential idiosyncratic 
biases of the investigator. Face-to-face interviews might be also vulnerable to be biased 
mainly due to the limited number of interviewees. In that case, reviewing various 
documents, as a method of triangulation, can provide the researcher with complementary 




Collected documents included government reports on the general situation of brownfield 
redevelopment in the city, official plans (called comprehensive plan in the City of Dalian), 
brochures of municipal incentive programs, policy statements on environmental 
protection, related environmental regulations, and consulting reports. Secondary data 
from these documents was carefully studied and interpreted. Through collecting and 
reviewing related documents, the researcher was able to systematically understand 
government policies and plans on brownfield redevelopment, but also gained an in-depth 
and holistic understanding about some specific brownfield projects. 
 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
Since human participants were involved in this research, research ethics in relation to 
other people were considered. First of all, each face-to-face interview had received the 
interviewees’ consent and the courtesy to the interviewees had also been paid after the 
interview. Specifically, all the interviewees were recruited by email or telephone. They 
were aware that their participation was voluntary. Interviewees could choose to decline 
the interview or decline to answer any of the interview questions. All participants were 
verbally thanked for their participation in the research. Some of them were given a small 
token of appreciation, such as a Chinese handkerchief made of silk or a small bottle of 
maple syrup, while some of them were sent a beautiful Thankyou card to show the 
researcher’s appreciation. 
 
All the interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality in their responses. Individual names 
will not appear in this thesis unless the participants permitted the researcher to do so. 
Anonymous quotations were used with interviewees’ permission. Besides, all the 
interviews were taken to fill a gap on brownfield redevelopment in existing academic 
literature which was not easy to be traced by individuals. 
 
Several electronic devices for recording data were used with the participants’ awareness 
and permission. An Mp3 player with a recording function was used during the interviews 
in English. All the participants were informed of its use and they could decline the use of 
the Mp3 player at any time. A digital camera was used to collect visual images in the 
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forms of photograph and video. These visual images were collected during the interviews 
and the on-site observations. Verbal consent was received whenever the human 
participants and their private property was the direct subject of the visual images.  




Three limitations affecting this research have been identified. Firstly, the research was 
restricted to the limited research time and funding. Given the short research time (only 
three months) and the limited research funding required to cover the field trip expenses 
both in Canada and in China, the number of research sites being studied in case study was 
relatively small. Moreover, the number of individuals to interview was also limited, 
considering that it usually required more time to find appropriate interviewees and get in 
touch with them when conducting the research in Dalian. 
 
Secondly, the selection of limited number of research sites in case study could lead to the 
difficulty to generalize the municipal experiences in brownfield redevelopment in Ontario 
which might be helpful for the City of Dalian, China. However, the researcher had made 
an effort to select appropriate municipalities in Ontario with years’ experiences in 
successfully facilitating brownfield redevelopment under the constraint of research time 
and research funding. This was accomplished by carefully reviewing related literature on 
brownfield redevelopment in each city and their potential help to the City of Dalian. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the case study was not intended to generalize the municipal 
brownfield redevelopment experiences across a large population, but to summarize the 
experiences learned from in-depth study about specific sites which may have the 
successful experiences to be applied by Dalian. These selected cities were “examples” of 
Ontario cities which had been relatively successful in encouraging brownfield 
redevelopment, not “samples” of all Ontario cities. 
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The third potential limitation of this research has already been addressed before, namely 
the potential idiosyncratic biases, which might either attribute to the limited number of 
interviewees in face-to-face interviews or result from the researcher in case study. This 
kind of limitation is inevitably encountered in any qualitative research. In order to ensure 
the trustworthiness, authenticity and credibility of the research, the researcher had carried 
out two types of methods to minimize the potential biases. On the one hand, the 
researcher had tried hard to include all key persons in brownfield redevelopment in three 
cities in the interviews. This was started from the initial key people, followed by a 
“snow-ball” technique. The researcher considered that the total twenty-four open-ended 
interviews were suitable to represent the stakeholders’ perceptions/concerns on 
brownfield redevelopment in all three cities in Canada and China. On the other hand, the 
researcher had triangulated different data sources of information by examining evidence 
from various sources, including face-to-face interviews and supplementary documents 
from both public and private sectors, and cross-checking them to validate both the first-















Chapter 4: Case Studies in Canada 
4.1 Introduction 
People say you can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. But the City of Kitchener and 
the City of Hamilton have been doing so by promoting brownfield redevelopment for 
years. In this chapter, the author assesses brownfield redevelopment in both cities and 
summarizes the successful municipal experiences. Each of the case studies consists of the 
following components: introducing the city’s history of industrialization and relevant 
background information of brownfield formation; describing the geography of 
brownfields in the city, including brownfield definition, location, quantities, distribution 
and characteristics; understanding the municipal impetus to promote brownfield 
redevelopment; identifying barriers to brownfield redevelopment from the municipal 
perspective; introducing corresponding approaches to overcome the barriers; and 
summarizing the achievements resulting from the municipal efforts. In addition, the 
author showcases one brownfield redevelopment project for each city. At the end of this 
Chapter, successful municipal experiences learned from Kitchener and Hamilton will be 
summarized under an overarching assumption: all municipal programs/approaches are 
considered “successful” if the redevelopment occurs as opposed to the corresponding 
option of not being redeveloped at all. 
 
4.2 Brownfield Redevelopment in the City of Kitchener, Ontario 
4.2.1 Introduction of Kitchener 
At first glance, Kitchener does not seem to be distinctive than any of its southern Ontario 
neighbours. Block after block of bright facades mix with late nineteenth-century (or even 
older) structures clad in dark brick or the traditional brick red paint. Familiar brand 
names, fancy or funky, wave to both city residents and out-of-towners. However, 
Kitchener has a unique history.  
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In 1790s when the first wave of German Mennonites settled in Kitchener from 
Pennsylvania, moving north for inexpensive land, freedom of worship and beliefs that 
Upper Canada had promised, Kitchener began to be imprinted with a German identity in 
its history (City of Kitchener, 2006a). Soon afterward, many German speaking 
immigrants from Europe moved here and named this city Berlin. “These Germans 
brought with them special skills and knowledge as well as their own cultural traditions”, 
and they contributed greatly to Berlin’s industrialization (English and McLaughlin, 1996, 
p11). By the end of the 19th century, Berlin had established itself as a major industrial 
centre and led all others in Canada in the manufacture of tires, rubber footwear, shirts & 
collars, furniture, buttons and leather (City of Kitchener, 2006a). “Busy Berlin”, coined 
as a catchphrase at the time, described perfectly the industrious, bustling city and its 
economic prosperity (See Figure 4.1). As a consequence of the extensive industrialization, 
many industrial buildings based on the progressive factory architecture of the time were 
built along the railroad during late 19th century and early 20th century. Figure 4.2 presents 
a classic view of Berlin’s factory district developed along the railway line. 
 
The city’s name was changed to Kitchener in 1916, mainly due to anti-German sentiment 
in the First World War. It was its diversification of industry that enabled Kitchener to 
survive the great depression and recover economic growth quickly in the post-war years. 
“By 1965, Kitchener had become Canada’s fastest growing city and one of the country’s 
leading industrial, financial and distribution centers” (City of Kitchener, 2006a). 
However, this city suffered a recession during 1980s when the labour-intensive 
traditional industries encountered enormous pressures from international competition and 
slackening domestic demand (English and McLaughlin, 1996). As a result, many old 
industries gradually collapsed, leaving empty factories standing as relics of a bygone age. 
These old mills, foundries, textiles, and tanneries turned into brownfields. 
 
At present, Kitchener, as an incorporated city of the Waterloo Region, is a vibrant 
cosmopolitan community with an estimated population of 209,872 (as of July 1, 2006, FP 
Markets-Canadian Demographics 2006). Although it experienced hard times during the 
1980s and 1990s, new industries especially the “high tech” industries allow this 
 55
community to outperform most other cities in Canada as to economic growth. The 
presence of two universities (University of Waterloo and Wilfrid Laurier University) and 
Kitchener’s very successful Conestoga College provide Kitchener with abundant 
resources, skilled workers, access to information and technology. Being part of the 
“Canada’s Technology Triangle (CTT)” 1 , Kitchener contributed to an annual Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of $17.81 billion (2004) within CTT (City of Kitchener, 2006b). 
 
Figure 4.1: The Popular Slogan2           Figure 4.2: Berlin’s Factory District in 1880-1912 
1912 
  (Courtesy English and McLaughlin Collection) 
 
              
 (Courtesy English and McLaughlin Collection)  
                                                
 
4.2.2 Brownfields in Kitchener 
The stirring Industrial Revolution dated back to the 1890s left a number of brownfields 
throughout Kitchener. These sites are the remnants of Kitchener’s gorgeous past when 
smoke belching from industrial chimneys was a sign of business success. In Kitchener’s 
 
1 The name “Canada’s Technology Triangle” is founded on the longstanding reputation for innovation established by 
businesses in Cambridge, Kitchener, Waterloo and Guelph. CTT came to be widely applied in the 1980s. More 
information related to CTT can be found at http://www.techtriangle.com/. 
2 “Busy Berlin” was coined as the slogan of the Board of Trade, which referred not only to the rush of Berlin’s factories, 
but also the intelligent and industrious German workmen in Berlin (English and McLaughlin, 1996, p80) 
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brownfield remediation Community Improvement Plan (CIP), a brownfield site is defined 
as “a property which contains environmental contamination either in the ground or 
building due to the operational activities of a previous land use, where the extent of the 
contamination renders the property vacant, under-utilized, unsafe, unproductive or 
bandoned” (City of Kitchener, 2006c). According to this definition contamination is a 
 site is 
cluded in the inventory by mistake, or vice versa, a contaminated site is missed 
uildings on the sites. As well, former gas 
ation and industrial/commercial/public activities situated in both urban and suburban 
 
                                                
a
necessary condition for Kitchener’s brownfields.  
 
The precise number of contaminated properties in Kitchener is unknown. In fact, the City 
of Kitchener does not have an inventory of brownfield sites even though the municipality 
has fully understood the benefits of such a list. What the municipality does have is an 
inventory of what the municipality believes are under-utilized sites1, among which some 
are contaminated lands. A senior planner in the City of Kitchener told the researcher: 
“property owners don’t have to share their contamination information with the City of 
Kitchener as this information will potentially affect their property value”. The city can 
not use the list of under-utilized land as an inventory of brownfields since this list was 
prepared based on suspicion other than solid evidence. The municipality may wind up in 
a civil liability by keeping a comprehensive list of brownfield sites if a clean
in
(Kitchener Senior Planner; RCI Consulting and Regional Analytics Inc, 2004). 
 
According to Kitchener’s Brownfield Remediation Community Improvement Plan (City 
of Kitchener, 2006c), some brownfield properties within Kitchener are former industrial 
sites which were abandoned or vacant in downtown or inner city lands. Many of them are 
located along major streets that are fully serviced and they often come with 
architecturally and historically significant b
st
areas are regarded as brownfieds in the city. 
 
1 They include the sites that are vacant; sites get either vacant buildings or vacant land or both; lands which are simply 
not performing their maximum land use potential (Kitchener Senior Planner) 
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4.2.3. The Impetus for Brownfield Redevelopment 
The Brownfield Remediation Community Improvement Plan (City of Kitchener, 2006c) 
has e
 
• otential of chemical 
• mmunity safety problems due to the lack of people, and “normal” 
• 
tandards inspections & enforcement; 
• ban land as typically, these vacant sites are fully 
rime access and 
• promote urban sprawl by forcing the City’s growth to be shifted to the periphery 
(City of Kitchener, 2006c, p4) 
Asi  f s brought by the redevelopment 




development and the related on-going upkeep costs;   
 id ntified a number of negative community impacts caused by brownfields, which:   
• visually degrade the community by the presence of empty building shells and 
vacant lands; 
• negatively affect surrounding property values, residents and businesses;  
present community Public Health risks due to the p
contamination in both structures and soils; 
can create co
activity taking place on site; 
increase municipal operating costs through additional Policing, Fire/Building & 
Property S
• provide only a minimum contribution to community costs due to a low level of  
assessment; 
are an inefficient use of prime ur
supplied with previously paid for urban infrastructure with p
exposure; 
of the City on greenfield lands which require the extension of urban infrastructure 
and community services; and     
• are an ongoing threat to the community’s ground water supply.  
 
de rom these negative impacts, the potential benefit
ro nfields are also recognized in Kitchener’s brownfield remediation CI
• increased assessment base as a source of tax revenue; 
• job creation (both construction and permanent);  
• more efficient and effective use of existing munici
rastructure and municipal services for greenfield• reduced expansion of inf
• reducing the potential threat to our community’s water supply; 
• increased attractiveness and community safety; and 
• reduced Police, Fire & Bylaw Enforcement Costs 
(City of Kitchener, 2006c, p5) 
 
A senior planner of Kitchener regarded five of the above perspectives as the primary 
reasons for the City to stimulate redevelopments. First, the City can increase the 
assessment base as a source of tax revenue by encouraging brownfield redevelopment. 
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Like most other municipalities across Canada over the past 10 years, Kitchener’s 
revenues have not grown with the economy and demands on the services and 
infrastructure have grown dramatically (City of Kitchener, 2006d). Therefore, there is a 
strategic corporate focus that the municipality wants to increase the amount of assessment 
and taxation, while redeveloping brownfields fits with the City’s need. Take the Kaufman 
Lofts project for example. It is estimated that once the Kaufman building is redeveloped 
it will produce about $1.2 million in property taxes per year; up from the $660,000 in 
es are located in 
owntown Kitchener or inner city lands. They are already serviced with roads, sidewalks, 
continuous building 
nforcement officials, fire department officials up to the sites to guarantee public safety. 
. Kitchener’s senior planner also confirmed the statement that “one vacant 
taxes the vacant building generates (Pender, 2004, December 29). “…The more the 
empty industrial land laid vacant, the more the bound of residence has to pick up the 
share in terms of contributions to taxes.” (Kitchener Senior Planner) 
 
Secondly, it is reasonable for the City to encourage brownfield redevelopment as a way 
of efficiently using land (Kitchener Senior Planner). Most brownfield sit
d
sewers, sanitary, storm facilities, water mains etc. Most of these infrastructures are still in 
good condition. “…The more we redevelop theses sites, the less we have to extend 
services onto the periphery of municipality.” (Kitchener Senior Planner) 
 
Thirdly, it is too costly to leave brownfield sites vacant (Kitchener Senior Planner). 
Vacant/abandoned sites do not generate taxes. There may be tax arrears in some of the 
brownfields. It costs the money when the City has to send 
e
There may be graffiti or vandalism. Sometimes the brownfields become venues for arson 
or drug activities. When brownfield properties are redeveloped, it will help the 
municipality to reduce the Police, Fire & Bylaw Enforcement costs. 
 
Fourthly, brownfields depress surrounding neighbourhood land values (Kitchener Senior 
Planner). It has been found that in the period when the hazardous waste site was 
identified and remediation occurred, “residential property owners in close proximity to 
the hazardous waste site experienced lower housing appreciation rates” (McCluskey et al, 
2003, p166)
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land leads to depressed eight adjacent sites” since nobody wanted to live next to a 
entified as sources of chemicals which had polluted the groundwater (Grand River 
Conservation Authority, 2005). Therefore, as one of the communities in the Grand River 
hener has paid special 
contaminated site. Depressed land value around brownfield sites leads to depressed 
assessment of property values, which ultimately affects the total revenue in the City of 
Kitchener.  
 
Finally, brownfield redevelopment reduces the risks to public health and safety, 
especially ground water (Kitchener Senior Planner). Approximately 75% of water used 
by the Regional Municipality of Waterloo (including Cambridge, Kitchener, Waterloo, 
Elmira and St. Jacobs) is groundwater (Bellamy and Boyd, 2005). Brownfield sites are 
regarded as an ongoing threat to the Region’s groundwater supply (Grand River 
Conservation Authority, 2005). Old industrial buildings and lands may contain toxic 
materials, which may leak into the ground water through various pathways and seriously 
threat groundwater quality. For example in Brantford, two former factories were once 
id
Watershed which use groundwater for drinking, the City of Kitc
attention to the redevelopment of brownfields in order to protect public health and safety. 
  
4.2.4 Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment in the City 
The researcher found three main obstacles to brownfield redevelopment, which are 
consistent with the literature review.  
 
The primary barrier confronting the private sector is financial (Kitchener Senior Planner, 
Kitchener Planning Consultant and Engineering Consultant). There are two interrelated 
factors to this issue. On one hand, Guideline for Use at Contaminated Sites in Ontario 
(Ministry of Environment, 1997) requires that site restoration work should be completed 
before any development is carried out on the contaminated sites. The upfront remediation 
costs can be very expensive, and can easily outweigh the assessed land value. For 
example, the Intown 90 Woodside Avenue, a former foundry in Kitchener, has a total 
assessment value of $1.25 million dollars in 2005 while the cost of remediation is 
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estimated to be $1.99 million dollars (Kitchener Senior Planner). In fact, Kitchener is 
adopting the most stringent cleanup criteria in Ontario because groundwater is used for 
drinking in this city. The surface soil and groundwater criteria for a potable ground water 
condition are adopted in Kitchener according to Guideline for Use at Contaminated Sites 
in Ontario. This usually involves a more technically difficult cleanup and associated 
higher costs than the remediation criteria for a nonpotable ground water condition 
(Kitchener Engineering Consultant). On the other hand, the questions of how to 
overcome the expensive remediation cost and who should pay for it have really set back 
developers. The wide-spread “polluter-pays” principle established to address 
contamination in current industrial activity may have negative effects on brownfield 
redevelopment. Many of the original “polluters” no longer exist. The cost is then born on 
the shoulders of any party that is associated with the brownfield sites, including the 
subsequent land owners or potential developers. As a result, financial institutions are 
unwilling to finance brownfield projects. Even though there are developers who do want 
to redevelop brownfields, very few of them can overcome the expensive remediation cost 
solely by themselves. “We all have the obligation now to pay for the remediation of 
rownfield sites”, says Kitchener Senior Planner, “…and I suggest all four levels of b
government, the city, the region, the province and the federal government, should make a 
contribution to the remediation since we all have benefited from the pollution in the 
industrialization …not just polluter pays…”  
 
The second significant barrier is liability. Two types of liability were identified by this 
research: regulatory liability and civil liability. The property owner of a contaminated site 
is subject to regulatory liability imposed by the Environmental or Administrative Orders, 
under the authority of Ontario’s three key environmental statutes: the “EPA”, the 
“OWRA”, and the “PA”. When an order is issued on a contaminated site, any activity 
beyond the property should be stopped until the site is cleaned up according to the 
requirement of the Ministry of Environment. As to civil liability, “the property owner is 
fully open to lawsuits from any party which believes they have been negatively affected 
by the environmental condition of the site” (City of Kitchener, 2006c, p6). These two 
types of liability are uncertain factors associated with any brownfield redevelopment 
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project, leading to more risks than a greenfield project (Kitchener Planning Consultant). 
One developer who held a brownfield project in downtown Kitchener also showed his 
concern about the liability during the interview. He told the researcher that he might have 
looked at one hundred brownfield sites in a year, only to discover one brownfield site that 
might be profitable to be redeveloped. Sometimes none of them turned out to be 
conomically viable. One of the reasons is the liability which can not be avoided when 
r Planning Consultant). With an upper regional level of government in 
itchener that governs issues of land use planning and the environment, additional time 
 an 
g review 
                                                
e
making an investment decision. The case of Lynnview Ridge1 in Calgary has been an 
alarm for both the private sector and the municipality about liability (Kitchener Senior 
Planner). 
 
Another main obstacle in Kitchener is the planning approval process occurring at two 
levels of government (Kitchener Senior Planner and Kitchener Planning Consultant). 
Unlike many other municipalities in Canada, Kitchener has two levels of government 
since it is part of Waterloo Region. Typically, a brownfield project in Kitchener may 
need all kinds of planning variances from both the region and the city, including the 
official plans, secondary plans, zoning by-laws, etc. For instance, the Kaufman Lofts in 
downtown Kitchener experienced five zone changes with an official plan amendment 
(Kitchene
K
and expense in obtaining planning approvals are needed, especially when there is
inconsistency of requirement between two levels of government in the plannin
process. 
 
4.2.5 Municipal Approaches to Promote Brownfield Redevelopment 
The City of Kitchener has been very progressive in addressing brownfield issues. As 
early as 1992, a committee led by former Kitchener councilor Mike Wagner had already 
begun to recognize brownfield problems and explored appropriate incentives to entice 
 
1 Lynnview Ridge is a former oil refinery owned by Imperial Oil. The site was remediated and redeveloped into a 
residential subdivision in 1970s. In 2001, it was discovered that the subdivision was not compliant with the new 
changed 2001 lead standard in Alberta and Imperial was issued Environmental Protection Orders to remediate the site 
again. Civil claims also followed with the orders. Further information regarding to the case can be found at 
http://www.cbc.ca/consumers/market/files/environ/brownfield/index.html  
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developers to clean up and reuse former industrial sites for new housing and businesses 
(Pender, 2005, June 23). In 1996, Kitchener’s Adaptive Re-use Program was developed 
in order to resolve the associated environmental, social and financial problems generated 
by former industrial/commercial sites around the downtown areas (MMAH, 2004). Today, 
many of the incentives developed previously in the Re-use program have been 
incorporated into Kitchener’s comprehensive package of Incentive Programs called The 
Kitchener EDGE (Encouraging and Directing Growth for Efficiency) Strategy. The 
EDGE Strategy, including both of the Downtown Incentives Program and the Brownfield 
Remediation Program (a.k.a. brownfield remediation CIP), provides financial incentives 
to the private sector to redevelop brownfield sites in the city. Sometimes, the municipal 
government has to directly intervene to promote redevelopment. Efforts in research and 
marketing financial incentive programs have also been made by the City of Kitchener to 
attract investment. In addition, the City has streamlined the planning process for 
proposals and improved the regulatory environment by providing professional assistance 
to investors. As to the barrier of liability, there is no municipal method to deal with it in 
Kitchener because it is beyond the city’s power to mitigate liability barriers created by 
current environmental laws and regulations (Kitchener Senior Planner). Also, in 
Kitchener’s recent Economic Development Strategy 2007-2010, the City decided to 
ontinually work with other levels of government (Regional, Provincial and Federal) to 
 the redevelopment of brownfields (City of Kitchener, 2007b). 
ategy, which follows the smart growth principles, aims 
 encourage the re-urbanization of developed areas in the downtown and inner city lands 
(Ci o al Incentive Programs 
inte estment in 
Kit n
• the restoration and re-use of our City Heritage resources;  
c
attract more resources to
Detailed municipal approaches carried out to overcome the barriers in Kitchener are 
presented as follows: 
 
1. Financial Incentives 
The Kitchener EDGE Growth Str
to
ty f Kitchener, 2006e). There are five City and Region
grated in the EDGE Strategy, which together are intended to stimulate inv
che er’s key functional areas: 
 
• continued investment in Kitchener Downtown; 
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• increased affordable multiple unit housing throughout our community. 
• remediation and redevelopment of Kitchener’s Brownfield lands; and 
• more intensive use of under-utilized Inner City lands;  
           (City of Kitchener, 2006e, p10) 
e programs, the Downtown Incentives Program and the Brownfield 
encouraging the private sector to redevelop 
s offered grants, loans and other types of 
stors, developers and business owners 
the loans approved in 2005 and 2006, 
rest rate will be zero. Besides, a Feasibility Study Grant with a maximum of 
$5,000 is provided to the property owner to identify major structural issues so that they 




Remediation Program play important roles in 
brownfields in Kitchener.  
 
(1) Downtown Incentives Program 
The Downtown Incentives Program, also known as the Downtown Community 
Improvement Plan, was initiated to attract investment in Kitchener’s Downtown in order 
to create a vibrant and sustainable environment within the urban centre of Kitchener. 
Many of the financial incentives developed in the early 1990s are parts of this program. It 
focuses on downtown areas, and brings benefits to many brownfield projects. Before the 
Brownfield Remediation Program was initiated in November 2003, this program played a 
key role in assisting developers in redeveloping brownfield sites in downtown, including 
the Kaufman Lofts Project — the 2005 Brownie Award for “Best Overall Small to 
Medium Project”. The City of Kitchener ha
assistance to downtown property owners, inve
within the project area of the Downtown Kitchener Community Improvement Plan (see 
Figure 4.3),.  
 
The Façade/Interior Loan Incentive Program was first established in 1989 and it has 
provided financial assistance to owners of downtown commercial properties for 
exterior/interior building improvements (City of Kitchener, 2006e). Under this program, 
a loan from $2,000 to $15,000 at a fixed rate of interest is provided to the owner to cover 
the costs of materials, labour and equipment necessary to complete improvements to the 
exterior and interior of their building. Especially for 
the inte
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Figure 4.3: Downtown Kitchener Community Improvement Plan Project Area 
 
Source: City of Kitchener (2006e), p6. 
 
The Upper Storey Renovation Program is part of the City’s five-year residential 
intensification initiative which is intended to help investors cover the costs of 
refurbishing and converting former factories and derelict buildings into residential 
housing (City of Kitchener, 2006e). The City of Kitchener will provide up to $100,000 
for building/renovation/upgrade/conversion per municipal address based on 50 percent of 
the project renovation cost. Eligible projects should have vacant upper storey or 
underutilized space that is situated above commercial use space (City of Kitchener, 
2006e). As well, the proposed project should result in an increase in the property owner’s 
assessment and create new residential units with a minimum of 650 square feet (60 
square meters) in size. 
 
 65
Rebates for Planning and Building Permit Fees are provided to the property owners 
who develop or renovate downtown properties. Property owners can get fees refunded on 
demolition and building permits, site plan approvals, occupancy certificates and sign 
permits, and all the other planning related application, upon the final completion of the 
project and the satisfactory final inspection of the work (City of Kitchener, 2006e). 
 
The Elimination of City and Regional Development Charges is provided for any 
project within the Downtown Community Improvement Plan Area. Both the municipal 
and regional development charges for the project will not be collected. The Park 
Dedication Fee is waived for all residential developments. 
 
The City of Kitchener Tax Rebate is a tax incentive for rehabilitation and 
redevelopment of institutional, residential, commercial and industrial sites within 
Downtown Community Improvement Plan area. The tax rebate lasts three years starting 
from the year when the work is completed. The rebate is equal to 50% of the city’s 
portion of the property tax increase resulted from the improvements (City of Kitchener, 
2006e). “The increase is calculated as the difference between the taxes levied in the year 
of receiving the building permit and the taxes levied during the first assessment following 
the completion of the project.” (City of Kitchener, 2006e, p14) It is required that 
improvements to buildings should be made in accordance with a Building Permit, the 
Ontario Building Code, as well as all the other applicable zoning requirements and 
planning approvals (City of Kitchener, 2006e). 
 
Among the above incentives, the rebates for planning and building permit fees, 
elimination of City and Regional development charges and Park Dedication Fee Waiver 
are automatically eligible for any development within the designated area shown in 
Figure 4.3. In other words, they are automatically included when the developer applies 






(2) Brownfield Remediation Program 
The Brownfield Remediation Program, also called the Brownfield Remediation 
Community Improvement Plan, was prepared and approved by the Council of the 
Corporation of the City of Kitchener on July 2, 2003. With modifications, it was further 
approved by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing on November 27, 2003. This 
program is the very first brownfield-oriented financial incentive in Kitchener which helps 
brownfield investors reduce or eliminate the expense of removing the contaminants. The 
Brownfields Statute Law Amendment Act 2001 (“Brownfields Act”) amends Section 28 of 
the Planning Act by authorizing Ontario municipalities to offer grants or loans for the 
redevelopment of brownfields in a designated community improvement project area 
through a community improvement plan (CIP). The City of Kitchener utilized this 
amendment and established the Brownfield Remediation CIP in order to “increase the 
development attractiveness of existing Brownfield lands to a level equal with similar 
greenfield lands, and thereby stimulate remediation and redevelopment of the 
community’s contaminated lands” (City of Kitchener, 2006c, p10-11). The strategy of 
this CIP is to assist property owners to overcome all or part of the site remediation costs. 
The brownfield remediation CIP project area includes all lands within the limits of the 
City of Kitchener. 
 
According to Kitchener Brownfield Remediation CIP (City of Kitchener, 2006c), Tax 
Incremental Financing (TIF) is provided to property owners of brownfields: 
 
“In exchange for a completed and filed Record of Site Condition or approved Site  
Specific Risk Assessment, the City of Kitchener will provide a grant in the form 
of an annual rebate on City taxes in an amount equal to 100% of the City Tax 
Increment.   The annual grant will continue for a maximum period of 10 years or 
until the total Eligible Remediation Cost has been reached, whichever comes first, 
where: 
 
a)  The City Tax Increment is defined as ‘the difference between the City portion 
of real property taxes as determined on the date of Application to this Program, 
and the new City portion of real property taxes levied as a result of a new 
assessment by the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC)  
following project completion’; and  
 
b) Eligible Remediation Costs include the cost of conducting Phase 1 & 2 
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environmental studies, environmental remediation project costs, associated 
consultant fees, and costs of complying with a Certificate of Property Use (CPU) 
under 168.6 of the Environmental Protection Act, as necessary, incurred from 
November 6, 2003, (i.e. The date of the approval of this CIP by the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs & Housing) and the date of issuance of the first Building 
Permit ( excluding demolition permits) for the proposed  project. ” 
            (City of Kitchener, 2006c, p11) 
 
The 100% TIF under the brownfield remediation CIP can be combined with other 
financial incentives under Kitchener EDGE Growth Strategy, such as the Downtown CIP, 
on the condition that the total value of the grant from the financial incentives does not 
exceed the value of the work done (City of Kitchener, 2006c). In order to understand the 
rationale of the 100% TIF in a straightforward way, a hypothesized brownfield 
redevelopment project in Kitchener is illustrated in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Example of 100% TIF in Kitchener 
Hypothesis:  
1. There is a brownfield project converting a former industrial building into an apartment 
building; 
2. Project begins in 2005 and will be completed and re-assessed in 2007; 
3. It will cost the property owner $900,000 to remediate the site; 
4. The municipal property taxes in 2005 for the site is $10,000; 
5. The projected municipal property taxes in 2007 will be $110,000. 
 
Mechanism: 
     Tax Increment = Municipal Taxes in 2007 – Municipal Taxes in 2005 
                              = $110,000 - $10,000 
                              = $100,000 
Outcomes: 
1. The property owner pay for the remediation costs of $900,000; 
2. The City issues a rebate on the property tax increment up to $100,000 to the property 
owner for 9 years beginning in 2008; 
3. In total, the property owner will receive a tax refund of $900,000 from the City, which 






2. Direct Intervention by the Municipality 
Basically, the municipal approach to encourage the renewal of brownfields in Kitchener 
is to offer the property owner the financial incentives as outlined above. However, there 
are cases where direct municipal intervention is necessary due to physical, financial, 
public health, legal or other circumstances (City of Kitchener, 2006c). That is, with the 
powers granted under Section 28 of the Planning Act, the City may acquire, hold the land, 
and clear, grade or prepare the land for improvement. In addition, direct assistance such as 
giving or lending any property of the municipality including money is permitted in 
accordance with the conditions set up in Section 28 of Planning Act upon the approval of 
the brownfield remediation CIP by MMAH (City of Kitchener, 2006c). Take the former 
Epton factory at the corner of Victoria & King Streets in Downtown Kitchener for instance. 
This site was once a major car parts manufacturer. The buildings were demolished and the 
site became vacant in the 1990’s. Today the site is being developed as the University of 
Waterloo’s new School of Pharmacy as well as a new Centre for Family Medicine. The City 
of Kitchener acquired the 3.35 ha.  Epton property and donated it to University of Waterloo 
for the initial development of the new campus. Underground contaminants were removed 
through an inground collection system (University of Waterloo and City of Kitchener, 2004). 
In addition, the City of Kitchener is investing $30 million from its $110 million Economic 
Development Investment Fund for the construction of a 120,000 square feet (111 square 
meters) new building on the site, including site preparation and site works (University of 
Waterloo and City of Kitchener, 2004). The bold strategy of building an education and 
knowledge creation cluster in downtown Kitchener is one of the major motivations for the 
City to directly intervene in the UW School of Pharmacy Project (City of Kitchener, 2005). 
 
3. Research and Marketing 
A successful brownfield strategy or program is based on a comprehensive understanding 
about the nature and extent of the brownfield sites within the city.  The City of Kitchener 
has spent considerable time and effort in collecting and filing the information on 
brownfield properties. The City has also conducted a program of environmental site 
assessments on properties in an area of its downtown (Piccioni, 2004). All RSCs filed 
with MOE and those being presently remediated have been recorded by the City 
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(Kitchener Senior Planner). Besides, a Brownfield Working Group in Kitchener was 
formed in 2002 as a forum for the discussion of brownfields. The Group included 
stakeholders from the development industry, environmental consulting, banking and 
financing, city planning, legal and real estate, generating comprehensive perspectives on 
brownfield issues (City of Kitchener, 2006c). 
 
The City also has undertaken marketing efforts for the brownfield incentive programs to 
attract investment. It is fully aware of the importance of marketing for a successful 
financial incentive program. Brochures of the Kitchener EDGE Growth Strategy are 
available in City hall. The website of City of Kitchener provides detailed publications on 
all the available incentives and brownfield redevelopment opportunities. By hosting the 
fourth annual CUI (Canadian Urban Institute) Brownfield Conference1 in 2003 at the 
Kaufman Building and sponsoring the 2005 Re-urbanization Conference2, brownfield 
redevelopment in Kitchener is widely known across Canada. The City also has been very 
active in presenting its programs in various brownfield conferences and workshops 3  
organized by CUI or Canadian Brownfield Network (CBN).  
 
4. Professional Assistance from Municipal Staff 
The complexity of planning approvals is also an important barrier to investors. In order to 
overcome this barrier, the City of Kitchener assigns special municipal staff to work 
directly with the investors through the administrative procedures. The Kitchener Senior 
Planner, who was the city representative in three brownfield projects, showed great 
enthusiasm and commitment about his work, “…I work hand-in-glove with the developer 
and the planning consultant. Any time they have a problem, they called me and I would 
find a solution for them…It is a client relationship between the investors and municipal 
staff. Sometimes they don’t understand the government and get frustrated or angry, and 
think the end of the world has come...It’s just to have a single point of contact. Somebody 
understands how the municipality runs and can be a bit of help to investors…” By 
directing a dedicated staff to work with investors and solve any of their problems, the 
                                                 
1 For further information regarding to this conference, pleas refer to 
http://www.aboutremediation.com/Events/EventDetails.asp?Event_ID=230 . 
2 http://www.region.waterloo.on.ca/rrr2005  
3 http://www.canadianbrownfieldnetwork.ca/workshops.asp  
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City of Kitchener has shifted the municipal attitude from regulators to partners.  Proactive 
and pre-investment advice and planning consultation from municipal staff are offered to 
brownfield investors. “…Kitchener is one of the most enjoyable cities to work in. The 
City has really been willing to assist us to make this a success” (Developer in Kitchener). 
In addition, the City of Kitchener has also designated a full-time brownfield coordinator 
and appointed members from Finance and Legal Departments to evaluate the applications 
of brownfield remediation program and to prepare a suggestion for the consideration of 
the City’s Finance and Corporate Services Committee and City Council. Therefore 
brownfield investors can successfully get approval of TIF granting. The coordinator 
works as a bridge between the government and the stakeholders, providing leadership and 
advancing collaboration needed in the partnership between the private and public sectors. 
 
4.2.6 Results 
Sound financial incentives, effective marketing, and a strong staff-client partnerships 
result in successful brownfield redevelopment projects (City of Kitchener, 2007b). 
According to the 2005 and 2006 Downtown Monitoring Report (City of Kitchener, 2006f; 
City of Kitchener, 2007a), the Downtown Incentives Program has continually facilitated 
renovations and intrigued private sector support for downtown redevelopment. Table 4.2 
summarizes the annual activity of all Downtown Financial Incentives from 2003 to 2006. 
Although this program is not especially designated to help investors clean up brownfield 
sites, several brownfield projects in downtown Kitchener have taken advantage of the 
Downtown Financial Incentives which help cover costs for building improvements and 
waive various planning and permit fees. These projects include the Kaufman Lofts in the 
old rubber boot factory, the Eaton’s Lofts in the former Eaton’s department store and the 
Mansion Lofts in a 103-year-old J.C. Snyder furniture factory. As a rule of thumb, the 







Table 4.2: Summary of Downtown Financial Incentives 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 









Total value of Façade/Interior 
loans 
$90,000 $130,000 $75,585 $255,000 
Total value of upper storey loans - - - $265,000 
Total value of Façade/Interior 
improvements31
$500,00 $605,000 $171,881 $1M 
Total value of upper storey 
improvements 
- - - $568,000 
Total value of downtown rebates $200,000 $21,230 $40,784 $61,500 
Sources: Financial Service Department, City of Kitchener (2006f), p12; City of Kitchener 
(2007a), p13. 
 
Table 4.3: Economic Benefits from Three Brownfield Projects in Downtown Kitchener 
Projects Kaufman Lofts32 Eaton’s Lofts33 Mansion Lofts34
Opened Year Opened 2007 Opened 2005 Opened 2005 
Site Area 1.7 ha. - 0.46 ha. 
# of New Units 270 32 58 
Range of Price 
Phase Ι:$115,990 to 
$221,990 
 
Phase II: $149,990 to 
$188,990 
$99,000 to $299,990 one-bedrooms starting at $169,900 
Annual Property Taxes 
Before Redevelopment $660,000 - $27,000 
Annual Projected 
Property Taxes After 
Redevelopment 
About $1.2 million - at least $100,000 
Sources: Bow (2005); Pender (December 29, 2004); Pender (January 31, 2005). 
                                                 
31 According to the 2005 Downtown Monitoring Report, estimated improvements are based solely on loans issued 
through the downtown Façade/Interior loans program (City of Kitchener, 2006f, p12) 
32 http://www.kaufmanlofts.com/
33 http://www.eatonslofts.com/
34 http://www.theloftsonmansion.com/home.html  
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The Brownfield Remediation Program has been active since the approval by MMAH in 
November 2003. “The program has been successful. Four developments are underway, 
and they would not make without municipal support” (Kitchener Senior Planner). 
“Kitchener has done a very good job in terms of coming up with an incentive package to 
facilitate brownfield redevelopment” (Kitchener Planning Consultant). Tax Incremental 
Financing in the Brownfield Remediation CIP has allowed the investors in the four 
projects to recover some or all of the cleanup cost, while in return the city gets increased 
tax assessment, reduced environmental threats, and new high-density housing units. 
Table 4.4 is a summary of the four projects using the Brownfield Remediation Program. 
The table was made based on information collected from interviews, local newspaper, 
and staff reports in the City of Kitchener. 
 
In addition, with the City’s direct assistance of donating the property and contributing the 
money, the St. Jerome’s building has become the new Wilfrid Laurier’s Lyle S. Hallman 
Faculty of Social Work, while the Epton factory is becoming the University of 
Waterloo’s School of Pharmacy rather than a vacant parking lot. A $6.5 million 
investment of the Economic Development Investment Fund (EDIF) from the City of 
Kitchener has made it possible for Wilfrid Laurier University to move its School of 
Social Work to the former St. Jerome’s High School. It is estimated that the new campus 
will annually generate economic spin-offs of $1.48 million (City of Kitchener, 2006f). As 
well, the new School of Pharmacy at the University of Waterloo on the former Epton 
Factory becomes possible through a $30 million EDIF and a donation of the property 
from the City (University of Waterloo and City of Kitchener, 2004). One hundred and 
twenty pharmacists are expected to graduate from the new school annually. It is estimated 
that “the project will add $31 million to the region’s economy; create approximately 358 
full-time equivalent jobs and some $21 million in wages and salaries” (City of Kitchener, 






Table 4.4: Summary of Projects Using the Brownfield Remediation Program (2004-2006) 
Project 1420 King St. E. 
537 Frederick 
St. 
The Intowns, 90 
Woodside Ave. 
Arrow Lofts, 112 
Benton St. 
Site Area 0.3 ha - 3.38 ha 0.89 ha 
Former Use - 





repair, and used 
car lot 
A succession of 
Buffalo Forge 
Company, Canadian 
Blower & Forge Ltd., 
Canadian 
Blower/Canada 










Medical building 128 condominium townhouses 
Phase I: 150-unit 
rental loft 
apartments in the 
old building 
Phase II: 180 










A break of 
$34,631.13 to 
cover the total 
eligible 
remediation cost 
A break of 
$1,215,260 over a 10-
year period to cover 
part of the cleanup 
cost of $1.9 million 
A break of 1.1 
million in 10 
years to cover part 
of the clean up 
cost of 2.3 million 
Projected 
Construction 











- - $417,614 $393,531 
 
Sources: Pender (October 13, 2006); Pender (November 20, 2004); City of Kitchener 
Reports (2006g, 2006h, and 2006i) 
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4.2.7 A Showcase: Kaufman Lofts  
The Kaufman building on King Street East at Victoria once housed one of the world’s 
most famous footwear manufacturers, the Kaufman Rubber Company plant. The 22-year-
old entrepreneur A.R. Kaufman started the footwear company in 1907 with financing 
from his father who owned a lumber business. By 1912 it had grown to be one of three 
largest rubber factories in Berlin35, and one of Berlin’s largest employers as well (English 
and McLaughlin, 1996). Kaufman Rubber had produced many famous footwear brands 
during its long period of operation, such as Life-Buoy, Foamtreads, Sorel and Funtreads 
(Mills, 2002). However, the pre-eminence of the old footwear factory ebbed away in July 
2000 when Kaufman declared bankruptcy. Kimshaw Holdings and its Toronto-area 
partner, Andrin Ltd., bought the Kaufman building in 2002 from Ernst & Young, the 
family-owned factory’s receiver. The new owners showed great respect to the history of 
the building, and planned to maintain the architectural integrity of the old building. They 
invested nearly $20 million to convert the 200,000 square feet (18581 square meters), 
five-storey historic building into a loft that can house up to 270 residential apartment 
units together with 350 surface parking lots. Also, the historic machine of the steam 
engine named “Hazel”, which had provided power for Kaufman Rubber with a huge 16-
foot flywheel right up until the factory’s closure, was donated by the developers to the 
City of Kitchener’s Industrial Artifacts Project. Figure 4.4 presents photographs of the 
Kaufman building in the past and pictures taken from on-site observation in July 2006. 
 
This site was contaminated with four phases of naphtha: (1) free product, (2) residual 
naphtha adsorbed on soil particles, (3) dissolved-phase naphtha (including BTEX), and (4) 
vapour-phase naphtha (Kitchener Engineering Consultant). The contaminants were 
concentrated in a hot spot under the back corner of the main building, which is a former 
underground storage tank that held naphthalene, a component of glue used to produce 
footwear. The original building itself was contaminated with lead-based paint, which 
could be readily removed.  
 
 
                                                 
35 The other two rubber factories are Dominion Tire and Merchants. 
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Figure 4.4: The Kaufman Building 
    
    
Upper Left:     An early sketch of the Kaufman Rubber Co (Mills, 2002, p44). 
Upper Right: The building still remains a very commanding presence on King Street 
East at Victoria. It is impossible to pass by it without notice.  
Lower Left:   A.R. Kaufman (fourth from the left) pauses during a game of shinny with 
other employees in the inner courtyard area (Courtesy Kaufman Collection, 
UW in Mills, 2002, p44). 
Lower Right: The architectural integrity of the old building was restored in the 
development. 
 
The developers of the Kaufman Lofts Project came up with the idea to sever the property 
into several parcels. The main building as a plot according to the severance was cleaned 
up to a generic set of standards and got a Record of Site Condition from MOE and 
finance from a financing company. But for the hot spot which took a relatively longer 
time for underground soil remediation and had the liability of contamination, a Site-
Specific Risk Assessment (SSRA) approach was used. There was a Multi-Phase 
Extraction (MPE) system installed in situ to lift free product, soil vapours and 
 76
groundwater to the surface for treatment. An oil-water separator was used to remove free 
product while an air stripper was used to remove contaminants from groundwater. As of 
the on-site observation date of July 11th, 2006, the work to remove the naphthalene 
contamination detected in the hot spot was in progress, while the southern half of the 
original building (i.e. Phase I) was being furnished and the northern half of the building 
(i.e. Phase II) was undergoing new window and structural construction. Figure 4.5 
illustrates a series of construction underway in Kaufman Lofts on July 11th, 2006 from 
on-site observation. The occupancy of the building was opened in April 2007. 
 
Figure 4.5: A Series of Construction underway in Kaufman Lofts as of July 11th, 2006 
   
 
Upper Left: Hot Spot that is 
undergoing remediation 
 
Upper Right: Loft in Phase I that is 
being furnished with interior features 
 
Left: New windows being installed in 
Phase II 
 
The Kaufman Lofts project turned out to be quite successful in terms of its sale record. 
The market success of the Kaufman Lofts was greater than the developers’ original 
expectation. The Phase II was totally sold out by October 2006 while the project’s first 
phase of 114 units in the southern half of the building was sold out rapidly in six weeks in 
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2005. In 2005, the Kaufman Lofts Project was named best small/medium scale project at 
the Canadian Urban Institute’s (CUI) Brownie Awards ceremony, in a competitive 
category with 60 nominations from all over Canada. The Kaufman Lofts project was also 
included in the brochure Brownfield Showcase II produced by MMAH in summer 2004. 
The final product of the project came out in April 2007. 
 
“The financial incentives and the municipal attitude about redeveloping downtown are 
essential attributes that draw us to the site” one of the co-developers in the project at 
Kimshaw Holdings stated in the interview. First of all, the Kaufman Lofts project has 
benefited from financial incentives contained in the Downtown Community Improvement 
Plan36. The City of Kitchener waived fees and development charges (both Regional and 
Municipal) worth about $1.4 million for the project. “If you don’t have the break on the 
development charges and those sorts of things, you just can’t afford it, unless they are 
luxury projects the margin isn’t there to develop downtown residential. It just isn’t” The 
project manager for Andrin Ltd. told the newspaper staff of The Record (Pender, 2004, 
December 29). “It was a huge amount of money for the cleanup of the contamination. If 
there were no such a financial incentive, the project wouldn’t be viable.” The developer 
at Kimshaw Holdings also confirmed the importance of financial incentives in the 
interview. Secondly, the City showed a very proactive attitude towards the project by 
assigning a city staff to work closely with the developers and to facilitate all the related 
planning approvals and variances. For instance, the developers changed the development 
plan for several times before they came to a final decision of converting the building into 
all apartments.  This decision encountered a great challenge of re-zoning application. The 
City of Kitchener had a prohibition against ground floor residential on King Street while 
the Kaufman building was right on the end of King Street, the end of downtown. 
Fortunately, the project finally received the re-zoning approval thanks to the cooperative 
efforts from the developer, the local government and the planning consulting firm serving 
in the project. The city staff and the brownfield coordinator are especially helpful to the 
developer during the planning approval process “…he is really great, with clear 
                                                 
36 The Kaufman Lofts project has not applied for TIF in the Brwonfield Remediation Program because the project 
commenced prior to the development of the program. 
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commitment and patience…” The developer in Kimshaw Holdings praised the 
brownfield coordinator. 
 
4.3 Brownfield Redevelopment in City of Hamilton, Ontario 
4.3.1 Introduction of Hamilton 
The City of Hamilton (formerly the Hamilton-Wentworth Region) has always been a 
fascinating city situated on the southwestern shore of Lake Ontario.  It is unique not only 
in its physical features but also in its fame as a centre of Canadian industry since the mid-
nineteenth century. To the North is the crystal-clear water of Hamilton Harbour; to the 
West is a spectacular bird’s eye view of Dundas Valley; while the world-famous 
limestone ridge, the Niagara Escarpment locally known as “the mountain”, running 
across the middle of the city, has long been a joy to the residents of the city. Canada’s 
two largest steel factories are located here. McMaster University, one of the finest 
Canadian universities, is also located in this city.   
 
 In 1813 when George Hamilton laid out his farm land into lots, little did he know that he 
had established the foundation of what would be, almost two hundred years after, a city 
called Hamilton with a population of more than half a million people (Lister, 1913; 
Freeman, 2001). At that time Hamilton was no more than a self-contained village with 
small workshops. The first impetus to the industrial life of Hamilton can be traced back to 
the year 1823 when the Burlington Canal was constructed to connect the Burlington 
Bay37 with Lake Ontario (Lister, 1913). With its opening in 1834, Hamilton soon became 
the entranceway for goods and people heading further west and an important port for the 
export of agricultural products (Freeman, 2001). Twenty years after, the Great Western 
Railway which went from Niagara Falls through Hamilton to London and Windsor was 
in operation. Manufacturing industries that took advantage of water and rail 
transportation gradually concentrated along the bayshore in Hamilton. This kind of 
expansion was especially the case during Hamilton’s Second Industrial Revolution 
                                                 
37 The historic name of Burlington Bay was changed officially to Hamilton Harbour in 1919 (Weaver, 1982) 
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(Weaver, 1982). Figure 4.6 provides a map of land use and railways in Hamilton in 1914. 
In early 1910s, Canada’s two largest steel producers, Stelco and Dofasco were 
established along the waterfront in the east end of the city. With massive investment in 
the manufacturing industries, workers flocked into Hamilton. Many British immigrants 
from the rapidly developing industrial centers of Britain came to Hamilton with valuable 
skills. Hamilton thus progressed to a manufacturing center at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and got its nicknames such as the Ambitious City, the Birmingham of 
Canada and Steel Town (Freeman, 2001). 
 
Figure 4.6: Land Use and Railways in Hamilton (1914) 
 
Source: Weaver, 1982, p97 
 
Hamilton suffered greatly from the 1930s Great Depression because of its dependence on 
heavy industry. Companies like National Steel Car and the steel companies were 
operating at 40 to 50 percent capacity (Freeman, 2001). Blue-collar people who earned 
their living by the honest sweat of their labours experienced hard times. Fortunately, 
boom times came back during the postwar period (1946-1980). Steel mills as well as 
hundreds of secondary industries dependent on steel expanded at an unprecedented pace 
(Weaver, 1982). In order to guarantee the expansion of plants and docking facilities, 
large-scale landfill projects in the east end of Hamilton Harbour were approved by the 
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Harbour Commissioners and new employment land was created (Freeman, 2001). Figure 
4.7 shows the industrial concentration on the harbour in 1968. Industrial land expanded a 
lot towards the Burlington Bay James N. Allan Skyway Bridge with landfill strips when 
compared with Figure 4.6. Hamilton had “one of the highest growth rates and per capita 
incomes in Canada during the 1960’s and 1970’s” (City of Hamilton, 2005a, p20).  
 
Figure 4.7: Land Use in Hamilton (1968) 
 
Source: Weaver, 1982, p180. 
 
The dominance of manufacturing in Hamilton’s economy has dwindled ever since the 
1980’s (City of Hamilton, 2005a). After the creation of NAFTA (North American Free 
Trade Agreement) in the 1980s, many Canadian companies encountered fierce 
competition from American companies. Companies were reformed into “smaller, more 
economical units” and they stopped operations in large manufacturing centres like 
Hamilton (Freeman, 2001). These closed-up factories in the past twenty years, as well as 
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the old textile and auto industries which disappeared in the 1950’s and 1960’s, form the 
so-called brownfields in Hamilton. However, the shrinkage of the manufacturing industry 
and economic change have not created as much of a panic as in the Depression.  Instead, 
Hamilton has evolved from a one industry “Steel Town” into a more diversified city 
today at the hub of Ontario’s Golden Horseshoe. Fuelled by innovative R&D at 
McMaster University, smaller and medium-sized technologically advanced 
manufacturing firms are springing up along the major transportation corridors while the 
service sector has grown (City of Hamilton, 2005a). Hamilton Health Sciences Corp is 
the largest employer in the city now with over 9,000 employees (City of Hamilton, 
2006a). The unemployment rate has remained between 5.5 and 6.8 percent in the past 
five years, approximately the same rate as Toronto and other centers in the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA) (City of Hamilton, 2006b). 
 
4.3.2 Brownfields in Hamilton 
In both Hamilton’s Environmental Remediation and Site Enhancement (ERASE) 
Community Improvement Plan and Hamilton’s Economic Development Strategy, 
“brownfields” are defined as “abandoned, idled or underused industrial or commercial 
properties in built-up urban areas where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by 
real or perceived environmental contamination, building deterioration/obsolescence, 
and/or inadequate infrastructure” (City of Hamilton, 2005a, p87; City of Hamilton, 2005b, 
p2). This definition has limited the physical boundary of Hamilton’s brownfields within 
built-up urban areas while at the same time extended the concept to a broader scope 
which is not just focused on contamination but also building deterioration. 
 
Similar to many other municipalities in Ontario, the City of Hamilton does not have an 
inventory of brownfields at present. What the City does have are fragmented databases, 
such as the listing of gas stations and former landfill sites inventory. According to the 
Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator, the City has received funds from FCM (Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities) for historic land use studies, which will help to establish a 
complete list of brownfields over the entire city. It should be noted here that all those 
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documents are restricted for internal use only and will not be released to the public, 
considering the negative impact on property value and the potential civil liability incurred 
by incorrectly labelling a brownfield site (Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator). It is 
estimated that there are approximately 150-200 brownfield sites within the 2001 ERASE 
CIP program boundaries (Boles, 2003). However, based on the updated Hamilton 
ERASE CIP approved by MMAH in November 2005, the number of brownfield 
properties in the entire area of Hamilton has increased to 300-400 (City of Hamilton, 
2005b). The main reason for the difference lies in the boundaries of the Community 
Improvement Project Area in the two versions of ERASE CIP. The original 2001 ERASE 
CIP applies to the Old Industrial Area, while the recent 2005 version has taken into 
account two additional areas where brownfields also exist. They are West Harbour Area 
and the Rest of Urban Area (See Figure 4.8). 
 
In the past, as shown by Figure 4.6 and 4.7, Hamilton’s industrial activities were mainly 
clustered in the Bayfront Industrial Area (1214 ha. in size), the North Hamilton Industrial 
Area (28 ha.), the West Hamilton Industrial Area (101 ha.) and part of the East Hamilton 
Industrial Area (26 ha.), all of which constitute the approximately 1376 hectares of the 
Old Industrial Area in Hamilton (City of Hamilton, 2005b). By and large, due to the 
extensive contamination resulting from past industrial uses and the vast quantities of 
contaminated soil placed as fill, the Old Industrial Area now is the location of 150-200 of 
Hamilton’s brownfields (City of Hamilton, 2005b). In addition, the industrial uses in the 
West Harbour Area also form part of brownfields in Hamilton, because the West Harbour 
Area is designated to be redeveloped for non-industrial uses according to the City’s long 
term planning project Setting Sail38 under collaboration between the City of Hamilton 
and Hamilton Port Authority (City of Hamilton, 2005b). The Port Authority transferred 
the land ownership of Piers 1, 2 and 5 through 8 in West Harbour Area to the City of 
Hamilton for recreational uses in the future. In fact, some of the industrial sites in the 
West Harbour Area have already been converted into recreational use in recent years, 
such as Pier 4, Bayfront Park and the Waterfront Trail. The few remaining industrial uses 




 Figure 4.8: 2005 ERASE CIP Project Area 
 




in this area will also be relocated and converted in the future. It is estimated that there are 
also more than 200 brownfields spread throughout the rest of the urban area in Hamilton, 
including the downtown (City of Hamilton, 2005b). These sites were abandoned or 
deteriorated as a physical legacy of suburbanization and industrialization in the past and 
they were potentially contaminated in soil and groundwater. These sites include former 
waste disposal sites, asphalt plants, automobile wrecking yards, textile mills, blacksmiths 
and dry cleaners (City of Hamilton, 2005b). Hamilton’s brownfields are spread in the Old 
Industrial Areas, the West Harbour Area and throughout the entire urbanized area. 
 
4.3.3 The Impetus for Brownfield Redevelopment 
The Hamilton 2005 ERASE CIP comprehensively identified the economic, social and 
environmental benefits from brownfield redevelopment (See Figure 4.9). Among all these 
benefits, the solid “public good” rationale is regarded as a main reason for government 
involvement in promoting brownfield development. These public goods include: 
 
• increased tax assessment for the municipality and the Province; 
• creation and retention of employment opportunities; 
• utilization of existing infrastructure resulting in a reduction of urban sprawl and 
its related costs (hard and soft services).; 
• contribution toward the revitalization of particular areas and neighbourhoods; and, 
• environmental restoration which can remove threats to the health of workers and 
residents.  
      (City of Hamilton, 2005b, p4) 
 
Two aspects of the above “public good” were also emphasized by the Hamilton 
Brownfield Coordinator during an interview: economic benefit on tax assessment and the 
environmental impact on public health/safety. According to the Hamilton Brownfield 
Coordinator, the economic benefit on tax assessment is twofold. On one hand, a 
brownfield site usually incurs mounting tax arrears, which is an “ever-increasing 
problem” in many Canadian cities (Piccioni, 2003). It is estimated that for abandoned 
industrial properties in Hamilton’s Old Industrial Area, the amount of property tax arrears 
is over $10 million (Piccioni, 2003). Redeveloping those abandoned brownfield sites not 
only stops the potential tax arrears but also generates new property tax. On the other hand, 
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redeveloping brownfields can increase the value of adjacent properties. A 1998 
Environment Canada study compared property sale prices for houses within 3,500 feet of 
Hamilton West Harbour’s Bayfront Park39 with sale prices for houses farther than 3,500 
feet away from the park during 1983 and 1996. The study revealed that for houses in the 
study group, approximately 18.5% of the aggregate 1996 property values were brought 
by the development of Bayfront Park and improvements in water quality (City of 
Hamilton, 2005b). The increased property tax resulting from the Bayfront Park could 
have contributed more than $560,000 to the City’s property tax revenues at the time (City 
of Hamilton, 2005b). Brownfield redevelopment presents a far-reaching economic 
opportunity to the City of Hamilton. 
 
Figure 4.9: Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment and their Interrelationships 
 
Source: Regional Analytics, 2002, in Hamilton 2005 ERASE CIP, p4  
 
Another obvious concern drawing the City’s attention are environmental problems 
associated with brownfield sites (Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator). Most of Hamilton’s 
brownfield sites are former industrial buildings which are abandoned, derelict and in a 
state of disrepair. Various industrial uses in the past could have caused soil and 
groundwater contamination, such as automobile wrecker yards and petroleum storage. In 
addition, some brownfield sites are subject to trespassing, vandalism, fire, crime, etc, 
                                                 
39 Bayfront Park was once a 16-hectare former landfill site on Hamilton West Harbour. 
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causing great public concern for safety (City of Hamilton, 2005b). Almost no 
Hamiltonian would have forgotten the 1997 conflagration at a plastics recycling facility 
known as Plastimet, a former metal smelting facility in the period of 1950 to 1990. A 
black toxic cloud had hung over the City for four days and the fire was the worst in 
Hamilton’s history. The fire aroused the City’s great concern on public safety, because 
the brownfield site was close to a residential area. 
 
Thirdly, the continuing demand for heavy industry and manufacturing types of land in the 
Hamilton area is considered as a significant motivation by Hamilton 2005 ERASE CIP as 
well as the academic literature (City of Hamilton, 2005b; Boles, 2003). In Ontario, it 
becomes more and more difficult for manufacturing industry to locate in an appropriately 
sized land parcel because most Ontario municipalities no longer zone land for such a kind 
of industrial use. In that case, the Old Industrial Area in Hamilton can best meet the 
growing demand because of its current inventory of heavy industrial uses and the 
restrictive zoning in greenfields (City of Hamilton, 2005b). Promoting the redevelopment 
of abandoned, underused industrial land in the Old Industrial Area for new industrial uses 
will generate new job opportunities and economic benefits for Hamiltonians. 
 
4.3.4 Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment in the City 
In the Brownfield Coordinator’s opinion, the biggest barrier to brownfield redevelopment 
in the City of Hamilton is the upfront financing which is twofold: 1) the expensive 
upfront cost; 2) banks’ unwillingness to finance brownfield projects. In the Hamilton 
2005 ERASE CIP, this issue has been addressed. For one thing, it usually requires a large 
amount of money for developers to cover the upfront cost of remediating brownfield sites. 
These upfront costs are additional costs of a brownfield rather than a greenfield project. 
They are mainly associated with the four sequential Phases of Environmental Site 
Assessment (ESA) required by Ontario EPA. Phase II (sampling and analysis) ESA can 
be very expensive, especially for large environmentally complex brownfield properties, 
needless to say remediating the site to meet the regulation standards. In addition, other 
upfront costs associated with building demolition and infrastructure upgrading may 
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sometimes exceed the costs of environmental remediation. This is a common occurrence 
on brownfield sites located in the Old Industrial Area, since Hamilton is an old city with 
a rich history of industrialization (City of Hamilton, 2005b). Unless financial assistance is 
provided to offset the expensive upfront costs, brownfield sites may remain less 
financially competitive than greenfield sites. For another thing, as part of the financing 
equation, banks fear of exposing themselves to the liability of contamination and are 
unwilling to finance brownfield sites unless the contaminated land has been cleaned up 
and a Record of Site Condition is filed in the Brownfield Environmental Site Registry 
(Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator). As a result, “…from the time developers buy the 
brownfield site, and decide to redevelop the site, to the time they get it clean and they can 
construct a new property, that’s a lot of money and it could be, who knows how long, 4, 6, 
8 years… it depends on how quickly the remediation goes…developers are financing 
themselves”, said the Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator. 
 
The second biggest barrier to brownfield redevelopment is the contamination liability 
(Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator). All participants in a brownfield project may be 
exposed to liability arising from the contamination caused by the original “polluter” 
(Hamilton Brownfield Cordinator). There is no definite time length of exposure to this 
liability as well as no fixed amount of the potential liability. In Hamilton, many large 
landowners are unwilling to sell their properties mainly because of the potential exposure 
to contamination liability (Boles, 2003). If they do sell their properties, they only sell 
them to those buyers with “deep pockets” who can reduce the risk of future problems 
(Boles, 2003). Imperial Oil has 4-8 hectare property down the industrial core in Hamilton 
which has been vacant for at least 25 years. Imperial Oil has been paying taxes on the 
property while doing nothing with the site. “My impression is that they feel they can not 
get the site cleaned up to the standard…and if they can clean it up to today’s standard, the 
standard will probably get higher in 2 or 3 years and when the liability stems back to 
them, they don’t feel they can be exempted from the problem”, said the Hamilton 
Brownfield Coordinator.  
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The third key barrier was identified as the lack of detailed information on brownfield 
sites in the City (City of Hamilton, 2005b). Traditional databases involving a map of 
potential brownfield sites over a large urban area, a listing of certain types of brownfields 
such as former landfill sites, and/or Phase I ESA, are not enough to attract developers to 
redevelop brownfields. In addition to the locations, detailed information on the existence, 
type, and extent of contamination, and the estimated cleanup cost all play an important 
role in developers’ decision-making (City of Hamilton, 2005b). Such detailed 
information is generally produced by a Phase II ESA. Due to the expensive study cost, 
few property owners are willing to carry out a Phase II ESA. Sometimes even though the 
property owners do have the detailed environmental information for the brownfield site, 
they do not tend to reveal their Phase II ESAs for the fear of undesirable consequences 
such as decreasing property value or being forced to clean up the property. Therefore, 
developers who are interested in brownfield sites usually have to educate themselves and 
collect all the related information. 
 
Fourthly, the complicated planning process and the lengthy time required to obtain 
planning approvals are also regarded as a key stumbling block by the municipality (Boles, 
2003; Piccioni, 2004). Before the City of Hamilton responded to this barrier and carried 
out any counter-measure as will be discussed following, it was common for developers to 
visit several different divisions for one brownfield project. At times, when different 
divisions reviewed and approved the same proposed redevelopment project, their 
responses might be overlapping and even inconsistent with each other, leading to the 
complexity and uncertainty. 
 
4.3.5 Municipal Approaches to Promote Brownfield Redevelopment 
The City of Hamilton is among the rare municipalities in Ontario which has been very 
proactive in addressing brownfield issue at a very early time dating back to the 1980s. At 
that time, the concept of brownfields was not recognized in Canada, yet contaminated 
land had drawn Hamilton’s attention. The City reclaimed 16.2 hectares of contaminated 
land on the City’s Bayfront in 1985 and converted the land into Bayfront Park 
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(CMHC&SCHL, 2005). However, it was not until 1997 that the City of Hamilton began 
seriously addressing the issue of brownfields (Piccioni, 2003). The City established a 
public/private sector task force known as Industrial Redevelopment Task Force in 1997, 
which consisted of 20 handpicked stakeholders, in order to identify the barriers to 
brownfield redevelopment and formulate an action plan. In June of 1999, the City of 
Hamilton Council authorized staff to prepare the City of Hamilton Environmental 
Remediation and Site Enhancement (ERASE) Community Improvement Plan (CIP). As 
suggested by its name, the CIP was aimed to “erase” brownfield sites by means of 
providing incentives to remediate and redevelop them into productive land uses (Piccioni, 
2003; Boles, 2003). The Plan was the first one in Canada which utilized a community 
improvement plan to provide financial assistance to brownfield redevelopment under 
Section 28 of Planning Act (City of Hamilton, 2005). The Plan was adopted by City 
Council in April of 2001 and subsequently approved by MMAH in August 2001. In 2005, 
the ERASE CIP expanded its project area from the original Old Industrial Area in 2001 
to the entire urban area of the City (See Figure 4.8). Besides, programs provided in both 
the 2001 and 2005 ERASE CIP are not limited to financial initiatives, but also include 
other initiatives such as Municipal Acquisition and Partnership Program, Marketing and 
Opportunity Program. As a whole, all these programs were adopted by the City in the 
past to overcome the barriers and promote brownfield redevelopment.  
 
1. Financial Incentives 
There are four types of programs particularly directed at the private sector and designated 
to provide financial assistance to overcome the major impediment in brownfield 
redevelopment in the City of Hamilton: 
 
• ERASE Study Grant Program (SGP); 
• ERASE Redevelopment Grant Program (RGP);  
• ERASE Tax Assistance Program (TAP); and 
• ERASE Development Charge Reduction Program (DCRP).  





(1) ERASE Study Grant Program (SGP) 
It has been identified that one of the key barriers to brownfield redevelopment in the City 
of Hamilton is the lack of detailed information on the existence, type, and extent of 
contamination, and the estimated cost of remediation. Few property owners will be 
willing to carry out Phase II ESA due to the expensive study cost. Therefore the purpose 
of SGP is to “promote the undertaking of environmental studies so that more and better 
information is available with respect to the type of contamination and potential 
remediation costs on brownfield properties” (City of Hamilton, 2005b, p28). The 
program is eligible for Phase II ESA and/or Phase III ESA – Remedial Work Plan within 
the Project Area shown in Figure 4.8. The SGP provides a matching grant equal to 50% 
of the total cost of the environmental study to a maximum of: 
 
• $15,000 per study; 
• two studies per property/project; 
• $20,000 per propert/project. 
(City of Hamilton, 2005b, p28) 
 
 (2) ERASE Redevelopment Grant Program (RGP) 
The program is considered as the “cornerstone” of the EARSE CIP and takes advantage 
of tax-increment financing (Piccioni, 2003). The purpose of RGP is “to remove a serous 
financial impediment to brownfield redevelopment efforts, namely the large tax increase 
that can result when a brownfield property is redeveloped” (City of Hamilton, 2005b, 
p31). Annual grants for up to 10 years to those brownfield redevelopment projects that 
will result in an increase in property assessment and taxes are provided in this program. 
These grants are equivalent to 80% of the municipal portion of the increase in property 
taxes that result from the redevelopment. The RGP applies to the costs of environmental 
remediation, demolition, and site preparation including improvement of sewers and water 
services. 
 
The grants from RGP are paid on a “pay-as-you-go” basis. Specifically, the property 
owner or developer at first pays for the total cost of the environmental remediation and 
redevelops the site into a new property. When the project is completed and the property is 
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re-assessed, the property owner or developer pays the property tax in full each year and 
the municipality reimburses the approved applicant with an annual grant. All grants in 
RGP stop when the payment equals to the total value of the work done, or after 10 years, 
whichever comes first (City of Hamilton, 2005b). The RGP is essentially a win-win 
situation both for the municipality and the private sector (Boles, 2003). Without this grant 
program, a brownfield project would never get started and the property taxes on the site 
would remain the same as the pre-project assessment, and then there is no increase on the 
tax base. 
 
(3) ERASE Tax Assistance Program (TAP) 
This program is quite similar to the RGP, and is also designated to overcome the biggest 
barrier of financing in brownfield redevelopment by providing assistance matching with 
80% TIF (Tax Incremental Financing) (City of Hamilton, 2005b). The major differences 
between TAP and RGP are that (1) the TAP applies only to the costs of environmental 
remediation; (2) the tax increment includes both the increase in the municipal portion of 
the property taxes and the education portion of taxes resulted from the remediation and 
rehabilitation of the property. Specifically, in TAP, taxes will be frozen at first. The 
developer pays the entire upfront cost of the remediation at the time of development, and 
then the City may cancel 80% of the increase in City taxes on an annual basis for up to 3 
years, after the incremental property taxes have been paid to the municipality (City of 
Hamilton, 2005b). Approval for the 80% of the increase in education portion of taxes 
under TAP may be provided by the Minister of Finance. It should be noted here that the 
brownfield project proposed for industrial uses in the West Harbour Area (See Figure 4.8) 
and proposals for residential uses in Old Industrial Area are not eligible for both of RGP 
and TAP according to 2005 ERASE CIP. 
 
(4) ERASE Development Charge Reduction Program (DCRP) 
This program provides a reduction of development charges for the developer to cover the 
costs of environmental remediation approved under the ERASE RGP. In other words, the 
approved applicants in RGP have the alternative to apply the remediation costs against 
development charges payable for the brownfield site (City of Hamilton, 2005b). For 
 92
example, if the remediation cost is greater than the payable development charges, the 
development charges will be reduced to zero, and the RGP will be reduced by the amount 
of remediation costs against the payable development charges (City of Hamilton, 2005b). 
Eligible costs include the remediation costs and Phase II and Phase III ESA/SSRA not 
covered by the SGP. 
 
2. Municipal Leadership and Partnership 
In Hamilton, there are brownfield properties owned by the municipality and sites with 
which the City may potentially be vested because of property tax defaults and a failed tax 
sale. In order to promote the economic renaissance and the redevelopment of brownfield 
sites over the entire city, the City of Hamilton has been taking a very proactive role in 
redeveloping those key brownfield sites ever since the early 1980s through municipal 
acquisition and/or participation in public/private partnerships, regardless of potential 
exposure to  the liability of contamination.  
 
In 2001, the ERASE Municipal Acquisition and Partnership Program (MAPP) was 
initiated for the City to “create awareness of brownfield redevelopment opportunities and 
funding through municipal leadership in property acquisition, investment and municipal 
financial involvement in pilot projects to clean up and redevelop brownfield sites in the 
Project Area” (City of Hamilton, 2005b, p41). MMAP is funded through the 20% of TIF 
or RGP kept by the City, money from the City Council as well as the Green Municipal 
Enabling Fund (GMEF)40 from the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. The City uses 
these funds to redevelop City owned brownfield sites, purchase and redevelop key 
strategic parcels, or participate in public/private partnerships in pilot projects (City of 
Hamilton, 2005b). These pilot projects involve innovative cleanup technologies, 
community consultation techniques, and use of other tools such as environmental 
insurance.  
 
                                                 
40 GMEF is a five-year, $25 million fund that provides grants to support feasibility studies that assess the technical, 
environmental and/or economic feasibility of innovative municipal or municipally sponsored projects. GMEF and the 
Green Municipal Investment Fund (GMIF) constitute the Green Municipal Funds (GMFs). 
http://www.fcm.ca/pcp/gmefcrit-e.html  
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3. Marketing and Education 
A program called ERASE Marketing and Opportunities Program (MOP) was initiated 
because the City has fully realized that the success of financial incentive programs in 
ERASE is closely related to the aggressive and appropriate marketing of these programs, 
particularly when it comes to brownfield redevelopment given the high level of risks 
(Piccioni, 2003). The financial incentive programs mentioned before would not be 
effective if the brownfield stakeholders are not aware of them (City of Hamilton, 2005b). 
According to the ERASE CIP, the MOP is composed of information, education and 
marketing, which takes the following form of: 
 
• revisions to the marketing brochure and City web site; 
• application forms and guides on CD ROM;  
• presentations to property owners, the development industry, real estate 
professionals, environmental consultants, planning consultants, lawyers, 
accountants and other support professionals; and 
• targeted mailings to property owners within the Project Area to inform them 
of the ERASE Programs and other activities. 
      (City of Hamilton, 2005b, p43) 
 
4. Planning Policy and Standardized Procedure 
In order to reduce the administrative burden and complexity in the planning approval 
process, the City of Hamilton established a formal policy to standardize the planning 
procedures of brownfield applications under the Planning Act in 1997 (Boles, 2003; 
Piccioni, 2004). The standardized procedure clarified the City’s site assessment and 
cleanup requirement, providing clarity and certainty to the property owners and 
developers (Piccioni, 2004). It also helped ensure that brownfield developers consistently 
received fair and efficient treatment in the applications (Boles, 2003).  
 
In addition, in the fall of 1999 when the ERASE CIP was being created, the City of 
Hamilton hired a Brownfield Coordinator to lead the development of the ERASE CIP. 
Henceforth, the position of Brownfield Coordinator has been kept until today. The 
Brownfield Coordinator works as a bridge connecting the municipality with the private 
sector in the brownfield projects. “…as much as a policy maker, the municipality really 
need to have an appointed person who can work with developers, understand what they 
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need and convey it to the City. We are trying to give a customer focus and we are right 
here on the ground”, said the Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator, “… my role is pretty 
much a role of the facilitation. Sometimes I might hold the developers’ hands and have 
them get in touch with the right person in the Building Division, Planning, Public Works 
whatever, who can help to solve their problems”. The City of Hamilton has also created 
the role of facilitator in other departments in the City, such as Engineering and Planning, 
in order to ensure all the brownfield applications are handled more efficiently and the 
process is streamlined and fast tracked (Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator). 
 
4.3.6 Results 
I. Before the Introduction of the City’s ERASE Community Improvement Plan in 
2001 
Because of the City’s ongoing commitment to brownfield development and participation 
in public/private partnerships, a number of brownfield sites in the City of Hamilton have 
been redeveloped before the introduction of the City’s ERASE CIP in 2001. These sites 
include the 1985-1993 development of Bayfront Park on a former landfill site, the 1992-
1993 development of Pier 4 Park, the LIUNA Station and LIUNA Nursing Home (City of 
Hamilton, 2000). Pier 4 Park and Bayfront Park were redeveloped by the City as part of 
the municipality’s initiative to revitalize the waterfront. “They have received local, 
provincial, national and international recognition and Hamiltonians are indeed proud of 
their revitalized waterfront” (City of Hamilton, 2006c). The LIUNA Station was a former 
CN train station and was vacant and abandoned for almost 10 years before it was 
redeveloped. The City provided an annual tax grant to the Labourers’ International Union 
of North America (LIUNA) for the $7 million conversion of the CN Station (City of 
Hamilton, 2003a). The site is now a beautiful conference-banquet centre as well as an 
office centre. The LIUNA Nursing Home was once a former Greening & Donald wire 
manufacturing plant. The building was demolished and converted into a parking lot. The 
City purchased the parking lot in early 1970s and the site became surplus in mid-1990s. 
In 1999, the City sold the site for only $1 to the developer LIUNA and a 50/50 
partnership on the cleanup cost of $1.2 million was established between the City and 
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LIUNA (City of Hamilton, 2003c). Right now the site has been redeveloped into LIUNA 
Nursing Home which houses 95 long-term care beds on Queen Street North in the 
downtown core. The City recouped its share of the clean-up cost by future tax revenues 
on the site.  
 
II. Results of 2001 ERASE CIP 
The City of Hamilton remained committed to brownfield redevelopment and began to 
seriously address the issue in 1997 by launching the Industrial Redevelopment Task 
Force. A formal brownfield redevelopment program, 2001 ERASE CIP, was adopted by 
the City Council in April 2001 and was later approved by MMAH in August 2001. 
 
From 2001 to 2002, 4.6 hectares of the industrial property was cleaned up and 
redeveloped (City of Hamilton, 2002). Around 228,000 square feet (21182 square meters) 
of building space was constructed or refurbished (City of Hamilton, 2002). The long-term 
property tax increase on properties taking advantage of the ERASE program was 
estimated to be $400,000, while the City’s investment of approximately $1 million 
leveraged almost $15 million investment from private sector (Piccioni, 2003). Six major 
redevelopment projects (three industrial, two residential and one commercial) were 
approved for the programs under the ERASE CIP, including JNE Consulting, Queens 
Garden Nursing Home, McCallum Sather Architects, 425 Parkdale Avenue North, 
Barton & Crooks Streets and 667 Parkdale Avenue North (City of Hamilton, 2001; City 
of Hamilton, 2002). 
 
In 2003, several major brownfield projects were also approved for grants in ERASE. It 
was estimated that these projects could result in the “remediation and redevelopment of 
7.6 ha. of the brownfield property for 48,000 square feet  (4459 square meters) of 
industrial space, 51,000 square feet  (4738 square meters) of commercial space, a major 
$45-60 million edible oil processing facility, and 93 new residential units” (City of 
Hamilton, 2003b, p10). The new industrial/commercial uses created approximately 90 
new jobs to the city (City of Hamilton, 2003b). 
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III. Results of 2005 ERASE CIP 
In 2005, the City revised the 2001 ERASE CIP so that a more comprehensive framework 
for the financial incentives in the ERASE CIP was provided. The revised ERASE CIP 
expanded the Project Area to cover the entire urban area of the City of Hamilton, and the 
new program ERASE TAP was adopted. Interests in the revised ERASE CIP have turned 
out to be outstanding (City of Hamilton, 2005c). According to Hamilton’s Economic 
Development Review 2005, six approved projects were awarded approximately $2.5 
million in ERASE Redevelopment Grant funding, which were supposed to leverage: 
 
• total construction expenditures in excess of $63 million; 
• remediation and redevelopment of 10.9 ha. of formally vacant and under-utilized 
brownfields; 
• construction and refurbishment of over 300,000 square feet (27871 square meters) 
of industrial/commercial space; 
• construction of 93 new residential units; 
• 100 new full time jobs; 
• An increase in long-term annual property tax revenues of approximately 
$1,000,000. 
(City of Hamilton, 2005c, p9) 
 
As of the interview date of June 23, 2006, the City had received 8-10 brownfield 
redevelopment applications for financial assistance provided in 2005 ERASE CIP and 
additional 5-10 developments were anticipated (Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator).  
 
4.3.7 A Showcase: Bayfront Park 
 The Bayfront Park, firstly called the Harbourfront Park, is the first major brownfield 
project which the City of Hamilton has done so far (Hamilton Planner). It is located in the 
western portion of the Hamilton Harbour at the western end of Lake Ontario. The land on 
which the Bayfront Park was built is not a natural land formation, but actually the result 
of years of harbour infill. In 1957, the Hamilton Harbour Commissioners (now the 
Hamilton Port Authority) sold the water lots in the northwest end of Hamilton to a 
Philadelphia-based company for a scrap metal yard. Later, this parcel of land and water 
lots were given to the Lax Brothers who were Hamilton scrap metal dealers (Freeman and 
Hewitt, 1979). In 1968, the Lax Brothers decided to build a multi-million dollar 
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residential complex known as “Bayshore Village” and began filling water lots in the west 
end of the Harbour (Freeman, 2001). Then, the controversy came. For Hamiltonians, 
especially for those people who had lived and played on the shores of Hamilton Harbour, 
the west harbour was clearly believed to be preserved as a place for recreation regardless 
of all the changes happening in the harbour (Bouchier and Cruikshank, 2006). In 1973, 
the Lax land filling was stopped because of mounting opposition from environment 
officials and Hamilton citizens (Freeman and Hewitt, 1979). However, over 20.2 hectares 
of harbour had been filled with reclaimed land at the time, and the land remained vacant 
and contaminated, slicing across the west end of the harbour (See Figure 4.10). The 16-
hectare Lax landfill site is now where the Bayfront Park is located. 
 
After over a decade of legal debate, the City Council ultimately acquired the landfill site 
from the Lax Brothers and decided to build a public recreational park on the waterfront. 
Environmental studies carried out by the Ministry of Environment (MOE) had found that 
various types of hazardous materials were found in the landfill site and the levels of toxic 
wastes exceeded standards in Regulation 309 of the Environmental Protection Act for 
lead and cadmium in leachate (City of Hamilton, 1993). Almost 20,000 tones of 
industrial waste and contaminated soil were removed from the park site, and then the 
landfill site was sealed with a 20 centimeter cap of clay which was proposed to stop 
toxins from infiltrating the water table and from leaching into the topsoil (Hamilton 
Planner). Finally, 6-8 inches of topsoil was seeded on the clay layer to establish a grass 
cover. In total, the remediation work had cost over 9 millions dollars to transform the 16-
hectare contaminated land into public green space, opened in 1993 (Hamilton Planner).  
 
According to the Hamilton Planner who was in charge of the Bayfront Park project in 
1990s, there were three aspects attributing to its success. Firstly, the City Council had a 
strong commitment to transform the landfill site into an open park to bring people back to 
the harbour. “…because it was the first major brownfield project the City had done, we 
have to be very careful with the first one and make it a success, like a pilot 
project…brownfields were really just becoming known to us in the 1980s. We knew they 
existed and they were going to be a problem to the community” (Hamilton Planner). In 
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addition, “…this is the only area we have the opportunity to put in trails and parks on the 
harbour and give the waterfront back to the people of Hamilton. That’s a goal in our 
Council…people hadn’t felt the waterfront was a part of their community for a long time” 
(Hamilton Planner). The prosperity and industrial expansion during the postwar period 
had dramatically reduced the size of the Hamilton Harbour and seriously polluted the 
water in the harbour. It was once called by scientists as an “11-square-mile sewer” 
(28,490,000 square meters) and “Canada’s biggest septic tank” in the mid-sixties (Wilson, 
1999, December 16). The public had been denied access to the western shoreline of the 
harbour and it had been fenced off for decades. Therefore, the City shifted the focus of 
harbourfront development from industrial to recreational schemes, “that’s why we 
determined to build a public recreational park” (Hamilton Planner). 
 
Figure 4.10: the Lax Landfill Site 
 
The Lax landfill site slicing through the water in the centre of the picture.  
Source: Freeman and Hewitt (1979), p156. 
 
Secondly, the community supported the plan of the project (Hamilton Planner). As shown 
in Figure 4.11, the project hosts a variety of public considerations as well as 
environmental amenities. The grass amphitheatre was created to provide the needed 
structure for festival seating while at the same time meets the needs of the natural 
environment (Vallentin, 1994). The upper plateau as a flat manicured area is ideal for 
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seasonal festivals while the beach area provides public access to the water’s edge. 
Furthermore, walking & cycling trails and a new boat launch are created for people relax 
on the park.  All these features represent deep human meanings for the people of 
Hamilton, especially for those who have grown up on the shores of the harbour.   
 
Thirdly, the municipality has established solid partnerships with community stakeholders 
and the senior level of government (Hamilton Planner). “For this very first brownfield 
project in really early days, you have to have the scientific technology available to know 
what’s going on that site, because it very dictates what you can do and how you manage 
the contamination. And you have to set aside enough money to do it right. You can’t do it 
halfway because there’re health issues, water quality issues…especially for our particular 
case on the harbour” (Hamilton Planner). The City of Hamilton had worked closely with 
experts and professionals from the Hamilton Harbour R.A.P (Remedial Action Plan)41 
who had provided the scientific technology and methods required in the project in terms 
of contamination remediation, shore protection, fish habitat enhancement as well as 
wetland creation. In addition, the project had luckily received political support from a 
senior level of government - the provincial government, especially area New Democratic 
MPPs, who came through in difficult times with almost $9 million investment in the 
cleanup of the land.  
 
Today, Bayfront Park has become one of Hamilton’s most popular parks and is 
considered as a jewel on the waterfront (See Figure 4.12). Ongoing improvements are 
being carried out on the park. In 2005, the City initiated a monitoring program for some 
of the high priority parks in Hamilton including the Bayfront Park, in order to make sure 
the remediation was put in place and worked in the way the City expected them 
(Hamilton Planner). Besides, more amenities such as seasonal cafés and equipment rental 
facilities as well as more shade will be provided in the Park in the future according to the 
Setting Sail Secondary Plan for West Harbour (City of Hamliton, 2006d). 
                                                 
41 In the early 1970s, the International Joint Commission identified the Hamilton Harbour as one of the 43 Areas of 
Concern (AOC) in the Great Lake’s region. In order to improve the environmental conditions in Hamilton Harbour, a 
Remedial Action Plan (RAP) for Hamilton Harbour was developed 
(http://www.on.ec.gc.ca/water/raps/hamilton/intro_e.html)  
 
Figure 4.11: Harbourfront Park Master Plan Concept 
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Source: City of Hamilton (1993). 
Figure 4.12: A Jewel on the Waterfront 
   
                    The Boat Launch                                         The Upper Plateau 
 
   
    People Having Fun on the Beach Area                         The Grass Amphitheatre 
 
   
         People Starting a Boating Cruise                          Geese Flocking on the Park 
(Photographed by the researcher on July 13th, 2006) 
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4.4 Successful Experiences Learned from Kitchener and Hamilton 
What are the successful experiences in Kitchener and Hamilton that may be used to assist 
in brownfield redevelopment in the City of Dalian? Before summarizing the successful 
municipal experiences, the researcher needs to emphasize the overarching assumption for 
measuring the success: all municipal programs/approaches are considered “successful” if 
the redevelopment occurs as opposed to the corresponding option of not being 
redeveloped at all. Two main reasons account for this assumption. First, there is currently 
no systematic indicator framework that is known to exist or be in wide use for measuring 
the success of brownfield redevelopment in a standardized way (Wedding and Crawford-
Brown, 2007). The definitions of successful municipal brownfield policy and the 
associated levels of success are thus very subjective. Although Bacot and O’Dell (2006) 
have suggested useful indicators for analyzing local government brownfield programs, 
these indicators are incomplete and limited in addressing the environmental and 
economic impacts of brownfield redevelopment (e.g., no discussion of green buildings). 
Second, neither Kitchener nor Hamilton has established any environmental, economic or 
social criteria to measure and track the performance of their brownfield programs over 
time (Kitchener Senior Planner and Hamilton Brownfield Coordinator). Seven interviews 
in Kitchener and Hamilton showed that the stakeholders considered the brownfield 
programs in their cities were “successful” at present because they had led to increased 
redevelopments that would have never happen if there were no such programs. As a 
result, the researcher uses the above assumption for measuring the success of municipal 
experiences in Kitchener and Hamilton. 
 
In order to better summarize the successful municipal experiences learned from the case 
study, it is meaningful here to develop an overview of brownfield redevelopment in both 
cities (See Table 4.5). Despite the variety of specific case experiences, there are some 
commonalties between Kitchener and Hamilton. According to seven interviews with 
stakeholders in two cities and the case study, the researcher found that a municipality’s 
persistent commitment, various financial incentives through CIP, leadership & 
partnerships (public/private and inter-government), marketing of the brownfield incentive  
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Table 4.5: Overview of Brownfield Redevelopment Experiences in Kitchener and 
Hamilton 
 Kitchener Hamilton 
Historic Formation of 
Brownfields 
Berlin’s Industrialization; 
Booming in late 19th century; 
Recession of the postwar period in 1980s 
 
Steel Town at early 20th century; the Great 
Depression; boom times during the 
postwar period (large-scale landfill 
projects in east harbor); shrinkage of 
manufacturing industry in 1980s;  
Definition of Brownfields 
a property which contains environmental 
contamination either in the ground or 
building due to the operational activities of a 
previous land use, where the extent of the 
contamination renders the property vacant, 
under-utilized, unsafe, unproductive or 
abandoned 
abandoned, idled or underused industrial 
or commercial properties in built-up 
urban areas where expansion or 
redevelopment is complicated by real or 
perceived environmental contamination, 
building deterioration/obsolescence, 
and/or inadequate infrastructure 
Number of Brownfields Unknown 300-400 
Distribution of Brownfields Most located on major streets in Downtown or Inner City lands 
The Old Industrial Area; West Harbour 
Area and throughout the entire urbanized 
area 
Primary Impetus for 
Brownfield Redevelopment 
Increase assessment base; municipal 
efficiency; help municipality reduce Police, 
Fire & Bylaw Enforcement costs; depressed 
land value around brownfield; public health 
and safety 
Economic benefit on tax assessment (tax 
arrear and nearby property value); 
environmental impact on public 
health/safety; continuing land demand for 
heavy industry and manufacturing. 
Identified Barriers 
1. Financial issue (upfront remediation cost 
and whose willingness & ability to pay); 
2. Liability of contamination (including 
regulatory liability and civil liability); 
3. Planning approvals (two levels of 
government) 
1. Upfront financing (expensive upfront 
cost and bank’s unwillingness to finance 
brownfield projects); 
2. Liability of contamination; 
3. Lack of detailed information on 
brownfield in the City; 
4. Complicated planning process and 
lengthy time for planning approvals 
Municipal Approaches 
1. Financial Incentives (the EDGE Growth 
Strategy), including Downtown CIP and 
Brownfield Remediation CIP (100% TIF); 
2.  Direct Intervention by the municipality 
(acquire, hold, clear , grade the land or 
direct assistance); 
3. Research and marketing (inventory of 
vacant land, record of all RSCs in the City, 
brownfield Working Group, brownfield 
conference and workshops) 
4. Professional assistance from municipal 
staffs, especially the brownfield coordinator. 
1. Financial Incentives (the ERASE CIP), 
including Study Grant, Redevelopment 
Grant, Tax Assistance (80%TIF), 
Development Charge Reduction Program; 
2. Municipal leadership and partnership 
(ERASE Municipal Acquisition and 
Partnership Program); 
3. Marketing and education (ERASE 
Marketing and Opportunities Program); 
4. Planning policy and standardized 
procedure; brownfield coordinator. 
Showcase 
Kaufman Lofts ---the best small/medium 
scale project at CUI Brownie Awards 
ceremony in 2005. 
Bayfront Park --- the first major 
brownfield project City of Hamilton had 
done 
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programs and brownfield coordinator all play a role in causing the brownfield outcomes 
addressed in Section 4.2.6 and Section 4.3.6. 
 
Municipality’s Persistent Commitment 
A municipality’s persistent commitment to pursue brownfield redevelopment is the first 
and foremost factor driving local government’s actions on brownfield redevelopment. 
With a persistent commitment, the City of Kitchener has been making brownfield 
policies to encourage cleanup and adaptation of old industrial sites since 1992. It 
launched a follow-up Adaptive Re-use Program in 1996. The City keeps its persistent 
commitment today and is implementing the comprehensive package of Incentive 
Programs, the Kitchener EDGE Growth Strategy. The City will continue to work with 
other levels of government to attract more resources in brownfield renewal according to 
the recent Economic Development Strategy 2007-2010 (City of Kitchener, 2007b). The 
same persistent commitment could also be observed for the City of Hamilton, another 
pioneer city for brownfield redevelopment. Hamilton converted 16.2 hectares of 
contaminated land on the City’s Bayfront into Bayfront Park as early as 1985 at a time 
when “brownfield” was even not coined as a concept in North America. Hamilton began 
to implement the Industrial Redevelopment Task Force in 1997, followed by the 2001 
and 2005 ERASE CIP. Both cities have many experiences with brownfield 
redevelopment and both have been continuously making proactive efforts in developing 
brownfield policies. It should be noted that fundamental motivations driving the two 
cities’ commitment to brownfield redevelopment are environmental concerns over public 
health/safety, as well as the social and economic benefits associated with the 
redevelopment. 
 
Various Financial Incentives through CIP 
Developers and property owners of a brownfield site face significant financial challenges. 
They are reluctant to fund brownfield redevelopments unless there is a strong public 
sector funding commitment to enhance the financial viability of the project. Case studies 
in Kitchener and Hamilton show that the upfront financing of a brownfield site are the 
foremost barrier to brownfield redevelopment in two cities. The financial issue has also 
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been frequently cited in a great deal of academic literature and government documents 
(Alberini et al, 2005; McCarthy, 2002; Pryce, 2003; Adams et al, 2000; NRTEE, 1997; 
NRTEE, 2003; MMAH, 2007a).  
 
In order to help developers overcome the financial challenge encountered in the 
redevelopment process, Kitchener and Hamilton established various financial incentive 
programs through CIP. In the Section 28 of the Planning Act, a community improvement 
plan gives Ontario municipalities the authority to implement grant programs and other 
incentives to registered or assessed owners, tenants or assignees in designated community 
improvement areas in need of improvement of the physical or built environment, in spite 
of the statutory “prohibition against bonusing rule” contained in Section 106 of the 
Municipal Act. The extent of a Community Improvement Project Area can include the 
whole municipality, or a specifically defined area of the City. Through CIP, both 
Kitchener and Hamilton provide various financial incentives in the form of grants, 
municipal fee exemptions or tax assistance to brownfiled owners in a specific area or 
city-wide area. Feasibility study grants are also available in the City of Hamilton through 
ERASE SGP for developers to cover the costs associated with Phase Π ESA and/or 
Remediation Action Plan. Kitchener provides developers with Façade/Interior Loans for 
the improvement of downtown properties. In addition, Kitchener provides developers 
with a tax increment equivalent grant in the form of Brownfield Remediation CIP to pay 
for the cost of ESA and remediation, which is equivalent to 100% of the incremental 
increase in the municipal portion of the property taxes resulting from the redevelopment. 
Similar 80% tax incremental financial relief programs are also provided in Hamilton 
ERASE RGP and ERASE TAP. Moreover, both cities provide otherwise incentives 
through CIP to exempt or reduce municipal fees associated with development charges, 
building permits and/or parkland dedication fees for brownfields.  
 
Table 4.6 summarizes all the municipal brownfield redevelopment incentive programs in 
two cities. These financial incentives are also widely used across other municipalities in 
Ontario (MMAH, 2007c). Grants and tax assistance have turned out to be the most 
commonly offered financial incentives among Ontario municipalities for the remediation 
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and redevelopment of brownfields according to the 2007 survey “Evaluating the Impact 
of Municipal Brownfield Incentives” by MMAH (MMAH, 2007b). Overall, these actions 
are considered by MMAH as a valuable role in encouraging developers and property 
owners to engage in brownfield redevelopment as well as being a signal showing that “a 
municipality is a ready and willing host for brownfield redevelopment” (MMAH, 2007b, 
p17-18).  
 
Table 4.6: Summary of Municipal Brownfield Incentives in Two Cities 
Type of Financial Incentive 
Kitchener 
(DowntownCIP42 and 
nfield Remediation Brow CIP) 
Hamilton 
(ERASE CIP) 
Grants  Façade/Interior Loan; 
 Upper Storey Renovation 
Program; 
 ERASE Study Grant Program 
(SGP); 
 
Tax Incremental Financing  City of Kitchener Tax Rebate 
(equal to 50%TIF); 
 Brownfield Remediation CIP 
(100%TIF); 
 ERASE Redevelopment 
Grant Program (RGP) 
(80%TIF in municipal portion 
of property taxes); 
 ERASE Tax Assistance 
Program (TAP) (equal to 
80%TIF, with education 
portion of taxes included); 
 
Fee Exemptions and 
Reductions 
 Rebates for planning and 
building permit fees; 
 Elimination of City and 
Regional development charges; 
 Elimination of park dedication 
fees 
 ERASE Development Charge 
Reduction Program (DCRP) 
 
 
Leadership & Partnerships (Public/Private and Inter-government) 
The private sector is targeted as a key player by various financial incentive programs 
provided in CIP, in which the municipal government acts as a facilitator. There are cases 
that municipal governments take leadership & partnerships (public/private and inter-
government) and directly carry out the redevelopment. These brownfield sites include 
properties owned by the municipality, sites of which the municipality may assume the 
                                                 
42 It should be noted here that even though the financial incentive programs provided in Downtown CIP are not 
originally brownfields-oriented, they have benefited several brownfield projects in Downtown Kitchener and thus 
should not be ignored in our research.  
 107
ownership because of property tax arrears and a failed tax sale, and sites that require 
direct intervention for the consideration of public health/safety or other economic, social 
motivations. For those brownfield sites, it is “in the best interests” of a municipality to 
acquire and hold the land, and to assess, clean up and prepare these sites for 
redevelopment (City of Hamilton, 2005b, p41). Both Kitchener and Hamilton have been 
very proactive in directing and participating in the redevelopment of such brownfields. In 
Hamilton, the ERASE Municipal Acquisition and Partnership Program (MAPP) was 
established for the municipality to invest and participate in pilot brownfield projects with 
the private sector and showcase the use of new environmental remediation technologies, 
community consultation techniques, and/or the use of other innovative tools such as 
environmental insurance. It is because of the City of Kitchener’s acquisition, donation 
and direct financial assistance that the 3.35-hectare former Epton property is now 
becoming the new campus of University of Waterloo for School of Pharmacy. 
 
The 50/50 public/private partnership on the cleanup cost of $1.2 million made it possible 
for the City of Hamilton to successfully develop the city-owned brownfield site into 
today’s LIUNA Nursing Home, which provides the community with much needed 
nursing home beds in the downtown core.  Hamilton’s very first brownfield project, the 
16-hectare Lax landfill site, would not have become the Bayfront Park, the jewel on the 
waterfront in Hamilton, if such a partnership was absent. It involved experts and 
professionals from the Hamilton Harbour R.A.P. and the financial support from the 
provincial government.  With the collaborative relationship between the City and 
Hamilton Port Authority, an ongoing long term planning project called Setting Sail was 
established. According to the project, the older industrial lands in Hamilton West 
Harbour Area will be redeveloped and revitalized in the future. 
 
Marketing Brownfield Incentive Programs 
Marketing plays an important role in promoting brownfields. Many of the brownfield 
incentive programs are relatively new since they are only available through 
municipalities’ CIP within the past few years. Many property owners and potential 
developers are not aware of such programs. If they are not known, the incentive programs 
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would not be effectively utilized. As a result, efforts are needed to inform potential 
investors and make the financial opportunities more attractive to related professionals. 
Both cities have fully recognized the importance of marketing to successful financial 
incentive programs on brownfield redevelopment. The two municipalities have been 
aggressively and consistently advertising and marketing their financial incentive 
programs available for the market. Through active hosting and sponsoring the national 
conferences associated with brownfields and/or re-urbanization as well as participation in 
the variety of brownfield workshops, the City of Kitchener has made its brownfield 
incentive programs and its brownfield achievement widely known across Canada. The 
City of Hamilton has initiated a Marketing and Opportunity Program (MOP) in its 
ERASE CIP in order to communicate and explain the ERASE programs to the brownfield 
redevelopment market.   
 
Brownfield Coordinator 
Case studies in Kitchener and Hamilton reveal that brownfield property owners and 
developers in both cities have encountered the challenge of complicated planning process 
and lengthy time for multiple planning approvals. Much academic literature has also 
addressed this challenge (De Sousa, 2001; Boles, 2003; Abdel-Aziz et al, 2004). Property 
owners, developers, lenders as well as other related stakeholders in brownfield 
redevelopment may need to spend considerable amount of time and money in complying 
with planning legislation and regulations for rezoning, administrative reviews, approvals 
and entitlements of the redevelopment. Effective communication between the 
municipality and the private sector becomes very necessary. 
 
Both Kitchener and Hamilton have established the position of brownfield coordinator 
who served as an advocate and liaison between the City and the private sector. Through 
the interviews in two cities, the researcher found that the coordinator acted as a constant 
point-of-contact who provided brownfield information of the City, guidance on the 
application of various brownfield incentive programs, and access information of the 
regulatory and planning contacts. A brownfield coordinator also provides useful 
suggestions and planning consultations to developers and property owners throughout the 
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redevelopment process in case they encounter any questions or concerns with regard to 
the planning approval process and municipal incentives. In addition, feedbacks from the 
private sector regarding the municipal incentives and policies can be conveyed to the City 
timely through the brownfield coordinator. In this case, the municipality can adjust and 
update government policies appropriately. To some extent, the establishment of 
Brownfield Coordinator has signalled the shift of municipalities’ attitude towards 
brownfield redevelopment from regulators to partners, showing a city’s proactive 
willingness to assist developers. Even the provincial government in Ontario has also 
recognized the importance of brownfield coordinator. In December 2005, MMAH 
announced the Office of Brownfield Coordinator. In the showcase of Kaufman Lofts in 
Downtown Kitchener, it was found that the success of the project was partly attributed to 




Case studies of Kitchener and Hamilton demonstrate that a municipality’s persistent 
commitment, various financial incentives through CIP, municipal leadership & 
partnership (public/private and inter-government), marketing of the incentive programs 
and brownfield coordinator all play an important role in overcoming the barriers in two 
cities. Without a persistent commitment to brownfield redevelopment, there would not be 
the drive for the establishment of the ongoing variety of financial initiatives in the CIP. 
Without the incentive programs to overcome the financial barrier, there would not be so 
many brownfield sites being redeveloped by the private sector. Without the municipal 
leadership & partnerships, those brownfield sites that are already owned or will be 
potentially owned by the City would continue to sit idle. Municipal efforts in marketing 
the financial incentive, and efforts of the brownfield coordinator provide indispensable 
stimulant and lubricant for the redevelopments. These four aspects of municipal 
approaches are interdependent and work together as a whole. 
 
In summary, many brownfield sites in Kitchener and Hamilton are entering a new chapter 
of history with assistance from the municipal approaches and initiatives (See Section 
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4.2.6 and Section 4.3.6). These brownfield projects may require a long time-frame to be 
completed and currently there is no systematic approach to evaluating the performance of 
brownfield programs. Therefore, it is hard to say how successful these 
programs/approaches will be. However, at this point of time, they may be considered 
effective and workable, since all the brownfield projects that are undergoing 
redevelopment would never have been launched if there were no such help and assistance 
from aforementioned municipal approaches provided by the City of Kitchener and the 
City of Hamilton. As brownfield redevelopment brings many benefits, the above four 



































Chapter 5: Case Study in the City of Dalian, China 
5.1 Introduction 
The case study in Chapter 4 has developed a comprehensive understanding of brownfield 
redevelopment in Kitchener and Hamilton, followed by the summary of successful 
municipal experiences. This chapter focuses on the brownfield redevelopment in the City 
of Dalian, China. Similar to the case studies in Canada, this chapter will also introduce 
Dalian’s experiences with regard to its historic formation of brownfields, current situation, 
challenges and corresponding municipal policies. An example of brownfield projects in 
Dalian will also be introduced. Perceptions of stakeholders on applying the successful 
municipal experiences in Ontario to the City of Dalian will be presented at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
5.2 Historic Formation of Brownfields in Dalian 
Unlike most Chinese metropolises which have evolved over thousands of years of history, 
the City of Dalian is a relatively new city of just over 100 years. With its Russian and 
Japanese architectural heritage standing in the urban center, one could tell that the city’s 
development had been more or less associated with colonial occupation. At the very 
beginning, Dalian was not a city but no more than a fishing village with several small-
scale fishing households, formerly named Sanshanpu in China (Dong, 2001). In 1898, the 
Russian Empire leased the Liaodong Peninsula from the Qing Dynasty, and laid out plans 
to build a free port named Dalny (today’s Dalian) at the southern tip of the Liaodong 
Peninsula (Dong, 2001). As per the Plan of Dalny shown in Figure 5.1, public works 
constructions and boulevards radiating from a central square (today’s Zhongshan Square) 
were laid out along the Gulf of Dalny (now called Dalian Bay). Little land was planned 
for industrial uses because Dalny was designated as a commercial sea port city for 
shipping resources and goods rather than industrial manufacturing (Dong, 2001). With 
Dalny’s unique location43 bordering inland China, the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese 
Archipelago, Dalny had become an important port-city as well as a military base in the 
                                                 
43 See Figure 1.1 on Page 5 
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eastern Russian Empire with a middle-scale population of nearly 40,000 in the seven 
years of the Russia Empire’s occupation (City of Dalian, 1982).  
 
Figure 5.1: Plan of Dalny, 1901 
 
Source: Dong (2001), p23 
 
In 1905, Dalny was transferred to Japanese control and was renamed Dairen (Dalian). 
During the forty years of Japanese control (1905-1945), the City of Dalian expanded 
rapidly. Tens of thousands of Japanese immigrated to Dalian and the population of Dalian 
had grown to 700,000 by the time when Japan unconditionally surrendered in 1945 (City 
of Dalian, 2000a). Docks and factories were built in eastern Dalian along the coastline of 
Dalian Bay and the South Manchuria Railway44 (City of Dalian, 1982). In order to meet 
the needs of a growing colonial economy, new industrial districts had been developed 
outside the urban centre of Dalian, stretching towards the northern and western parts of 
Dalian, namely today’s Ganjingzi District and Shahekou District (Dong, 2001).  In total, 
over one hundred factories existed in the City of Dalian in 1945 when Dalian acquired its 
liberation (City of Dalian, 1982). 
                                                 
44 Information about the railway can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Manchuria_Railway  
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After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the City of Dalian entered 
a peaceful period of urban development and industrialization under a centrally-planned 
economy. At that time, the municipality faced the tasks of recovering a backward 
economy which had been created by a series of events – the Second World War, the 
Chinese Civil War and the Korean War (Dong, 2001). Like all the other cities across 
China, the City of Dalian adopted the Soviet model of industrial-oriented economic 
development, insisting that urban development should concentrate on the construction of 
new industries, especially heavy industries. A sequence of five-year plans for the social-
economic development in the City of Dalian was established and followed since 1953, so 
as to transform Dalian from a “consumer city” into a “production city” (City of Dalian, 
1982). The first master plan of Dalian called the Five-Eight Plan was brought forth in 
1958. It was designed to stimulate industrial growth and subservience to economic 
planning, namely the five-year plans (Dong, 2001). As per the first master plan, the City 
of Dalian was designated to be a big industrial city based on the mechanical 
manufacturing industry and the chemical industry (City of Dalian, 1982). A number of 
large-scale state-owned manufacturing enterprises and plants were built on the old urban 
centre, spreading in a shape of “C” along the coastline of Dalian Bay and the Changda 
railways (former South Manchuria Railway) (Pan, 1998). New industrial land was 
planned to be developed in Shahekou District and Ganjingzi District for massive 
industrialization (see Figure 5.2).  
 
Unfortunately, during the ten-year political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976) in China, Dalian experienced turbulent urban planning and the Five-Eight Plan 
was totally discarded. Industrial factories were allowed to be constructed on any available 
vacant site in the city, leading to an irregular industrial layout in the urban areas (Dong, 
2001). By 1980, after thirty years of socialist modernization, Dalian had become one of 
the important industrial bases in China and a major industrial centre in northern China, a 
leading edge in the mechanism, metallurgy, shipbuilding, petroleum, chemical and textile 
industries (City of Dalian, 1982).  
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Figure 5.2: Urban Planning Map of Dalian, 1958 
 
Source: Dong (2001), p57. 
 
Urban planning in the City of Dalian was restored and re-established after the economic 
reform in China in 1978. In 1982, the Master Plan of Dalian for Urban-Rural 
Construction was prepared by the Dalian Urban Planning & Design Institute, and was 
approved by the State Council in 1985 (City of Dalian, 2004). According to the master 
plan in 1982, the City of Dalian was designated to be first a port city, then an industrial 
and tourist city (City of Dalian, 1982). Twelve industrial zones were established in the 
central city45 of Dalian so as to adjust the irregular industrial layout in the Central City 
resulting from the chaos in the Cultural Revolution (See Figure 5.3). New industries 
expanded within the twelve industrial zones, while factories scattered in the urban centre 
outside the industrial zones were required to relocate. In addition, no large industrial 
project was allowed to be built in the Central City in consideration of environmental 
protection (City of Dalian, 1982). 
                                                 
45 The Central City of Dalian includes four districts:  Zhongshan, Xigang, Shahekou and Ganjingzi. 
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Source: City of Dalian (1982), Appendix One 
Notes: ①Yandao Chemical Industrial Zone; ②Youyi Road North Light Industrial Zone; 
③Ganjingzi Industrial Zone; ④Paoya Zone; ⑤Wangjiagou Zone; ⑥Shadong Zone; 
⑦Heizuizi Zone; ⑧Wuyi Square Zone; ⑨Ronghua Beigang Zone; ⑩Siergou Zone; (11) 
South Shahekou Zone; (12) Zhuanshantun Zone. 
 
In 1995, the last year of the Eighth Five-Year Plan period, the City Council made an 
important decision for Dalian’s urban development and decided to relocate and transform 
the industrial enterprises in the central city into the newly built industrial parks or 
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development zone far outside the urban center (City of Dalian, 1995a). These enterprises 
were mainly state-owned or collective–owned. They were heavy industries which 
consumed large amounts of energy and resources, caused serious pollution, but yielded 
poor economic returns. The decision was made mainly based on three aspects of concerns 
according to the City Council (City of Dalian, 1995a). 
 
First, the City wanted to enhance state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) technology, 
competitiveness and economic returns by means of industrial relocation so as to adjust 
and optimise the industrial structure in Dalian. Some of the SOEs were inefficient in their 
production and business operations because of dated products, obsolete equipment and 
low efficiency (City of Dalian, 1995a). Without restructuring and innovation, these SOEs 
could not be competitive in the market. However, they lacked sufficient finances to 
restructure. Through industrial relocation, theses SOEs could make use of the money 
from the transfer of land use rights to bring in updated technology and equipment and 
further get rid of plight.  
 
Second, the City wanted to improve the urban environment in Dalian and make it a more 
pleasant city for people to visit and inhabit (City of Dalian, 1995a). Urban development 
in Dalian had been plagued and restrained by pollution which resulted from the 
inappropriate industrial layout in history (City of Dalian, 1995a). Heavy industries were 
scattered within residential and commercial areas, causing many pollution problems and 
affecting neighbourhoods as well as the natural environment. Relocating the industries in 
the Central City became necessary to enhance the quality of life in Dalian and to curb 
environmental pollution (City of Dalian, 1995a).  
 
Third, the Dalian municipal government wanted to rationalize and maximize the 
efficiency of urban land us. Many industrial enterprises with poor economic performance 
were located in areas which would bring in much higher economic benefits such as 
commercial or residential land. Therefore, the City wanted to relocate the industrial 
enterprises and change the use of urban land into high-value industry, mainly tertiary, so 
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as to strengthen Dalian’s urban function in port, transportation, trade and tourism (City of 
Dalian, 1995a). 
 
As the industrial enterprises causing serious pollution, high energy consumption and low 
economic returns have gradually been removed and relocated out of the central city of 
Dalian since 1995, pieces of former industrial land became brownfields, whereas at the 
same time, the urban environmental quality in Dalian has been increasingly improved. In 
2001, Dalian was honored as “Global 500” by the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) for Dalian’s outstanding environment achievements.  
 
5.3 Current Situation of Brownfield Redevelopment in Dalian 
How many brownfields are there in Dalian? Are they just a few parcels scattering here 
and there, or do they concentrate on certain areas of the City? Government documents 
collected from the municipality provide little clarification since the term brownfields has 
not been recognized by the City yet. However, there does exist a planning terminology 
old industrial sites which was widely accepted and discussed by government officials, 
planners and environmental experts in Dalian. From the seventeen interviews in Dalian, 
two common facts associated with the old industrial sites were found. First, the old 
industrial sites in the City of Dalian were spontaneously emptied as a result of the large 
scale industrial relocation in the central city since 1995. Second, certain money and time 
on demolition or decontamination were required to redevelop any old industrial sites for 
the concerns of contamination resulted from past industrial uses. Since the common 
usage of old industrial sites matches the broad context of brownfields in this thesis, here 
in the case study of Dalian, the old industrial sites in the central city should be considered 
as the brownfields in Dalian.  
 
The old industrial sites include not only former industrial enterprises which have already 
been relocated, but also those which are being relocated or are expected to be relocated 
soon according to the City’s Master Plan of Dalian from 2000 to 2020. In the period 
1995-1999, ninety six industrial enterprises in the central city were relocated, and old 
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industrial sites in total area of 2.93 square kilometer had been redeveloped into urban 
open spaces, residential or commercial areas (City of Dalian, 2000a). Four old industrial 
zones began to be relocated and redeveloped during this period, including Siergou Zone, 
Zhuanshantun Zone, Wuyi Square Zone and Ronghua Beigang Zone (City of Dalian, 
2000a). The dark reddish brown areas in Figure 5.4 show all the contemporary industrial 
land in the Central City of Dalian in the year of 2000. However, more industrial 
enterprises located in the Central City will be relocated from 2000 to 2020. The City 
decided to remove, relocate and transform the twelve industrial zones in the City in 
twenty years (2000-2020). Only four industrial zones will remain in the Central City, 
namely Youyi Road North Light Industrial Zone, Ganjingzi Petrochemical Industrial 
Zone, Heizuizi Shipbuilding Industrial Zone and the High-Tech Industrial Zone (City of 
Dalian, 2000a). As shown in the planning map in Figure 5.5, the industrial land in the 
Central City of Dalian colored in dark reddish brown will shrink greatly into the four 
circled plots. In fact, from 2000 to 2005, up to 100 additional industrial enterprises were 
relocated and nearly 3.67 square kilometers of old industrial sites were redeveloped in the 
Central City of Dalian 46 . These sites include former chemical plants, paint factories, 
textile mills, heavy machinery plants and smelteries. At present, three large-scale highly 
polluting SOEs, which are very influential in China, are being relocated outside the 
central city starting in 2006 (City of Dalian, 2006a). They are the Dalian Cement Plant, 
the Dalian Steel Company and the Dahua Group Dalian Chemical Industry Company, 
which in total cover a total area of 4.74 square kilometers47. Their relocation will be 
completed in 2009 when these old industrial sites become future brownfields. In a word, 
nearly 200 brownfields were formed and redeveloped in the City of Dalian from 1995 to 
2005, which spread over the old industrial zones in the central city as a result of industrial 




                                                 
46 This information was learned from the interview with Mr. Mingchen Tong, Vice-Director of the Department of 
Economic Operation, Dalian Economic Committee, on August 2nd, 2006. 
47 From the Interview with Mr. Desheng Liu, Director of the Department of Enterprises, Dalian Economic Committee, 
on August 4th, 2006. 
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Figure 5.4: Current Land Use Map of the Central City of Dalian, 2000 
 
Source: City of Dalian (2000b), p5. 
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Heizuizi Shipbuilding Industrial 
Zone 
Youyi Road North Light 
Industrial Zone 
High-Tech Industrial Zone
Source: City of Dalian (2000b), p6. 
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What are the brownfield sites in the City of Dalian usually redeveloped into once the old 
industrial enterprises were ultimately relocated? According to the City’s Master Plan of 
Dalian from 2000 to 2020, these vacant old industrial sites are designated to serve the 
development of service industries, residential housing developments and urban 
afforestation & greening, so as to enforce the City’s urban function in port, transportation, 
trade and tourism (City of Dalian, 2000a). 
 
Mr. Haibo Zhou, the senior planner and Director of the Institute of Urban Planning in 
Dalian Urban Planning & Design Institute, said 
  
“…New industrial enterprises will not be arranged on the old industrial sites within the 
Central City except for the four remaining industrial zones in consideration of the 
environment. The old industrial sites were usually redeveloped into commercial, 
residential, recreational land or green spaces. For example, the former Dalian Lipid 
Chemical Plant was redeveloped into Dalian Navy Square in September 2000, which is 
the first square in China named after navy. The beautiful residential quarter Xinghai 
Renjia in 2002 was once the former Dalian Paint Factory located in South Shahekou 
Zone. Similarly, many other projects such as the Xiwang Square and Xingfu e-Home are 
all developed on the old industrial sites.”  
 
Figure 5.6 includes pictures taken from on-site observation on the redeveloped old 
industrial sites mentioned by Mr. Zhou. Little evidence from the pictures shows that they 
were built over former industrial sites since the old industrial buildings had been totally 
demolished.  
 
Figure 5.6: The Redeveloped Old Industrial Sites 
         
Residential Quarter Xinghai Renjia 
(Former Dalian Paint Factory) 
Dalian Navy Square 
(Former Dalian Oil&Fat Chemical Plant) 
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Mr. Xiaoguang Xu, a senior planner in Dalian Urban Planning & Design Institute, told 
the researcher: 
 
 “In the City of Dalian, similar to many other large cities in China, it is very common to 
knock down the old industrial building and substitute it with a whole new high-rise 
commercial or residential building… It is not just because new high-rises allow for more 
spaces, but also because the old industrial facilities pose their own physical or 
environmental problems for efficient commercial or residential use. Some of them were 
so dilapidated and contaminated that it did not make any economic sense for the 
developers to clean them up and redevelop them in situ…However, we do have begun to 
realize the intangible value in the architectural and historic context of the old industrial 
heritage which new high-rises are missing. That’s why we are considering learning from 
the North American experiences, i.e. to convert old industrial properties into lofts. 
Actually, this idea has been incorporated into the first draft of the redevelopment plan of 
former Dalian Steel Company and Dahua Group Dalian Chemical Industry Company.” 
 
It should be noted here that in addition to the old factories and plants, the buildings 
within the old industrial sites may include some dilapidated residential apartments and 
commercial establishments which may also be considered as brownfields in Dalian. 
These residential buildings were usually built by the adjacent state-owned industrial 
enterprises in 1950s when a work unit (known as danwei in China) was required to 
provide housing and basic social services (such as health care and child care, etc) for its 
employees. Shops and outdoor farmers’ markets were spontaneously established to serve 
nearby residents. At that time, many of these residential and commercial buildings were 
constructed without being properly planned. Some of them lacked sanitation networks, 
while some were usually serviced by antiquated sewers and water lines over 50 years old. 
Many of these services have not been replaced and some of them caused sewage leakage 
in the past. Therefore, there is often a need to deal with the potential sewage 
contamination beneath the buildings and the debris & wastes once they are emptied and 
torn down, along with the large-scale industrial relocation. 
 
5.4 The Process of Brownfield Redevelopment 
The redevelopment of brownfields in the City of Dalian is a complicated process which is 
closely related with industrial relocation and involves a variety of public and private 
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sectors. Figure 5.7 illustrates a conventional planning process of brownfield 
redevelopment in the city, as well as the interactions, behaviours and functions of 
different public and private sectors.  
 
Typically, the whole redevelopment process is initiated by the release of municipal 
notification of the relocation plan, which states the project outline and timetable for 
relocation and resettlement. The Dalian Land Reserve and Transaction Center (DLRTC) 
will take charge of the notification release on behalf of the municipal government. Then, 
the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which are involved in the relocation plan will obtain 
financing from financial institutions to purchase new lands outside the City and establish 
new plants, while at the same time, the old factories will still be kept in operation until 
the construction of new ones is completed. The municipal government will allocate the 
new land in the suburb to the SOEs for the construction of new industrial plants in 
accordance with the overarching master plan. The SOEs obtain the allocated land use 
right of the new land without paying any rent and they can maintain the allocated land 
use right without time limitation48. What the SOEs do need to pay is the resettlement 
compensation to farmers, since the allocated new land in the suburb is mainly farmland 
and it is expropriated from farmers by the municipal government. Due to the resettlement 
compensation and the construction cost of new plants, the SOEs need to obtain financing 
for the relocation. It usually takes the SOEs one or two years, sometimes even longer, to 
complete the whole process of relocation, depending on their company scale and the 
ability of financing. As the SOEs gradually move out of the central city, former old 
industrial plants become vacant, waiting for the redevelopment coming soon. 
 
A professional team from the Dalian Land Resources and Housing Bureau (DLRHB) is 
then sent to the vacant former industrial sites to carry out Phase One land development 
which refers to site preparation regarding the process of dismantling the old buildings & 
fixtures on the old sites, and leveling the ground to make the land become “serviced land”. 
Serviced land is a real estate terminology in China which especially refers to land for 
                                                 
48 The allocated land use right is quite different from the assigned land use right through bid invitation, auction or 
quotation, which will be introduced later. 
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Figure 5.7:  A Conventional Planning Process of Brownfield redevelopment 
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which the dismantlement of above-ground buildings & fixtures and natural land 
consolidation has been completed, and is serviced with “Availability of 7 Issues” 
(including traffic, electricity, water, drainage, telecommunication, cable TV and gas) and 
ready for the new construction. Serviced land is a semantic counterpart to “raw land” 
which is described as land that has not undergone basic infrastructure construction 
(water/sewage, stormwater management and other utilities) and can not be developed into 
new land uses directly. The Phase One land development is a required preliminary 
process before the vacant industrial land can be recorded into the land reserve system and 
then be supplied to the land market for redevelopment. Usually DLRHB is responsible 
for Phase One land development. However, considering the potential for bureaucratic 
inefficiency, DLRHB will not always do it itself. Instead, DLRHB will issue a certificate 
to a qualified developer and authorize it to carry out Phase One land development. The 
latter approach is more often adopted in Dalian according to a government official at the 
Dalian Economic Committee. The qualified developer is elected by means of bidding. 
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Once the Phase One land development is completed and the brownfield becomes serviced 
land, it will be put into the record of urban land reserve by DLRTC. The DLRTC is a 
municipal department which is responsible for managing the urban land reserve system 
including land purchase, requisition & recall, land reserve and supplying land to the 
market. The DLRTC assembles those serviced lands from dispersed land users, clears 
their title and consolidates them for future supply.  
 
At the same time, a detailed plan is drafted by the Dalian Urban Planning Bureau (DUPB) 
and revised after public hearings. It is then examined and approved by the City Council. 
A detailed plan, in conformance with the master plan, outlines the goals, objectives and 
policies regarding the redevelopment of brownfields, usually accompanied by schedules 
identifying proposed land uses, development constraints, the general planar lay out, and 
provisions of the by-law such as set backs and building permits.  
 
With the establishment of the detailed plan, the DLRTC releases a public notification 
with mass media to call for potential developers to redevelop the proposed brownfield 
site. Under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the state owns the nation’s 
lands and assigns licenses to those who inhabit, utilize, and improve it. Therefore, public 
notification is not announced to transfer ownership of the proposed land, but to assign the 
right to the use of proposed state-owned land to the market through bid invitation, auction 
or quotation. Because the DLRTC does not undertake the environmental study of 
brownfields, detailed information regarding the contamination on the brownfields will 
not be included in the public notification. Typically, public notification will outline the 
basic condition of the proposed land such as location and area, permitted land use, the 
planning control indexes, the qualification requirement for potential applicants in bidding, 
auction or quotation for the assigned land use right, and other associated measures and 
regulations in bidding, auction or quotation. The base price or minimum price will be first 
evaluated by a qualified land evaluation institute in accordance with the relevant 
provisions, and then decided by the DLRTC in light of the evaluation result and the 
industrial policy of the municipal government in Dalian (City of Dalian, 2002). The base 
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price or minimum price will be kept secret by the DLRTC until the bidding, auction or 
quotation of the assignment has reached a conclusion. 
 
Potential developers who are interested in the redevelopment of proposed brownfields   
submit their application to the DLRTC for bidding, auction or quotation before the 
deadline. The bid winner or auction winner will sign the Contract for Assignment of the 
Right to the Use of State-owned Land with the assignor DLRTC on the condition that the 
charges for the assigned land use right has been paid in full. It should be noted here that 
the assigned land use right, unlike the allocated land use right, is subject to a specified 
term and limitations on the redevelopment to general purposes similar to detailed plan 
and zoning classifications, depending on the specific terms in the Assignment Contract. 
Generally speaking, the highest timeframe of the assigned land use right for residential 
use is 70 years; for industrial use is 50 years; for non-profit organizational use such as 
education and research institutes is 50 years; for commercial, tourism and recreational 
use is 40 years; while for all other uses is 50 years (DLRTC, 2002). Ninety percent of the 
proceeds from the assignment of the right through to the use of State-owned land will be 
transferred back to the SOEs which are involved in the industrial relocation for their 
future restructuring and innovation, while the rest 10% of the proceeds is retained by the 
municipality for public use (City of Dalian, 2003). 
 
When all the formalities for the assigned land use right transaction are cleared, 
developers begin to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the 
approval by Dalian Environmental Protection Bureau (DEPB), as well as a project 
feasibility report for the approval by Dalian Development & Reform Commission 
(DDRC), and the application for Land Use Planning Permit to DUPB. According to the 
People’s Republic of China Environmental Impact Assessment Law which took effect in 
September 2003, any land use plan or regional development plan is required to submit an 
EIA report which analyzes and forecasts the environmental impacts of such a plan, and 
proposes counter-measures to mitigate adverse environmental impacts (SEPAC, 2002). 
There is no exception in the City of Dalian. If the conclusion of the EIA report is not 
accepted in the course of examination and approval by the authority, namely the DEPB, 
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the development plans are not allowed to be implemented. In addition to the EIA report, 
the developer needs to obtain the Dalian Development & Reform Commission’s (DDRC) 
approval for the project feasibility report. Besides, according to the Urban Planning Act 
1989 49 , prior permissions for land and property developments from the planning 
authority before the commencement of construction are required, which contain Land 
Use Planning Permit, Land Development Permit and Building Permit. The DUPB will 
evaluate the development applications against the non-statutory Detailed Plan and issue a 
Land Use Planning Permit to developers attached with land use planning parameters such 
as plot ratio, site coverage and building height. When the EIA report, the project 
feasibility report and the Land Use Planning Permit are all approved, as well as the land 
site details finalized, a Land Development Permit will be issued to the developer by 
DUPB. Then, the developer can proceed to commission architects to design the building. 
After the review of building designs by the Dalian Urban & Rural Construction 
Committee (DURCC) staff, a Building Permit is issued and the redevelopment of a 
brownfield site can proceed to the stage of contamination clearance and new construction. 
The DEPB will undertake follow-up monitoring during the process of contamination 
clearance and construction to ensure that the project is being undertaken in conformity 
with the EIA report. 
                                                
 
5.5 Challenges to Brownfield Redevelopment in Dalian 
Through nine interviews with government officials from DEPB, DUPDI, DEC and 
DLRTC, four challenges to brownfield redevelopment in Dalian were identified. The 
prior concern is about the potential pollution problems left on the former industrial land. 
Since most of the enterprises involved in the large scale industrial relocation are SOEs in 
heavy industries which produce a significant amount of pollution in the central city, there 
is more or less some perceived or unknown contamination resulted from past industrial 
uses left on the land. “Considering that these former industrial sites are designated for 
residential or commercial use in the near future according to the City’s master plan, we 
 
d. 
49 The Urban Planning Act was abated on January 1st, 2008 and a new planning act called Urban and Rural Planning 
Act enacted on October 28th, 2007 replaced it and took effect on January 1st, 2008. However, the provisions regarding 
the prior permits for urban land and property development remain unchange
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need to pay special attention to the potential pollution problems left on the sites”, said Mr. 
Ni, one of the top officials in DEPB, “although developers are required to undertake an 
Environmental Impact Assessment and get their Environmental Impact Assessment 
report approved by us before the commencement of construction, we still can not 
optimistically think that the potential contamination will be thoroughly cleared by the 
developer and the site is suitable for people to inhabit or utilize.” On the one hand, the 
EIA of a brownfield project usually focuses on the contamination related to the air, water 
and solid wastes, which can be perceived directly and easily (Environmental Expert from 
DUT). Yet the hidden potential contamination in the soil is seldom studied in the EIA. 
On the other hand, there is currently no national or provincial environment laws and 
regulations that especially regulate the cleanup criteria for soils and groundwater 
contaminants in brownfields (Government Official in DEPB). The only national standard 
that can be used in identifying whether a brownfield site is ready for redevelopment of 
other land uses after remediation is the Environmental Quality Standard for Soils 
promulgated by SEPAC in 1995. But this set of criteria may be too loose and does not fit 
into the specific conditions of brownfield sites in the city, because it is originally applied 
to cultivated land not urban land. Urban land, especially land for residential use, may 
require more stringent soil and groundwater standards to be protective of all receptors. As 
a result, potential contamination left on brownfields may still exist and pose a potential 
environmental risk to public health, even though the developer has implemented EIA and 
undertaken some methods to remediate the site. 
 
“…As a matter of fact, we have already received some appeals from residents living in a 
residential quarter, reporting that they began to feel uncomfortable after they had lived 
there for two or three years, and they suspected there might be some chemical wastes in 
the soil left by the former paint factory that had not been cleaned up, and it might be the 
chemical contaminants in the soil that made them feel uncomfortable. Since everything is 
still under investigation, I could not tell you more details about it right now. But what I 
do can tell you is that those appeals have aroused special concerns in our bureau, even the 
City Council, and we are getting down to establishing an environmental regulation in the 
near future to regulate the redevelopment of former industrial sites. People do not need to 
wait too long.” (Government Official in DEPB) 
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The second challenge to brownfield redevelopment identified in Dalian is the lack of 
detailed historical information on former industrial enterprises, which leads to uncertain 
identification of potential contamination and presents problems to DEPB staff when they 
examine and approve the EIA report. DEPB does not have a record of former industrial 
enterprises’ historical site information, even though most of the enterprises are SOEs. 
One of the main reasons for this is that many SOEs themselves do not have the 
management of archives clearly recording their past manufacturing and operations. 
Furthermore, some of the enterprises may no longer exist due to relocation and 
restructuring. They may have shut down, while some may have amalgamated into other 
companies. Thus, many of the past historic documents are inevitably destroyed or 
missing while some of the insiders may have retired. Without a clear understanding of 
historical site information, it is hard for developers to identify potential contaminants of 
concern and potential areas of contamination on brownfields and thus the accuracy of 
EIA can not be assured. The lack of detailed historical information on brownfields has 
become a serious problem to DEPB, particularly in the case of hazardous solid wastes. 
Before the enforcement of the Law on Prevention and Control of Environmental 
Pollution by Solid Wastes of the People’s Republic of China in 1995, enterprises usually 
adopted landfill as a method to dispose of hazardous solid wastes (HSWs). However, due 
to the unavailability of documentation, it is very difficult for DEPB to collect complete 
past information associated with the generation, transportation and disposal of HSWs in 
the past, thereafter increasing the inaccuracy in identifying potential contaminations on 
browfield sites where former industries might have produced HSWs. 
 
The third challenge of brownfield redevelopment in the City of Dalian is to assemble 
multiple dispersed adjacent properties into a parcel that is shaped and sized appropriately 
for redevelopment in the large scale of industrial relocation. This often requires recalling 
the dispersed land use rights from various individual land users and incorporating several 
contiguous parcels under a single land use right. However, some industries may not be 
willing to move and relocate outside the City, even though the land under their properties 
belongs to the state and they are required to move according to the released municipal 
notification. This is mainly because most of the employees in the industries live at the 
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Central City which is close to urban amenities, and they are reluctant to move to the 
suburb where they need to spend considerable amount of time everyday in commuting 
from their homes. Moreover, some affected households from residential brownfields may 
be also unwilling to move out of their apartments or houses because of unsatisfactory 
resettlement compensation. “Frankly speaking, it is really an arduous job to assemble the 
dispersed brownfields from individual land users. No one psychologically wants to move 
and resettle in a new place once he/she has stayed at a place for years, except that the 
compensation exceeds the cost of resettlement. So the timeframe of redeveloping those 
former industrial sites is usually prolonged” a governmental official at DLRTC told the 
researcher. 
 
 The final challenge that was repeatedly emphasized in the interviews with government 
officials is not directly related to the redevelopment of brownfields, but an economic 
problem stemming from the whole process of industrial relocation and brownfield 
redevelopment. That is the issue of unemployment. It has been mentioned before that 
90% of the proceeds from assignment of the right to the use of former industrial land will 
be transferred back to the SOEs which are involved in the industrial relocation for their 
future restructuring and innovation. The industrial restructuring and innovation inevitably 
trigger layoffs and employees no longer qualified for the new jobs are thus laid off. 
Unemployment becomes worse, particularly when it comes to the case of the SOEs that 
have stopped their operation in the industrial restructuring. “Unemployment is 
increasingly challenging the safety and stability of our society in Dalian…The placement 
of these laid-off employees has become an urgent social problem drawing the City 
Council’s attention” said Mr. Tong, an official at DEC. 
 
5.6 Municipality’s Response to the Challenges of Brownfield 
Redevelopment in Dalian 
 
The potential environmental problems in brownfield redevelopment have caused great 
safety concerns in the City of Dalian. In November 2006, the City Council released a 
Decision on Implementing the Scientific Concept of Development and Strengthening 
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Environmental Protection (the “Decision”), which for the first time put forward that “the 
vacant former industrial site is not allowed to be redeveloped until soil risk assessment 
and site restoration have been undertaken and completed” (City of Dalian, 2006b). Later 
in August 2007, the City Council released Notification of Enhancing Environment 
Pollution Prevention in the Process of Industrial Relocation (the “Notification”), which 
for the second time emphasized the request for soil contamination cleanup and brought 
forward policies regarding the liability of contamination (City of Dalian, 2007a). 
According to the Notification, developers are required to commission a qualified 
environmental impact assessment agency to carry out EIA on soils before redeveloping a 
brownfield site. It is not until the identified contaminants have been cleaned up to meet 
the related national environmental protection standards that the developer is able to 
proceed with new construction. The original polluter of brownfields is responsible for all 
the remediation costs, following the principle of “polluter pays” according to the 
Notification. The cleanup cost can be brought into the relocation cost or the bankruptcy 
liquidation in accounting by the industries involved in the relocation. In the case that the 
original polluter is absent or out of the discharge ability, the municipal government will 
bear part or all of the cost, hinging on the specific condition of the case and the City’s 
financial ability.  
 
The City of Dalian has been very progressive in implementing the Notification. In 
September 2007, DEPB made a decision to launch a joint program with foreign investors 
to cooperatively remediate the 700,000 ㎡ brownfield sites at the District of Ganjingzi. 
These sites formerly housed eight industrial enterprises, among which seven were heavy 
industries. DEPB decided to remediate the sites before they could be redeveloped for 
commercial and residential use. Considering the limited remediation technology currently 
available, DEPB wanted to attract foreign investment and bring in advanced remediation 
technology. The municipal government would pay for the cleanup cost while the foreign 
enterprises would give technological support for the program. According to the official at 
DEPB, the municipal government hoped the program could be a showcase of brownfield 
redevelopment in Dalian, which not only reduced potential environmental risk on public 
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safety but also helped to disseminate advanced remediation technology among developers 
(Cong, 2007). 
 
As to the challenge of the lack of detailed historical site information on brownfields, the 
City still has not yet come up with an effective counter-measure. “What we currently do 
is to hold workshops and interviews with the old environmentalists of the city and other 
related insiders’ of the company, in order to acquire historical site information of 
brownfields such as their past operations and disposals of wastes. But the effect is rather 
limited. You know, some of the insiders may have passed away or have retired. It is hard 
to get in touch with them” The official at DEPB told the researcher disappointedly. In the 
case of hazardous solid wastes, the City established a new department called the 
Department of Dalian Solid Wastes Management at DEPB in August 2002, which was 
especially responsible for supervising and monitoring the whole process of production, 
transportation and disposal of HSWs in the City. Industrial enterprises which produce 
HSWs in their operation are required to declare and register all the information of HSWs 
to the Department. Therefore, the municipal government can keep a very good record of 
all the present HSWs in Dalian and have stringent control of the HSWs management. 
However, as aforementioned, past information regarding the production, transportation 
and disposal of HSWs before 1995 when the Law on Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes of the People’s Republic of China was not 
enacted is still incomplete. As a result, the EIA on brownfields where former industrial 
enterprises may have produced HSWs is covered with clouds of uncertainty. The City is 
still working on methods to clear those clouds. 
 
In terms of the challenges related to enterprises’ and individuals’ unwillingness to 
relocate and the issue of unemployment, the City of Dalian has issued two documents in 
order to smooth the process of industrial relocation and brownfield redevelopment. In 
August 2006, the Regulation of Industrial Enterprises’ Relocation and Transformation in 
the Central City of Dalian (the “Regulation”) was released, which required the relocated 
SOEs to actively provide other job opportunities, if possible, for the laid-off employees 
before they finally dismiss them (City of Dalian, 2006c). If the SOEs do not have the 
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capacity to provide possible jobs, they must give an appropriate amount of compensation 
to the employees when they are dismissed, so that the employees can maintain their 
minimum living standard before they find new jobs by themselves. Unemployed people 
can apply for jobless claims from the City according the Regulations. In February 2007, 
another document Revised Implementation Measures for Urban Housing Demolition and 
Relocation in City of Dalian was issued, which pointed out the countermeasures 
exclusively for potential conflict over resettlement compensation from affected individual 
property owners in the industrial relocation (City of Dalian, 2007b). By way of public 
consultation, the municipal government and the affected individual property owners will 
together decide and commission a real estate evaluation company to appraise the old 
buildings, and then work out the amount of appropriate compensation that will satisfy 
both sides. Resettlement contracts are signed between the municipal government and the 
existing property owners. If two parties can not reach agreement, either one can resort to 
the intermediate court in the city for a justified adjudication.  All these measures are 
designed to mitigate potential opposition and appeals from residents who are required to 
relocate. 
 
5.7 Example of Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment Project 
Lingshui Bay is a shallow estuary through which Lingshui River enters the Yellow Sea. It 
is located in western part of Dalian, surrounded by a region called Lingshui Bay Area. 
Lingshui Bay, together with Xinghai Bay and Xiaoping Island, were once considered the 
Three Jewels in the City of Dalian. With the crystal clean water running from Lingshui 
River into the Ocean, a long sandy beach as well as an abundance of greenery and 
flowers nearby on the Bay Area, Lingshui Bay had once been one of the favorite resorts 
for Dalian People. However, the industrialization and urban development in the past had 
dramatically changed Lingshui Bay and the bay area. Lingshui Bay is no longer a shiny 
jewel in western Dalian, but a Lingluan bay which in Chinese means disorder and 
pollution (See Figure 5.8). Raw sewage from both households and industrial enterprises 
are discharged directly to Lingshui River without treatment. Solid wastes were dumped 
on roadsides. Stinky smells from the aquatic products breeding & processing factory 
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disperses over the north end of Lingshui Bay. “Lingshui Bay Area shouldn’t be in the 
way it currently presents. Particularly considering its geographic location, Lingshui Bay 
Area should be a treasure in Western Dalian, not a Lingluan Bay Area. It lies astride the 
important transportation corridor between Dalian and Lushun (the fast-traffic-lane, 
Lushun South Road) and is exceptionally close to Dalian University of Technology in the 
north and Dalian High-Tech Industrial Park in the south” The Director of the 
Construction Bureau of Dalian High-Tech Industrial Zone said to the researcher. 
 
Figure 5.8: Observations on Lingshui Bay Area 
         
Sewage Leaking on Lingyuan Road                   Wastes Piling along the Roadside 
 
         
Overlooking the Smeltery Sitting besides         Abandoned Hyperbolic Cooling Tower at 
Lingshui River                                                    at the Third Coal Power Plant 
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Lingshui River and nearby Sewer Pipes              Wharf of the Aquatic Products Breeding 
                                                                              &Processing Factory on the Bay 
 
 
        
Lingshui Bay Wholesale Market for                   Shabby Residential Building on 
Agricultural and Sideline Products                     Lingyuan Road 
 
In early 2006, the Dalian High-Tech Industrial Zone (DHTIZ) launched the Lingshui Bay 
Area Redevelopment Project which was aimed to remediate the contamination and 
redevelop the bay area into a Science & Culture Region (See Figure 5.9 for the 
perspectives of urban design). The project is part of the City’s long term planning project 
Detailed Plan for Qixianling Industrial Base under the administration of DHTIZ. In order 
to facilitate the redevelopment process, DHTIZ ad hoc established the Lingshui Bay Area 
Redevelopment Office which exclusively took charge of the project. According to an 
official at the Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment Office, the project is composed of three 
main steps.  
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Figure 5.9: Perspectives of the Redevelopment Area 
       
Main Entrance of Redevelopment Area      Birds Eye View of Main Redevelopment Area 
Source: DUPDI (2006), p17 
 
First, 34 enterprises and institutions, whether they are large or small, as well as near 300 
households will be moved and relocated to the suburb. Industrial enterprises creating 
heavy pollution will either be relocated or closed in situ, including the Third Coal Power 
Plant, the Aquatic Products Breeding & Processing Factory and the smeltery. The shabby 
residential quarter on Lingyuan Road which is serviced with antiquated municipal 
utilities will be torn down and redeveloped into a new modern residential community. 
The Lingshui Bay Wholesale Market for Agricultural and Sideline Products which is 
polluted by sewage and wastes will be closed and dismantled. Figure 5.10 includes a 
current land use map of Lingshui Bay Area, and Figure 5.11 is an intended land use map. 
Comparing both Figures, it reveals that most of the former industrial sites which may 
have caused potential environmental contamination are designated to be redeveloped for 
educational and research institutes, or for residential use.  
 
Second, a comprehensive environmental pollution remediation will be carried out 
extensively on the Lingshui Bay Area, including the land polluted by raw sewage and 
wastes, the abandoned railways, the contaminated Lingshui River and the waterfront. 
 
Third, an infill project will be launched to reshape the coastline of Lingshui Bay and 
provide new lands for recreational/cultural public open space (See Figure 5.11). A new  
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Figure 5.10: Current Land Use of Lingshui Bay Area50
 
Source: DUPDI (2006), p4 
                                                 
50 For explanations related to the classification of various urban land uses in China, please refer to Appendix VIII. 
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Figure 5.11: Proposed Land Use of Lingshui Bay Area 
 
Source: DUPDI (2006), p8. 
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high way Binhai in the north and stretching towards south to Lushun, in order to mitigate 
the traffic pressure on Lushun South Road. In total, the Lingshui Bay Area 
Redevelopment Project will cover a redevelopment area of 3-5 square kilometers and an 
estimated amount of $330 million will be invested in the construction of new 
infrastructure (Director at the Construction Bureau of DHTIZ). 
 
In interviews with government officials from the Construction of Bureau at the DHTIZ 
and the Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment Office, all four interviewees unanimously 
considered the greatest challenge in the Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment Project was 
to relocate affected enterprises and households in the bay area and assemble multiple 
dispersed properties into a parcel suitable for redevelopment. Because of disorganized 
urban development in the past, the land use rights on Lingshui Bay Area had been 
allocated to various interest groups, including SOEs, private enterprises, the Army, etc.  
 
 “Thirty four enterprises and institutions are required to move and relocate, involving the 
Third Coal Power Plant, Lushun Naval Logistics Base, Dalian Maritime University, and 
so forth. Do you know what they mean to us? We need to negotiate and persuade them to 
move single by single, dealing with all kinds of complicated conflicts and interest 
groups…You can’t imagine how hard it is to reach agreement with them. Some of them 
are governed by two different District governments, Ganjingzi District and Shahekou 
District. Some are the premises of Lushun Naval Logistics Base. We have totally no idea 
about what to do next when the project affects the army’s interest. It is almost impossible 
to ask the army to compromise.” (Official at Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment Office) 
 
According to the interviewees, DHTIZ had spent a large amount of time and energy in 
negotiating with various affected interest groups in order to reach agreement. The issue of 
resettlement compensation had also been pending for a long period, causing the delay in 
the relocation and dismantlement of the residential quarter on Lingyuan Road. 
 
Another barrier relates to the potential contamination on Lingshui Bay Area. 
Contamination is two-fold in the redevelopment project. On the one hand, although 
environmental pollution remediation will be carried out extensively on the Lingshui Bay 
Area including the potential contaminated land, Lingshui River and the waterfront, 
DHTIZ could not assure the contamination on brownfield sites would be completely 
cleaned up. A director at the Construction Bureau of DHTIZ said: “we can clean up the 
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contaminants in Lingshui River and the bay to reach the national standards on inland 
water and seawaters. But when it comes to the contaminants on brownfields, we are not 
so confident… because there is no national or provincial cleanup standard available in 
hand with regards to the soil and groundwater contaminants in brownfields.” On the other 
hand, DHTIZ was concerned about the potential negative environmental impact of the 
infill project along the coastline of Lingshui Bay. The primary purpose of the infill 
project was to remediate the contaminants around Lingshui Bay and to provide new lands 
for new development. DHTIZ worried that the infill would otherwise destroy the natural 
ecosystem on the bay and the waterfront, unexpectedly causing new environmental 
contamination.  
 
As of July 27th, 2006, the Lingshui Bay Area redevelopment project had been launched 
for nearly seven months. Although the project was still in the stage of industrial and 
residential relocation, substantive progress had been made. The relocation and 
dismantlement of the 36,000 square-meter residential quarter on Lingyuan Road had 
almost been completed. Households in the community had already moved out and an 
authorized developer who won in the bidding had already started the Phase One land 
development on the site. Agreements between DHTIZ and Lushun Naval Logistics Base 
had been reached. Lushun Naval Logistics Base had agreed DHTIZ to dismantle its 
24000 square-meter Lingshui Bay Wholesale Market for Agricultural and Sideline 
Products, as well as its 3.9 kilometers abandoned railway. The environmental impact 
assessment of the infill project along the Lingshui Bay coastline had been completed by 
environmental experts at Dalian University of Technology and submitted to the DEPB for 
examination and approval. 
 
Great progress has been made in the Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment project 
according to a telephone interview with the Director at the Construction Bureau of DHTZ 
on February 25th, 2008. A waste water disposal factory located on the south end of 
Lingshui Bay has been completed and begun its operation. All the raw sewage from 
current households and industrial enterprises at Lingshui Bay area are no longer 
discharged directly to the Lingshui River without treatment, but flow through newly 
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established sewer pipes into the factory for disposal. As a result, the contamination of the 
Lingshui River is controlled from the source. Solid wastes piling along the roadside in the 
bay area have already been dug and dumped away to the landfill sites for treatment. 
Contaminated sediments in Lingshui River and Lingshui Bay will be dredged and 
removed this year 2008 according to the official. In addition, negotiations with the Third 
Coal Power Plant, Dalian Maritime University and other enterprises which have not 
reached agreement with DHTIZ are still expected to continue in 2008. 
 
5.8 Stakeholders’ Perceptions on Applying the Successful 
Brownfield Redevelopment Approaches to the City of Dalian 
Seventeen face-to-face interviews in the City of Dalian, China were carried out with key 
stakeholders involved in brownfield redevelopment, including environmental consultants 
and scholars from DUT, planners and government officials from DUPDI, DEPB, DEC, 
DLRTC, and DHTIZ. According to the interviews, two types of perception were found 
among stakeholders with regard to applying the successful municipal experiences in 
Ontario to the City of Dalian. The majority of the interviewees (10 in 17) considered that 
it was impossible to apply those Canadian experiences to Dalian. In the eyes of the ten 
interviewees, the difference in brownfield redevelopment between Canadian cities and 
Dalian was identified as the main factor accounting for their disagreement regarding the 
application. The difference includes four main aspects: (1) different situation of 
brownfield redevelopment in two countries; (2) different challenges facing the 
municipalities; (3) different environmental law system in two countries; and (4) different 
land ownerships. They are reflected by the following typical arguments from the ten 
stakeholders: 
 
“…applying the Canadian municipal experiences to Dalian? How could that be 
possible? The situation of brownfield in Dalian is totally different from Canada. We 
don’t need to worry about developers’ unwillingness to redevelop those former 
industrial sites. In fact every time when we supply the vacant former industrial land 
to the market, we’ve got many applications from various developers for 
participation in the bidding or auction. The market force itself works very well. In 
this case, it is not necessary for the City to adopt any policy especially aimed to 
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encourage the developers, needless to say the Canadian experiences…” (An official 
from DLRTC) 
 
“…I don’t think the Canadian experiences are going to work out in Dalian. They are 
not panacea. They are designated to solve their own set of problems in brownfield 
facing their cities. City of Dalian has its own distinctive challenges in the 
redevelopment of brownfield. We don’t have the same problems as in Canada. 
Policies turn to work in Canada, which does not mean they are going to work in 
Dalian, in China. It is just like the old Chinese idiom Suit the Remedy to the Illness.  
We can’t take the medicine for cough to cure loose bowels. They just don’t fit…” 
(An official from DEC) 
 
“…In the industrial relocation and redevelopment of former industrial sites, our 
priority concern is not that these brownfield sites will be or are being left idle or 
abandoned, but the environmental risks arising from the potential contamination left 
on the sites after the redevelopment. Our current environmental legislations and 
regulations associated with brownfield redevelopment are not as comprehensive and 
stringent as in Canada. Developers do not have to spend a large amount of money in 
remediating the sites in order to meet the standards. I think what the City needs to 
do right now is to make concerted efforts to precipitate the establishment of 
environmental regulations regarding the cleanup of former industrial sites. It is not 
necessary for us to apply the Canadian experiences to Dalian to attract potential 
developers into brownfield redevelopment…” (An official from DEPB) 
 
“…It is very good that you can do such kind of cross-nation and cross-culture 
research to introduce successful foreign experiences to China. However, we can not 
ignore the basic situation of two countries. You know, what is the biggest difference 
between Canada and China in redeveloping former industrial sites? It is not the 
difference in economics, neither in the environmental law system. It is the political 
system that fundamentally dictates the redevelopment of brownfield is going to be 
different in two countries. We are a socialist country based on public ownership. All 
the land in China is owned by the state. That means the ownership of all former 
industrial lands belongs to the state. However, in Canada, it is a country based on 
private ownership. Those municipal approaches used in Canadian cities are mostly 
initiated to facilitate the redevelopment of privately owned brownfield sites. The 
subject of these policies is different from China. How can it be feasible to apply 
them to Dalian? It is not realistic…” (A scholar from DUT) 
 
Even though the majority of the interviewees denied the potential of applying Canadian 
experiences to the City of Dalian, seven interviewees considered that it might be 
meaningful. It was identified that there were three types of opinions among these 
stakeholders. Four of them considered that even though the current situation of 
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brownfield redevelopment in Canadian cities and in Dalian was different, the City of 
Dalian should learn from Canada to prioritize environmental issues in front of economic 
growth. Two of them thought that the municipal government in Dalian might learn the 
financial incentive programs from Canada mainly because the environmental laws related 
to brownfields in China would be strengthened in the long run. Only one of them 
suggested that the Canadian experiences with regard to marketing and brownfield 
coordinator might be of help to the City of Dalian. These three types of opinions from the 
seven stakeholders are reflected by the following typical arguments: 
 
“…Here I would rather say the City of Dalian should learn from Canadian 
municipalities in stead of applying their approaches to Dalian. I don’t suggest we 
should carry out exactly the same kind of policies in brownfield redevelopment as 
in Canadian cities, because our situation is quite a lot different from Canada. 
However, let’s take a close look at these Canadian experiences. We can clearly find 
that they are all driven by a strong commitment to brownfield redevelopment. 
Furthermore, under the commitment is the motivation to ensure public health and 
safety in their cities. That’s the point I want to mention here. City of Dalian should 
learn from the Canadian cities and place the issue of public health and safety as No. 
1 priority in front of the economic growth. Former industrial sites should not have 
been redeveloped in such a blind way as it is today. More attentions should be paid 
into the cleanups of contamination …” (An environmental expert from DUT) 
 
“…In the short run I think the potential for us to apply Canadian successful 
municipal experiences in brownfield redevelopment is very weak, as we face 
different challenges. However, in the long run, they might be of help to our 
city…As you know, early this year our State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) released a regulatory document Decision on Implementing 
the Scientific Concept of Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection. 
The document advocated all levels of government in China drawing up the drafts of 
environmental legislation and regulations related to soil contamination. It called for 
soil risk assessment and site restoration on former industrial sites as well. So we can 
foresee that in the very near future, there is going to be a series of legislations and 
regulations regarding contaminated land being enacted. At that time, environmental 
remediation will become a major issue in the redevelopment of brownfield. Then 
maybe the Canadian experiences can become helpful to Dalian, like providing 
grants or funding for environmental site assessment and the municipality taking up 
leadership role in brownfield redevelopment…” (An official from DEPB) 
 
“…I think we might learn from Canada of marketing and brownfield coordinator. 
What we marketing are not the brownfield incentive programs, since we don’t have 
those programs in Dalian. What I consider is the marketing of our brownfield 
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redevelopment vision for the community. We need local support on the future land 
use plan. It is the lack of public support from the community that our work to 
relocate and resettle affected enterprises and individuals becomes so tough…Also I 
think the brownfield coordinator might be a wonderful tool to run in Dalian. We 
need someone to work as a bridge connecting the City with the private sector to 
ensure the effective and efficient communication between them. This can help the 









































Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In order to achieve the research objectives outlined in Section 1.2, this chapter will 
analyze the similarities and differences in brownfield redevelopment between two 
selected Canadian cities and Dalian. Findings based on the comparison will be further 
presented, followed by the recommendations to China’s practice. The chapter will also 
discuss the implications of Canadian brownfield redevelopment experiences to the City 
of Dalian. 
 
6.1 Comparing Brownfield Redevelopment between Canadian 
Cities and Dalian, China 
Five interesting aspects of brownfield redevelopment between Canadian cities and Dalian, 
China are compared. These comparative points include the historic formation, geography 
of brownfelds, impetus, barriers to redevelopment and the planning process. The 
comparison emphasizes the different realities existing in Canadian cities and Dalian, as 
well as the similarities present under the differing context. Key findings derived from the 
comparison will be identified, followed by recommendations to China’s brownfield 
practice. 
 
6.1.1 Historic Formation of Brownfields 
In both countries, the formation of brownfields follows a similar pattern. It is more or less 
related to two typical processes: the extensive industrialization and the follow-up 
industrial decentralization. History tells us that each of the two processes happened in 
Canada decades earlier than China. The early age of industrialization would always seem 
intensive with many industrial establishments erected along railroads or waterways and 
located within the urban cores due to transportation costs and the economy of 
agglomeration (Crafts & Mulatu, 2005), no matter whether it was in “Busy Berlin”, “the 
Birmingham of Canada” or “Dairen”. The prosperity of industrialization was then 
followed by an industrial decentralization process: old industrial buildings became vacant 
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as firms closed down or gradually migrated from urban centers to the suburbs or overseas. 
Various industrial resources, such as capital and technology, were decentralized outside 
the cities. Consequentially, brownfields were formed in the urban areas.  
 
Despite similarities in the broad context of industrialization, the underlying forces 
contributing to the industrial decentralization in the two countries differ significantly. 
Traditional industries in Kitchener and Hamilton had experienced a serious recession 
during the 1980’s. They confronted fierce competition from international markets and the 
shrinkage of domestic demand. Many manufacturing industries were closed.  The 
industrial decentralization in two cities happened spontaneously with the market as the 
driving force. However, decentralization in Dalian was quite different. It was determined 
more by governmental intentions than by the market.  Most of the old industrial firms in 
Dalian are SOEs. The government holds predominant powers in the decision-making 
process of SOEs. Before 1978, when Chinese economic reforms started, industrial firms 
in Dalian did not have the right to make their own decisions regarding site selection. A 
sequence of five-year plans for social-economic development in Dalian dictated the way 
industrial firms were located and developed. Later, the SOEs had to move out of the city 
centre when the government decided to restructure its urban layout following the master 
plan.  
 
Key Finding: The formation of brownfileds in Dalian is more governmental policy-
oriented not market-oriented, which results from the State ownership of urban land. 
 
In Canada, most of the brownfield sites are privately owned and they are usually left 
vacant for a long period of time by property owners because of their concerns on the 
costly upfront environmental studies and remediation costs while at the same time being 
fear of the potential liability of contamination in the future. However, in China, the State 
owns all the land in urban areas while land in rural and suburban areas is owned by 
peasant collectives under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the Land 
Administration Law of P.R.C. These state or collective ownerships of land are the 
fundamental necessities of maintaining the socialist society in China while developing 
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the market economy. Therefore, when it comes to the ownership of brownfield sites in 
the City of Dalian, they are all State-owned. State ownership has two major impacts on 
the formation and redevelopment of brownfields in Dalian.  
 
When modern land reform in the amendment of the Chinese Constitution in 1988 allowed 
that “land use can be transacted according to the law”, the municipal government 
acquired a new source of revenues through the separation of land ownership and land use 
rights of State-owned urban land. In other words, the municipality can raise a large 
amount of money by assigning land use rights to urban land users for a specified term of 
years. When the City of Dalian needed extra revenues to fund the SOEs for their 
restructuring and innovation, the City came up with the decision of relocating the SOEs 
in the central city and selling the land use rights of brownfields to developers for land use 
fees. That is also the reason why the formation of brownfields in Dalian was so closely 
related to industrial relocation.  
 
State ownership of brownfields also indicates that the state is not only the beneficiary of 
land use right transactions, but also assumes responsibility for liability related to 
perceived or potential contamination on brownfields. In terms of the fair allocation of 
liability, even though the principle of “polluter pays” applies in current environmental 
laws and regulations, the liability of contamination on a brownfield site should not only 
be imposed on the industrial firms, but also the government since most of the industrial 
firms themselves are State-owned and the government had benefited from both the 
income taxes of SOEs and the proceeds from land use transactions.  
 
However, under current environmental laws and regulations, the potential liability related 
to contamination has not been taken into account by the City when the municipality sells 
the land use rights of former industrial sites. The transaction price of brownfield sites 
does not reflect the potential remediation cost and the liability of contamination in the 
future. In Hamilton, the developer of LIUNA bought the parking lot which was a former 
wire manufacturing plant from the City of Hamilton at a price of only $1 because the cost 
of potential contamination and environmental liability had partly mitigated the 
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profitability of the brownifeld project. In contrast, land use rights of brownfields in 
Dalian have been transferred at a significant price in the past. It is estimated that the City 
had received more than $4 billion from the transaction of land use rights on former 




1. The Chinese government should be more proactive in brownfield policy-making, 
including developing an appropriate environmental policy with respect to the liability of 
contamination and establishing a national strategy of brownfield redevelopment. 
 
2. The Chinese government should also be responsible for contamination cleanup in order 
to facilitate the fair allocation of liability. 
 
State ownership of urban land in China reveals a basic fact that the land ownership of 
brownfield sites belongs to the State. This type of land ownership indicates that all levels 
of Chinese governments (central, provincial and municipal) should take proactive actions 
in brownfield policy-making. However, the research indicates that brownfield policy-
making in China has been evolving more slowly than in Canada. There is no such a 
national brownfield redevelopment strategy in China as provided by the National Round 
Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE) in Canada (NRTEE, 2003). It was 
not until December 3rd, 2005 that the central government took its first major step in 
dealing with brownfield problems, namely, the release of the State Council’s Decision on 
Implementing the Scientific Concept of Development and Strengthening Environmental 
Protection51, which for the first time called for soil risk assessment and restoration on 
contaminated sites after former industrial enterprises have moved out. Furthermore, there 
is not any environmental policy established to address the issue of contamination liability 
on brownifleds. Therefore, the Chinese government should take more proactive efforts in 
rule-making, regulating and planning brownfield redevelopment. National principles on 
brownfield sites liability should be developed. A national strategy regarding the 
                                                 
51 Available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-12/13/content_125680.htm  
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redevelopment is recommended in order to guide the provincial and municipal 
governments. 
 
State ownership of brownfield sites also reveals that the government should be 
responsible for the contamination cleanup not just “polluter pays”. The principle of 
“beneficiary pays” should be supported in the remediation policy and legislation, based 
on the concept that there should be no “unfair enrichment”. Chinese government should 
not be exempted from contamination liability because it has benefited from both the 
income taxes of SOEs and the proceeds from land use transactions of brownfield land. 
 
6.1.2 Geography of Brownfields 
The distribution of brownfields in the three cities is similar in that most of the sites are 
concentrated on the old industrial areas of the city, either in an urban core or along major 
transportation connections. This could be easily understood because these enterprises 
were resource intensive and the transportation cost for raw materials as well as the output 
was a major part of the total operational cost.  
 
However, there is an important difference between Canada and China. Many brownfields 
in Kitchener and Hamilton generally remain abandoned and idled for many years. They 
were the authentic yet not proud legacy of past industrialization. They usually could not 
be redeveloped without a strong funding commitment from the public sector. In contrast, 
brownfields in Dalian are fairly “young”, being formed over the past decade; more 
brownfield sites are currently being formed due to the large scale of industrial relocation 
starting from 1995. They were not being abandoned or derelict for a long period of time 
after firms had moved out. Some of them were redeveloped immediately once turning 
vacant.  
 
Key Finding: In terms of the physical and site condition of brownfields, Chinese 
brownfields are different from those in Canada as they are not being abandoned but 
redeveloped rapidly once they become vacant.  
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The length of vacant periods, in a way, possesses a defining power to tell the difference 
between Canadian and Chinese brownfields. In Chapter 2 literature review, a brownfield 
site in this thesis is defined as “… real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse 
of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant” (US EPA, 2002). With the case study in Dalian, the 
author considers this definition is especially suitable in the context of China. Many 
scholars may disagree with the author in defining brownfields in China. They may think 
if a former industrial site is developed into other forms of land uses once the former firm 
moved out, the site can not be called a brownfield site. In other words, they might think a 
former industrial site should stay vacant for quite a while before people can name it a 
brownfield. This argument is not a surprise as it seems appropriate in the North American 
context. For example, a brownfield in Canada is defined as “an abandoned, vacant, 
derelict or underutilized commercial or industrial property where past actions have 
resulted in actual or perceived contamination and where there is an active potential for 
redevelopment” (NRTEE, 2003, p A-3). However, this thesis research needs to adopt a 
wider definition which grasps contamination as the key feature of brownfields, and does 
not consider the importance of how long the site has stayed vacant and  whether the land 
has been redeveloped. If contamination is contained and stays on site, even a new 
residential/commercial building is constructed on it, people should still call this site a 
brownfield, because it may explode as a time bomb of pollution some time in the future. 
Potential environmental hazards may happen suddenly when least expected. 
 
Recommendation:  
Former industrial sites in China should be also considered as brownfields which are “… 
real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by 
the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant” 
(US EPA, 2002).  
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6.1.3 Impetus for Brownfield Redevelopment 
Through the case study in Kitchener and Hamilton, it was found that they shared the 
same primary impetuses of redeveloping brownfields. The impetuses are the economic 
and environmental benefits brought by the redevelopment. First, brownfield 
redevelopment helps increase a city’s property tax base and the municipal revenue. It 
makes further economic contribution by alleviating brownfields’ negative impacts on 
property values. Second, the redevelopment helps to mitigate the environmental risks 
associated with the perceived or potential contamination left on brownfields and ensure 
the public health/safety within the community.  
 
The impetus in Dalian seems to show the same kind of economic and environmental 
concerns as in two Canadian cities. The municipality wants to raise money for the 
restructuring and innovation of SOEs through relocation and the redevelopment of former 
industrial sites. The City also wants to redevelop brownfields to meet the growing land 
demand in the central city for service industries, residential housing developments and 
urban afforestation&greening. However, one issue worth discussing is whether Dalian 
interprets the environmental benefits differently from Kitchener and Hamilton. Dalian 
wants to move the heavy polluters out of the central city so as to improve urban 
environment quality. Both the government and residents are concerned about pollution, 
but their concerns are more associated with observable pollution such as air and water 
pollution than with the contamination in soil which is not easily observed. When these 
heavy polluters move out, the soil contamination they have caused is easily ignored just 
because the contamination is underground.  
 
The factor leading to this phenomenon is the lack of environmental risk awareness. It has 
been identified in the western literature that contaminated soil and groundwater in a 
brownfield site can pose a variety of health and ecological/environmental risks, 
depending on the contaminants, pathways and receptors (Rao Kolluru, 1995; De Sousa, 
2004; Ellerbusch, 2006; MOE, 2007).The case study in Dalian reveals that neither the 




Key Finding: Because of the insufficient awareness of potential environmental risks on 
brownfields, the impetus for redevelopments in Dalian has been interpreted differently 
from Canadian cities with respect to the environmental benefits. 
 
In Kitchener and Hamilton, property values close to a brownfield site are significantly 
lower than the same properties located elsewhere. This is because the public is concerned 
about the environmental risks posed by brownfields and hesitates to live next to a 
contaminated site. However, in Dalian, the soaring housing price at the beautiful 
residential quarters which are built on former industrial sites in the central city in recent 
years shows that little attention has been paid by the public to the potential contamination 
arising from the past industrial activities on the site. Or in other words, one can say that 
the public in Dalian will seldom link former industrial sites with contamination. This can 
be seen by the daily use of brownfield words appearing in the public media and 
government documents. As a matter of fact, it was discovered in this research that even 
the term Contaminated Sites has not been widely adopted both by the municipality and 
the public, needless to say the term Brownfields. Alternatively, the planning terminology 
Old Industrial Sites and the real estate term Former Industrial Sites are more frequently 
adopted. However, it is unclear to the public and the government what they mean when 
they talk about old/former industrial sites. After all, these two terms have concealed the 
basic fact that they are more or less related to perceived or unknown contamination 
because of past industrial uses. 
 
The environmental risks associated with brownfields have not become a particular 
concern to Chinese governments. That can be seen from the release of the No.5 Decree of 
the Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C. --Disposition Rules of the Unused Land (the 
“Rules”) in April 1999. The unused land described in the Rules refers to construction land 
where  landholders have legally acquired the land use rights from the government, yet 
where the new construction has not started within the term of years specified in the 
original assignment contract of land use right. According to the Rules, the government at 
or above the county level shall, with the approval of the original approving authority, take 
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back the landholders’ right to the use of the land without compensation if the unused land 
has been vacant for two consecutive years (MLR, 1999). When the Rules is applied to a 
brownfield site, it happens that: if the developer has received the land use right of a 
former industrial site through legal bidding or auction and the developer has not begun 
the construction of proposed land use within two years, then the brownfield sites will 
become unused land and the municipality can revoke the land use right from developers. 
Shown by the Rules, it is clear that the central government has neglected the special case 
of brownfields which may pose potential environmental risks arising from their past use 
and may require uncertain years of remediation prior to the construction of proposed new 
use.  
 
To some extent, people can say that the Rules has indirectly attributed to the prompt 
redevelopment of brownfields in Dalian. Moreover, according to the case study, it was 
not until 2006 that the municipal government began to address the potential 
environmental problems in brownfield redevelopment by releasing the Decision, yet 
brownfields have been formed and redeveloped in Dalian ever since the start of industrial 
relocation in 1995. With insufficient environmental awareness, the City of Dalian has 
been relatively slow in brownfield policy-making. 
 
Recommendation:  
1. There is a need for a uniform definition and common understanding of brownfields in 
China in order to increase general awareness of environmental pollution issues between 
the public and the government. 
 
2. The central government should revise the provisions in the No.5 Decree of the 
Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C. --Disposition Rules of the Unused Land and 
address the issue of brownfields separately. 
 
Both the Chinese academic literature and government documents should make efforts in 
the recognition of brownfields and the adoption of this term. Former industrial sites 
should be regarded as brownfields which are properties, the expansion, redevelopment, or 
 155
reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of 
contamination. By doing this, the public is educated and well informed of the associated 
environmental risks. The government can better regulate and address the problems in 
brownfield redevelopment. Public health and safety can be further protected.  
 
Some scholars may doubt that the Chinese government will adopt the term brownfileds, 
because the wide recognition and adoption of this term may otherwise increase the 
sensitivity of environmental pollution issues among the population and thereby slow 
down the rapid redevelopment. However, the prior concern regarding brownfield 
redevelopment in current China is not the issue of facilitating the redevelopment but the 
issue of ensuring public safety/health during the redevelopment. The case study in Dalian 
reveals that the municipality is becoming very concerned about the environmental 
pollution contained on brownfield sites. In fact, the central government in China is 
paying more and more attention to environment remediation and prevention while 
promoting economic development ever since October 2003 when the central government 
put forward the scientific concept of development (human-oriented, overall, coordinated 
and sustainable development) as a national development principle in the Third Plenary 
Session of the 16th CPC National Congress. For example, a national project, the Survey 
on the Current Condition of National Land and the Protection & Remediation of Its 
Contamination, was conducted by the State Environmental Protection Administration of 
China and the Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C. from 2005 to 2008 in order to 
establish suitable legislation/regulations regarding the remediation and prevention of soil 
pollution. Therefore, the author considers that Chinese government will welcome and 
accept the term of brownfields, because only by doing this, the nature of the 
environmental pollution issues associated with former/old industrial sites can be kept in 
perspective and will be addressed appropriately. 
 
6.1.4 Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment 
Barriers to brownfield redevelopment in the two selected Canadian cities are quite 
different from those in Dalian. Both Kitchener and Hamilton face similar barriers which 
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have already been frequently discussed in Canadian literature (De Sousa, 2006; Abdel-
Aziz et al, 2004; NRTEE, 2003; Boles, 2003; De Sousa, 2001): the lack of upfront 
financing, concerns on liability of contamination and a complicated planning approval 
process. Particularly in Hamilton, developers also encountered the challenge of a lack of 
detailed information on brownfields in the city, including information on the existence, 
type, and extent of contamination, and the estimated cost of remediation, etc. Such 
information is generally collected through a Phase II ESA. Due to the expensive study 
cost, few property owners are willing to undertake it. 
 
In the City of Dalian, developers do not encounter the same barriers as in Canadian cities. 
A different set of challenges was discovered. The first one would be the “time bomb” 
effect of the contamination. Even though developers are required to conduct an 
Environmental Impact Assessment and clean up the site to meet standards before 
redevelopment, potential contamination may still remain and the site may not be suitable 
for the proposed use. The contamination buried underground acts like a time bomb which 
may lead to serious accidents and harm in the future. The second challenge is the lack of 
historical information of brownfields. When DEPB staff examine and approve an EIA 
report, they do not have sufficient information in hand with regard to the history of such 
site. This leads to inaccuracy in the identification of potential contamination. The third is 
to assemble multiple dispersed adjacent properties into one parcel suitable for 
redevelopment, because the City lacks community support from affected industrial firms 
and individuals who are reluctant to relocate or resettle. The ongoing Lingshui Bay Area 
Redevelopment project in Dalian was delayed mainly because of this challenge. In 
addition, the issue of laid-off employees arises from the whole process of industrial 
relocation and brownfield redevelopment. Although it is not directly associated with the 
redevelopment of brownfields, it has challenged the safety and social stability in the City 
as far as one official from Dalian Economic Committee is concerned. 
 
The challenges faced by Chinese municipalities are seldom discussed. Most of the 
Chinese academic literature has concentrated on the introduction of brownfield 
redevelopment experiences in developed countries (Fu and Jiang, 2005; Wang et al, 2006; 
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Zhang, 2004; Luo, 2002; Jiang, 2005; Zhao and Yang, 2006) and discussed the 
conversion of old industrial buildings into other uses without demolishing them from an 
urban landscape’s perspective (Zhang et al, 2003; Wang and Ren, 2003; Wang, 2004; 
Chen and Bao, 2003). The case study of Dalian filled this gap and revealed challenges in 
brownfield redevelopment for the first time. 
 
Key Finding: Brownfield developers in Dalian do not encounter the same barriers as in 
Canadian cities, which can be largely attributed to the gaps in current environmental 
legislation and regulations in China. 
 
In China, current environmental legislation and regulations related to brownfield 
redevelopment are rather scant and limited. Brownfield developers in Dalian encounter 
less stringent criteria than their counterparts in Canada. They do not have to spend a 
considerable amount of time and money in studying and remediating the site to meet 
regulated criteria appropriate for the proposed land use. There are two key gaps in current 
environmental legislation and regulations: 
 
The first gap relates to the prevention or remediation of contamination on urban land, 
particularly on former industrial sites. The four key national environmental statutes 
related to preventing/remediating soil contamination are the Environmental Protection 
Law, the Land Administration Law, Environmental Quality Standard for Soil and the 
Environmental Quality Risk Assessment Criteria for Soil at Manufacturing Facilities. In 
the provisions of the first two laws, they have synoptically put forward the idea of land 
protection, such as “prevent and remediate land contamination”; “remediate land and 
enhance the productivity of land”. However, they do not provide specific regulations in 
terms of how to guarantee the land from being contaminated and how to remediate land 
that is already contaminated. Furthermore, the standards set in the Environmental Quality 
Standard for Soil are not designed for urban land. Contaminants regulated in the law are 
limited to heavy metal elements and two organic contaminants ---hexachlorocyclohexane 
and DDT. The soil criteria regulated in the Environmental Quality Risk Assessment 
Criteria for Soil at Manufacturing Facilities are only applied to the environmental quality 
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risk assessment of soil in the initial decision-making of site selection and the stage of 
industrial operation. They are not applied to the vacant land where former industrial sites 
were located. As a result, there is no available environmental law or soil standard which 
is especially aimed to the prevention and remediation of contamination on urban land, 
particularly if it is on former industrial land. 
 
The second gap concerns the application of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
especially of impacts that may exist in soil. Even though brownfield developers are 
required to carry out an EIA on former industrial sites and get the EIA report approved by 
DEPB, information of perceived/potential contamination provided in the report often is 
incomplete and limited. The application of an EIA on brownfields appears to be relatively 
weak. Through interviews with four environmental experts and scholars in DUT and two 
officials from DEPB, the deficiency of an EIA on brownfields represents two 
perspectives. First, the environmental elements included in an EIA of a brownfield 
project usually focus on the air, water and solid wastes which can be perceived directly 
and easily. Environmental studies of soil which may be potentially contaminated by past 
industrial use are seldom carried out. An environmental expert in DUT revealed that only 
2 out of 15 brownfield projects he once participated in had performed a Soil 
Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA). Current EIA requirements mainly emphasize 
the negative impacts of external pollution sources on a brownfield and the control of new 
pollution source arising from the new construction, while neglecting the perceived or 
potential contamination caused by its past industrial activities (Environmental Scholar 
from DUT). Second, the study scope of SEIA on a brownfield site is rather limited. The 
assessment factors in a SEIA mostly concentrate on heavy metal elements in the soil 
while neglecting the organic contaminants which in fact have already become important 
soil contaminants in China (Environmental Expert from DUT). In addition, most of the 
SEIAs on brownfields have not taken into account the proposed land use; neither does the 
regulated soil standards in current related regulations. Therefore, an EIA on a brownfield 





1. In order to avoid such environmental disasters as the Love Canal happening in the 
future and ensure public health/safety, the Chinese government should expedite 
legislation and upgrade existing environmental laws regarding the prevention and 
remediation of contamination on urban land, particularly if it is former industrial land. 
 
2. The government should amend the existing People’s Republic of China Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law to incorporate environmental studies of soil on brownfield sites 
in the EIA.  
 
3. Soil criteria regulated in the current Environmental Quality Standard for Soil should be 
broadened to cover organic contaminants which are important contaminants in soil 
pollution, such as hexachlorobenzene, Pentachlorophenol, Petroleum Hydrocarbons 
(PHCs), etc.  
 
4. It is advisable for China to take into account various types of land use when the 
government starts to develop appropriate clean-up criteria for brownfields, because 
different types of proposed land use (residential, industrial, commercial, parkland, etc.) 
may require different levels of standards to be protective of all receptors. 
 
6.1.5 Planning Process of Brownfield Redevelopment 
In Ontario, a development review and planning approval process for a brownfield project 
usually integrates planning and environment requirements. All relevant planning and 
environmental legislation and regulations need to be considered, including the Planning 
Act, the Building Code Act, the Environmental Protection Act, as well as the municipal 
policies such as official plans and zoning requirements. Brownfield developers or 
property owners are usually required to carry out environmental studies, site assessments 
and then submit an acknowledged Record of Site Condition (RSC) or approved Site 
Specific Risk Assessment (SSRA) to the municipality together with a planning 
application. Figure 6.1 is an example of planning process model for contaminated 
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properties in Ontario, Canada, which showcases how municipalities in Ontario integrate 
the various land and environmental-related process components when dealing with 
brownfields (MOE, 2004).  
 
Figure 6.1: A Planning Process Model for Contaminated Properties in Ontario 
Development Approval 
Process 
Municipal Model Cleanup Process 
Municipality “flags” sites that 
are known or suspected to be 
contaminated 
Municipality “informs” 
proponent of need to follow 
Guideline and for submission 
of Record of Site Condition 
Municipality “receives” 
acknowledged Record of Site 
Condition and does not need to 
secure agreement 
Municipality “secures” 
agreement to ensure appropriate 
cleanup for proposed use and 
submission of completed 
Record of Site Condition
Municipality “receives” 























Source: Ministry of Environment (2004), p43. 
 
At first glance in the City of Dalian, a conventional planning process of brownfield 
redevelopment illustrated by Figure 5.7 may show that it has also integrated planning and 
environment requirements. Developers are required to undertake an EIA on brownfields 
and prepare an EIA report for the examination and approval by DEPB. However, there is 
a big difference between two countries. In Ontario, brownfield developers will not 
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receive planning approval from the municipality if the site has not been cleaned up to a 
protective level shown by a received RSC or approved SSRA. Developers are not 
allowed to commence the construction for new land uses. In Dalian, brownfield 
developers could usually get their planning application approved before the 
commencement of remedial work and new construction (See Figure 5.7). DEPB takes 
charge of the follow-up monitoring in order to ensure that developers have followed the 
EIA report and carried out the proposed counter-measures to remediate the site. In other 
words, the City of Dalian has not taken into account the contamination remediation in the 
planning review and approval process. 
 
Key Finding: A conventional planning review and approval process of brownfield 
redevelopment in China has not taken into account contamination remediation. 
 
Inspired by the Canadian planning approach, the author considers that introducing the 
remediation of contamination in the planning process of brownfield redevelopment in 
China is very necessary.  Chinese municipalities need to have a more effective control of 
the perceived/potential contamination left on former industrial sites rather than 
monitoring the enforcement of an EIA report after developers have received planning 
approval. The unclear responsibility in the enforcement of the EIA report and the lack of 
an adequate monitoring system tend to result in the failure of brownfield developers to 
undertake the proposed method to clean up the contamination (Environmental Expert 
from DUT). In some cases, irresponsible brownfield developers may skip the remedial 
work and start new construction directly when they have received planning approval from 
the City. As a result, known or potential contamination on a brownfield site may still 
remain, posing an environmental risk concern to the City. By incorporating 
contamination remediation in the planning process, the municipality can better control the 
remedial work on brownfields. Developers will not be allowed to commence the new 
construction unless they have carried out the initial remediation for the proposed land use 
by following the EIA report. Canadian planning process is advisable in terms of 




Chinese government should integrate the remediation of contamination into the planning 
review and approval process in order to facilitate the efficient cleanup of brownfields. 
 
6. 2 Implications of Canadian Experiences to Dalian’s Practice 
 The comparison between two countries shows that brownfields in the City of Dalian are 
being formed, purchased and redeveloped in a different way from Kitchener and 
Hamilton.  The challenges confronting the City also differ greatly from those in Canadian 
cities. But this does not mean that brownfield redevelopment in two countries have no 
intersections and that Canadian brownfield experiences have nothing to do with the 
Chinese practice. As a matter of fact, brownfield redevelopment in Canada and China do 
have something in common and Canadian successful experiences can be meaningful to 
the practice in the City of Dalian.  
 
It might be more suitable to describe brownfield redevelopment in the two countries as 
two parallel lines at present which have the same tendency or direction yet do not 
intersect. For both countries, the redevelopment of brownfields is driven under the same 
guideline of sustainability. In Kitchener and Hamilton, brownfield redevelopment is 
driven by the pursuit of sustainable development and smart growth, while in the City of 
Dalian it is guided by the scientific concept of development which focuses on human-
oriented, overall, coordinated and sustainable development. However, these two lines do 
not intersect presently because Canada has completed industrialization while China is 
still in the initial stage of industrialization. Canadian cities have taken one step ahead of 
Chinese cities over the issue of brownfield redevelopment. What is happening on 
brownfield sites in Dalian is pretty much similar to what it was in Canadian cities in the 
past when people had not been aware of the risks associated with contaminated 




Looking back to the industrial past in Canada, people can find that brownfields were also 
not a particular concern at one time. The term Brownfields was not created until the 
1990’s and the development of generic criteria for use at contaminated sites in Ontario 
essentially began in the early 1980’s (MOE, 2007) while brownfield sites had already 
existed for a long time. Therefore, learning from successful Canadian experiences has 
profound meaning to the practice of brownfield redevelopment in Dalian, which is a 
heavy industry city and aims to be an Eco-city. The following is the discussion of the 
potential application. 
 
Firstly, Dalian can learn from Kitchener and Hamilton to take up the leadership or 
establish partnership with the private sector or other levels of government to proactively 
involve in the redevelopment of brownfields owned by the State. It was discovered in the 
case study that potential environmental contamination left on the brownfield sites has 
become a prior concern for the City of Dalian. When DEPB received complaints from 
residents in a residential quarter developed on a brownfield site, the City Council began 
to pay particular attention to this issue. Government documents such as the 2006 
Decision and the 2007 Notification emphasize the necessity of an EIA on soil in the 
redevelopment of brownfields. However, because of the gaps in current environmental 
legislation and regulations in China, more proactive actions are needed in Dalian to deal 
with potential contamination. Dalian can learn from Canadian experiences to take up the 
leadership and work as a pioneer in brownfield redevelopment with a strong commitment 
to address the issue of potential contamination and to ensure public health and safety. 
Moreover, by establishing some kind of partnership (private or inter-government) in pilot 
projects, the City can work closely with developers, environmental experts and other 
related stakeholders to showcase the development of appropriate remediation criteria, the 
introduction of new scientific remediation technologies and the use of community 
consultation techniques, etc. All of these are greatly needed at present in Dalian. The 
success of the Bayfront Park in Hamilton is a very good example from which Dalian can 
learn. Bayfront Park was Hamilton’s very first major brownfield project which was 
started at a very early time when the issue of brownfields was just known to the City. The 
big picture under which the project was started and redeveloped is similar to today’s 
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Dalian. It was found that the partnerships among community stakeholders and the 
provincial government had contributed to the success of the park. 
 
Recommendation: 
1. The municipality should establish a brownfield working group for the discussion of 
brownfield problems in the city. The working group should be made up of stakeholders 
from both the private and public sector, including developers, environmental experts, 
planners, lawyers, lenders and government officials. An action plan should be made by 
the working group in order to develop a municipal brownfield strategy and overcome the 
challenges. 
 
2. The municipality should play a leader role in mitigating the potential environmental 
risks associated with former industrial sites. The City should also be responsible for the 
cleanup of contamination not only the SOEs. The land use right of brownfield sites 
should not be transacted in the market until the land has been remediated. 
 
Secondly, Dalian can learn from the marketing efforts and the brownfield coordination, 
which are proven effective in creating community trust/support on the redevelopment of 
brownfields, improving the regulatory environment, and reshaping the City’s image in 
front of the public. Although the marketing efforts in Kitchener and Hamilton are focused 
on the marketing of financial incentive programs, they can be also applied as an idea for 
Dalian aiming to the brownfield redevelopment vision for the community (Official from 
DHTIZ). According to the case study, one of the challenges confronting the City is the 
lack of community support when the municipality wants to recall multiple dispersed land 
use rights from various land users and assemble them into one parcel suitable for 
redevelopment. Various methods of marketing, such as advertisements of the brownfield 
redevelopment vision and presentations on the benefits brought by the redevelopment in 
public meetings, will all help to improve the mutual understandings between the City and 
the community. In addition, brownfield coordinators can provide useful information and 
suggestions for developers in terms of planning approvals, funding applications and even 
technological support. They could serve as a single point of contact between the City and 
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the private sector, significantly enhancing their mutual understanding and cooperation. It 
was considered that such a single point of contact in the locality to deal with development 
issues was one of the most important things that a community can do to encourage 
redevelopment of brownfields, whether privately or locally owned (Finneran, 2006).  
 
Recommendation: 
1. Dialogues regarding the industrial relocation and brownfield redevelopment between 
the municipality and local citizens should be started. They can be in the form of public 
consultation, workshops and presentations. The municipality should introduce the 
potential value in the redevelopment and clarify the future vision of the community. 
Marketing brochures and City web site should provide citizens a sense of certainty about 
the redevelopment and they should be easily accessed by the public. 
 
2. The municipality should assign a knowledgeable municipal staff in every department 
which has a stake in the brownfield redevelopment to work directly with developers 
through the approval process. A brownfield coordinator can be assigned to provide timely 
guidance and advice for developers whenever they encounter any question or difficulty 
related to municipal policies and administrative procedures. 
 
Thirdly, Dalian can learn from the Site Specific Risk Assessment (SSRA) approach to 
develop appropriate clean-up criteria for a brownfield site. In Ontario, there are two types 
of risk-based approaches in use to establish criteria for specific contaminants: the generic 
approach and the SSRA. The MOE Site Condition Standards (commonly known as 
generic standards) currently used under the Guideline for Use at Contaminated Sites in 
Ontario were derived through the generic approach (MOE, 1997). The generic approach 
is a conservative approach which takes into account all the various ways that humans, 
plants, wildlife and the natural environment can be exposed to the contamination. Generic 
standards are thus developed into broad categories based on land uses (agricultural, 
residential/park land, industrial/commercial land use), groundwater use 
(potable/nonpotable), soil texture (surface/subsurface soil) and the depth of contaminants 
(full depth and stratified). However, it may be difficult and costly to remediate a 
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brownfield site to meet the generic standards set out by the MOE. In addition, not all of 
the exposures considered in generic standards will be occur at a particular brownfield site. 
Under these circumstances, a SSRA approach may be used. It takes into account the 
information about the conditions and characteristics of a specific property (such as the 
physical characteristics and the potential use of the land) in the development of property 
specific standards. The case study of Dalian reveals that currently there are no available 
national/provincial cleanup criteria for brownfield developers to implement when they 
undertake an EIA and remediate the brownfield sites. The ongoing Lingshui Bay Area 
Redevelopment project has also faced this challenge. Under these circumstances, a SSRA 
approach might be a useful scientific technique for both the City and the developer to 
establish appropriate clean-up standards on a specific brownfield site and thus protect 
human health and the environment. 
 
Recommendation: 
Internal DEPB staff should work closely with environmental experts/scholars from DUT, 
developers and other external stakeholders to discuss the adoption of the SSRA approach 
and the development of appropriate cleanup standards. 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
The two Canadian cities, Kitchener and Hamilton have achieved encouraging success in 
redeveloping their brownfield site. Their success has an inevitable association with 
government’s persistent commitment, various financial incentives through CIP, effective 
marketing efforts, and good public-private partnerships. The researcher regards these 
issues as successful municipal experiences based on a common-sense assumption that all 
municipal programs/approaches are considered “successful” if the redevelopment occurs 
as opposed to the corresponding option of not being redeveloped at all.  
 
The case study in Dalian reveals that brownfield redevelopment in China is confronting 
many challenges from aspects of potential environmental risks, detailed historic site 
information, and community support. The ongoing example of the Lingshui Bay Area 
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Redevelopment Project further confirms such findings. Fortunately, several 
corresponding municipal policies were made from 2006 to 2007 addressing these 
challenges, and more are being discussed/enacted.   
  
In general, Canadian practices of brownfield redevelopment are different from Chinese 
practices at several points. However, in terms of the research purpose of exploring the 
potential application of brownfield redevelopment in Dalian, China, based on municipal 
experiences in Ontario, Canada, the answer would be: the successful municipal 
experiences learned from Kitchener and Hamilton are meaningful references to Dalian’s 
practice. The municipal government of Dalian can learn from Kitchener and Hamilton to 
establish partnerships with private sectors to proactively participate in the redevelopment 
of brownfields owned by the State. The City can also learn from the idea of brownfield 
redevelopment marketing and brownfield coordinator which would be helpful in creating 
community support, improving the regulatory environment, and reshaping the City’s 
public image. The SSRA approach used in Canada to develop appropriate clean-up 
criteria for a brownfield site may be a useful scientific technique for Dalian. Nevertheless, 
upper levels of Chinese government must take hard efforts of rule-making, regulating and 
planning, in order to ultimately disable the time bombs of brownfields’ contamination at 
the local level. 
 
6.4 Academic Contribution and Future Research Direction 
This research has presented an overview of Canadian experiences of brownfield 
redevelopment and the potential of applying Canadian experiences to Chinese practice. 
The researcher has made the following academic contributions. First, the researcher built 
up case studies in two Canadian cities which are known to be the brownfield 
redevelopment leaders in Ontario. Case studies allow the researcher to comprehensively 
summarize the experiences of redeveloping Canadian brownfields at a city level which 
are relatively limited in current academic literature. Second, the researcher investigated 
the situation and challenges of redeveloping brownfields in China, a leading developing 
country. This thesis has contributed to literature as one of the earliest case studies on 
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brownfield redevelopment in developing countries. Third, this research bridges the 
experiences of developed countries to practices of developing countries. By exploring the 
potential of redeveloping brownfields in China based on Canadian experiences, the 
research has set up a model for future research in international development.    
 
Subsequent research should be carried out in terms of developing a systematic indicator 
framework to monitor and evaluate the performance of municipal brownfield policies, 
with emphasis on all the three aspects of concerns (environmental, social and economic). 
Successful municipal experiences of brownfiled redevelopment should be measured and 
summarized in a standardized way which creates more certainty and clarity. 
 
In addition, due to time and funding limitations, this research only examined two 
Canadian cities and one Chinese city. More case studies are needed in order to examine 
the stakeholders’ perceptions and the potential of applying Canadian experiences to 
Chinese practice. China is still at the beginning stage of brownfield development. 
Government, enterprises and citizens have just begun to realize the environmental risks 
of contaminated land. Different regulations in this field are expected to emerge in the 
near future, which would significantly impact the thinking and behaviours of various 
stakeholders in China’s brownfield redevelopment. The ongoing changes in China make 
it necessary to further investigate brownfield practices in China so as to further 
recommend policies and strategies. It should be noted that future research might still face 
the challenge in the short run with regard to the data collection of environmental 
contamination/remediation on brownfields from Chinese governments, mainly due to the 
government’s lack of transparency. However, in the long run, as the democratic reform 
progresses in China, this situation will be improved and more transparency will be 









Appendix I: Interview Questions for Local Government 
Officials/Planners in Canada 
 
Background Information about Brownfield Redevelopment 
1) Based on your work experience, how do you understand the concept of brownfield 
sites? 
2) How many brownfield sites are there in your city? How much area do the 
brownfields cover? What are the locations of the brownfield sites in your city? Does 
the city have a formal brownfield inventory? 
3) In terms of the formation/history of brownfields, what are the main characteristics of 
brownfields in your city? 
4) Is brownfield redevelopment considered as a policy priority in your city? If so, why 
does the municipality want to encourage brownfield redevelopment? What are the 
guiding principles? 
 
Impediments to Brownfield Redevelopment and Policy Tools for Overcoming 
Impediments 
5) Does the municipality encounter any impediment in redeveloping brownfields? 
According to the previous research on brownfield redevelopment, the following are 
the most common impediments cities may confront in brownfield redevelopment. 
Please choose the impediments applicable to your city and rank them by significance. 
-Liability of contamination 
-Lack of financing 
-Marketability of brownfield projects 
-Clean-up criteria 
-Administrative burden and complexity 
-Lack of information on brownfields (location, history, remediation or disposal options, 
etc.) 
-Market conditions (including site location, site size and configuration, building 
characteristics, construction cost, and access to a skilled labor force) 
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-Awareness and communication 
-Land fragmentation and ownership issues 
6) Other than the above impediments, are there any impediments to your city? If yes, 
please specify. 
7) How does your city overcome the impediments? Has your city developed any policy 
tools listed as follows? Or any other policy tools? 
-Liability protection 
-Financial incentives 
-Streamlined regulatory process 
-Standardized clean-up criteria 
-Build public/private partnerships 
-Public education 
8) Has the city launched any municipal programs to implement the aforementioned 
policy tools? If any, please briefly introduce them. What are the results of these 
policies? 
9) Has the municipality made any indicators to evaluate the brownfield performance? 
 
Comments 
10) Do you think the brownfield redevelopment policies and initiatives are effective? 
Why? 
11) In your opinion, what are the most successful experiences in terms of policy tools in 
brownfield redevelopment in your city? Please illustrate them with some successful 
brownfield redevelopment projects in the city. 
12) Do you have any expectations or recommendations for the future brownfield 








Appendix Π: Interview Questions for Consultants in Canada 
 
1) Have you ever participated in any brownfield project? What is your role in these 
brownfield projects? 
 
2) In your opinion, why does the municipal government should encourage brownfield 
redevelopment?  
 
3) Based on your working experience, what do you think are the main impediments to a 
brownfield project? What is the most difficult part of your work? 
 
4) How did you work cooperatively with developers, government officials, bankers and 
other participants to successfully overcome the impediments? Could you please 
introduce it with one successful brownfield project? 
 
5) Do you think the brownfield redevelopment policies and initiatives in the City are 
effective? Why? 
 
6) In your opinion, what are the most successful experiences in brownfield 
redevelopment in the City? What are the keys leading to the success? 
 
7) Do you have any expectations or recommendations for the future brownfield 
redevelopment in the City? Have you heard about any comments/suggestions from 







Appendix III: Interview Questions for Developer in the 
Kaufman Lofts Project, City of Kitchener, Canada 
 
1) Is this your first time redevelop a brownfield site? How many brownfield sites have 
you ever redeveloped or participated in the redevelopment? Does the Kaufman Lofts 
differ from the other brownfield project you have ever involved? What are the 
differences? 
 
2) What is the history of the Kaufman Lofts? What are the factors driving you to 
redevelop the site? When did the redevelopment begin? What is the development plan 
of this project? At present, in what stage is the project progressing? Are you satisfied 
with the progress?  
 
3) Have you encountered any barrier in redeveloping the site (such as remediation, 
financing and planning approvals, etc)? What are they? Have they been addressed or 
already overcome? How did you overcome them? 
 
4) Do you know the municipal incentives and/or brownfield programs available to your 
brownfield project? Has your brownfield project got assistance from those municipal 
brownifeld programs? If yes, please specify them. 
 
5) How does the market respond to the project? In your opinion, do you consider the 
Kaufman Lofts is successful? If yes, what are the keys leading to the success? If no, 
what are the lessons we can learn from it? 
 
6) Do you have any expectations or recommendations for the future brownfield 





 Appendix IV: Interview Questions for Planner Involved in the 
Bayfront Park Project, City of Hamilton, Canada 
 
1) Is this your first time participating in a brownfield project? What is your role in the 
project? 
 
2) What is the history of the Bayfront Park? What are the factors driving the City to 
redevelop the site? When did the redevelopment begin? What is the development plan 
of this project?  
 
3) Did the City encounter any barrier in redeveloping the site (such as contamination 
remediation, financing and community support)? What are they? How did the City 
overcome them? 
 
4) When was the project completed? How does the community respond to the project? 
In your opinion, do you consider the Bayfront Park is successful? If yes, what are the 
keys leading to the success? If no, what are the lessons we can learn from it? 
 
5) Does the City have any plan to monitor and improve the Park after the project is 
completed? Do you have any expectations or recommendations for the future 











Appendix V: Interview Questions for Local Government 
Officials/Planners in Dalian, China 
 
1) What is your understanding of “brownfields”? Have you heard about this concept? 
Has the term been recognized and adopted in the municipality? If not, how does the 
City define sites that have been previously used and suspected of being contaminated? 
Are the terms old industrial sites and contaminated sites more frequently used in 
government documents? 
 
2) How many brownfield sites are there in the city? Where are they located and 
distributed? How did they become vacant? Why did the municipality want to relocate 
the old industrial sites? When did that begin? Is the redevelopment of brownfields 
considered as a policy priority in the city? If so, why does the municipality want to 
encourage the redevelopment? What are the guiding principles? 
 
3) What is the current situation of brownfields in Dalian? Are they being abandoned or 
being rapidly redeveloped? What are the brownfield sites usually redeveloped into? 
What are the main characteristics of brownfield redevelopment in Dalian? 
 
4)  How are brownfields being purchased, sold and redeveloped in the city? What is the 
conventional planning process? How many public/private sectors are involved in the 
process? What are they? What is the major responsibility of your department in terms 
of brownfield redevelopment and what is your role? 
 
5) Has the potential environmental pollution left on former industrial sites been 
considered by the municipality in the redevelopment of brownfields? Is there a 
pollution incidence happening on a brownfield site? If so, how did the City manage it? 
What is the major impact of this incidence?  
 
6) Are there any specific government policies with regard to the remediation of 
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pollutions (such as regulations related to the environmental impact assessment on a 
brownfield site)? Is there any related environmental legislation regarding the 
prevention and remediation of contamination on urban land, particularly if it is 
former industrial land? If so, what are they? What are the cleanup criteria? How does 
the municipality monitor and regulate the remedial work? How is the liability of 
contamination allocated among the stakeholders? What are the guiding principles in 
the allocation? 
 
7) Does the municipality encounter any barrier/challenge in redeveloping brownfields? 
What are the major factors resulting in those barriers? How does the City overcome 
the barriers? Has the City developed any policy tool to particularly address the 
brownfield challenges?  
 
8) Do you think the Canadian brownfield redevelopment approaches (such as a 
municipality’s persistent commitment, various financial incentives through CIP, 
municipal leadership & partnership, marketing of the incentive programs and 
brownfield coordinator) can be potentially applied to the City of Dalian? Do they 
make sense in your opinion? Either yes or no, please explain it. 
 
9) What do you think the municipality should do to maintain economic growth while at 
the same time ensuring public safety/health in brownfield redevelopment? Do you 
have any expectations or recommendations for the future brownfield redevelopment 










Appendix VI: Interview Questions for Chinese 
Scholars/Environmental Experts 
 
1) What is your understanding of “brownfields”? Have you heard about this concept? 
Has the term been recognized and adopted in Chinese academic literature? If not, how 
do the Chinese scholars define sites that have been previously used and suspected of 
being contaminated? Are the terms old industrial sites and contaminated sites more 
frequently used in academic literature? 
 
2) Have you ever participated in any brownfield project? What is your role in these 
brownfield projects?  
 
3) If you have ever participated in the environmental impact assessment of a brownfield 
project, could you please provide some details regarding how the environmental 
assessment was conducted on brownfields? What are the related regulations in current 
People’s Republic of China Environmental Impact Assessment Law? 
 
4) Is there any related environmental legislation in current China regarding the 
prevention and remediation of contamination on urban land, particularly if it is former 
industrial land? If so, what are they? What are the cleanup criteria? How does the 
municipality monitor and regulate the remedial work? How is the liability of 
contamination allocated among the stakeholders? What are the guiding principles in 
the allocation?  
 
5) Based on your professional experiences, what do you think are the main challenges to 
a brownfield project in Dalian? What are the major factors resulting in those 
challenges? What do you think is the most concerned environmental 
protection/remediation issue? 
 
6)  Do you think the Canadian brownfield redevelopment approaches (such as a 
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municipality’s persistent commitment, various financial incentives through CIP, 
municipal leadership & partnership, marketing of the incentive programs and 
brownfield coordinator) can be potentially applied to the City of Dalian? Do they 
make sense in your opinion? Either yes or no, please explain it. 
 
7) As a scholar/environmental expert, what would you suggest to overcome those 
challenges and maintain economic growth while at the same time ensuring public 
safety/health in brownfield redevelopment? Do you have any expectations or 
























Appendix VII: Interview Questions for Officials Involved in 
the Lingshui Bay Area Redevelopment Project, Dalian 
 
1) Is this your first time participating in a brownfield project? What is the major 
responsibility of your department and what is your role? 
 
2) What is the current situation in the Lingshui Bay area? What are the factors driving 
the City to redevelop the area?  
 
3) When did the redevelopment begin? What is the development plan of this project? At 
present, in what stage is the project progressing? Are you satisfied with the progress?  
 
4) What does the municipality plan to do in dealing with the existing and potential 
contamination in the bay area? How will the contamination be remediated? 
 
5) Did the City encounter any barrier in redeveloping the site (such as contamination 
remediation, financing and community support)? What are they? Have they been 
addressed or already overcome? How did the City overcome them? 
 
6) When will the project be completed? How does the community respond to the project?  
 
7) Based on your current experiences in this project, do you have any expectations or 











Appendix VIII: Types of Urban Land Use in China 
 
Type Definition 
(R) Residential Land All kinds of land occupancies for residential purposes.  
(R1) Type I 
Residential Land 
Low-rise residences with high quality municipal facilities, 
complete overall arrangement, and excellent neighborhood 
environment.   
(R2) Type II 
Residential Land 
Medium or high rise residences with good quality municipal 
facilities, good overall arrangement, and good neighborhood 
environment.  
(R3) Type III 
Residential Land 
Residences with somewhat good quality municipal facilities, 
poor overall arrangement, and poor neighborhood environment; 
or land intersecting with industrial land. 
(R4) Type IV 
Residential Land Simple and deteriorating residences 




Land used by municipal administrative organizations as offices 
(C2) Commercial 
and financial 
business land  
Land used by commercial industry, financial industry, service 
industry, hotels, and marketplaces  
(C3) Recreational 
and artistic land  
Land used by press, artistic organizations, broadcasting, 
exhibition, and recreational parks 
(C4) Athletic land  Land used for sport stadium, athletic training, excluding school playgrounds. 
(C5) Health and 
hospitals land  
Land used for medical treatment, health care, sanitation, 
epidemic prevention, clinics, and emergency.  
(C6) Research and 
education land 
Higher education, technical school, research and development 
(excluding primary, secondary schools and childcare, which 
should be classified as residential land)  
(C7)Heritage relics 
land 
Ancient relics, tombs, buildings, etc. Excluding those which 
have been used for other purposes other than culture.  
(C8) Public facility 
land  
Other land of public facilities, such as religious activity ground, 
social welfare centers, etc. 
(M) Industrial Land Land for factory production workshops and attachments, excluding surface mining.  
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(M1) Type Ι 
Industrial Land 
Land for industries which basically do not interrupt and pollute 
the environment (such as residence and public facilities), 
including electronic industry, sewing industry, arts and crafts 
industry, etc.   
(M2) Type II 
Industrial Land 
Land for industries which disturb/pollute the environment (such 
as residence and public facilities) to a certain extent, including 
food processing factories, pharmaceutical and medication 
manufacturing, textile mills, etc.  
(M3) Type III 
Industrial Land 
Land for industries which disturb/pollute the environment (such 
as residence and public facilities) seriously, including excavation 
industry, metallurgical plants, mechanical manufacturing 
industry, paper manufacturing, leather manufacturing, etc. 
(W) Warehouse Land Land for depots, stacking ground, packaging workshops and attachments. 
(T) Transportation Land Land for Railways, roads, highways, pipelines, ports, airports and attachments 
(S) Street and square 
Land Streets, squares, and parking lots. 
(U) Municipal public 
service Land 
Land for performing public service, including buildings, structures, and 
maintenance facilities.  
(G) Public Green Space Public green land, and protective green land, excluding gardens and forests.  
(D) Special purpose 
Land 
Land used for special purposes, including military grounds, consulates, 
etc. 
(E) Water body and 
other land All other types of land, including rivers, lakes, ocean, reservoirs, etc.  
 













Appendix IX: Abbreviations 
 
CIP Community Improvement Plan 
DEC Dalian Economic Committee 
DEPB Dalian Environmental Protection Bureau 
DHTIZ Dalian High-Tech Industrial Zone 
DLRTC Dalian Land Reserve and Transaction Center 
DPS Development Permit System 
DUPDI Dalian Urban Planning & Design Institute 
DUPB Dalian Urban Planning Bureau 
DUT Dalian University of Technology 
EDGE Encouraging and Directing Growth for Efficiency 
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment 
EPA Environmental Protection Act 
ERASE Environmental Remediation and Site Enhancement 
ESA Environmental Site Assessment 
HSW Hazardous Solid Waste 
MMAH Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
MOE Ministry of Environment 
NRTEE National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy 
RSC Record of Site Condition 
SEPAC State Environmental Protection Administration of China 
SOE State-Owned Enterprise 
SSRA Site-Specific Risk Assessment 
TIF Tax Incremental Financing 
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